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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Bernie R. Burrus*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF LIMITATION

A. The Historical Setting
The government of the United States, as well as those of its
constituent subdivisions, is predicated upon the principle of limitation.1 Neither birth nor divine right, neither deified economic
law nor revolutionary usurpation, serves to legitimate the status
and authority of our governing mechanism. Such is derived, rather, from a document of concession-the Federal Constitution. 2
Therein, the people, as the source of sovereignty, created their
government as an instrument or agent to do, as Abraham Lincoln
phrased it, "what they could not do so well for themselves." 3

*Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown University; formerly Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan,
1960-62. LL.B., N.Y.U., 1960; M.P.A., Woodrow Wilson School of
Public & International Affairs, Princeton University, 1957; B.S., University of Houston, 1955.
1. The limitation is both of philosophical orientation, i.e., of an overriding "higher law" or natural law background [ see generally Corwin,
"The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," 42
Harv. L. Rev. 149-85, 365-409 (1928-29)], and a reflection of the
positive law as devised. The clear language of the Constitution concerning, for example, "enumerated powers" and "reserved rights"
seems support enough on the latter point, although reference may be
made to The Federalist Nos. XLIV - LI (Dawson ed. 1863). See also
Pound, "Law and Federal Government," in Federalism as a Democratic Process 27 (1942).
2. Such would appear manifest from the very Preamble to our Federal
Constitution: 11 We the people of the United States . . .establish this
Constitution . . . ." See also the language of Mccullogh v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816); and Chisholm, Ex'r. v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793).
3. 2 Lincoln, Complete Works of Lincoln 183 (Nicholay & Hay ed. 1905).
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The scope of the agency, however, was to be rigidly confined. The forefathers had witnessed the excesses of absolutism,
both of the privileged few4 and of the deprived many,5 and sought
to preclude the eventuality in the new nation of Acton's dictum
that "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 6
Thus, power was trifurcated in accord with the ancient Aristotelian "functions of government. " 7 In separating legislative, executive, and judicial functions by means of a tripartite governing
body, each insulated against encroachment by any other, yet each
possessing certain checks in regard to one another, the framers
sought to effect a balanced government, devoid of absolutism
either of the executive or of the parliamentary type.8 Further,
the powers of each branch were specifically enumerated, and all
4. See generally Hicks & Mowry, A Short History of American Democracy 3-87 (2d ed. 1956). Such considerations impinged frequently
upon the framers' discussions. See, in this regard, the remarks of
Hamilton, e.g., "If government in the hands of the few, they will tyrranize over the many," in 1 Farrand, The Record oithe Federal
Convention 308-10 (rev. ed. 1937).
5. See letter of General Knox to Washington, printed in Hofstadter, The
American Political Tradition 3-4 (rev. ed. 1955). Hamilton commented on the locus of governmental power: "If ( in] the hands of
the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the
hands of both; and they should be separated." 1 Farrand, supra note
4, at 308. The fear of the excesses of popular democracy, i.e., the
"tyranny of the majority," was, as is well known, a motivating enigma
of the framers in constructing the new government. E.g., The Federalist No. LVII, supra note 1. This theme runs throughout DeTocqueville, Democracy in America (Bowen ed. 1956).
6. Acton, Letter to Mandell Creighton, April 5, 1887 (Letter now at
Cambridge University).
7. Politics, Book IV, ch. 14 (Jowett trans. 1888). For a discussion, including citations, of the debate over Aristotle's parentage of this
doctrine, see Winters, State Constitutional Limitations on Solutions
of Metropolitan Area Problems 110-12 (1961). It was, of course,
Montesquieu who forged the analytic functionalism of Aristotle into a
viable, comprehensive theory of political philosophy, ingeniously combining both sound government and individual freedom. See Vol. I of
his Spirit of Laws Bk. XI, ch. VI, 151-61 (Nugent trans. 1873). The
framers were explicit in acknowledging their debt. See The Federalist No. XLVII, supra note 1. See generally Spurlin, Montesquieu in
America, 1760-1801 (1940).
8. See particularly The Federalist No. XLVI, supra note 1. See also
Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 139-40 (1922); and
Sharp, "The Classical American Doctrine of 'The Separation of Powers,'" 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935). As Jefferson wrote in his
autobiography: "It is not by the consolidation, or concentration of
powers, but by their distribution that good government is effected."
Quoted in Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 29.
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powers not so designated were "reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."9 Finally, so as to leave no doubt as to the
limited nature of the agency prescribed, the Bill of Rights was
designed as a necessary complement to popular sovereignty, or
majority rule.IO By this means, the framers sought to guarantee
against certain types of governmental activity, or at the least to
provide a certain set of procedures required of government in
effectuating its decisions of policy.
This concept of limitation, the skeleton upon which the flesh
of our body politic was erected, proved quite compatible with the
actualities of the early days of our federal republic. Two great
oceans insulated the infant nation against the contingency of foreign attack and precluded the necessity of a central government
of a strength sufficient to sustain a more-or-less permanent mobilization for its national defense.11 The great frontier provided
a safety-valve for urban discontent, affording opportunity to escape the stratification of the older societies of the Eastern Seaboard.12 No need was thus evinced for supplicating government
to assuage the hunger pains and apotheosize the aspirations of
the "have-nots." Indeed, our very national image, the frontiersman-proud and self-reliant, militated against the demand that
government become a provider of social services.13
But times change, and with them the conditions out of which
are derived the political and social theories designed for their
rationalization and service. Such theories, however, institutionalized over time, assume an existence independent of the now-disappeared conditions upon which they were structured. Exhibiting
a tenacity to life as formidable as any attributed by the psychologists to man himself, the old bottles of institutionalized theory
9. U.S. Const. amend X. See The Federalist Nos. XLIV, XLV, supra
note 1. See generally Briggs, "States Rights," 10 Iowa L. Bull. 297

(1925).
10. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government
3-4 (1955). See generally Commager, Majority Rule and Minority
Rights (1943).
11. In fact, the provision of "standing armies" was specifically disclaimed by the framers as being within the power of the Federal
Government. See The Federalist No. XXIV, supra note 1. Cf.
Mcilwain, "The Historical Background of Federal Government," in
Federalism as a Democratic Process, supra note 1, at 37-39.
12. See generally Turner, The Frontier in American History (1921); and
Hicks & Mowry, supra note 4, at 534-37.
13. In addition to the Turner book cited supra note 12, see his Rise of
the New West, 1819-29 (1906), and The United States, 1830-50 (1935).
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endeavor desperately to contain the new wine of new social conditions.14
Toynbee's allegory is indeed apropos of the importunate
juncture confronting this nation today. In this age of thermo-nuclear capability, the prophylactic significance of the great oceans
has receded in military consequence to that of a dry stream.1 5
No longer may we heed the parting admonition of President Washington to "avoid entangling alliances. 1116 No longer may we extol
the wisdom of President Jefferson, who saw in our very association with the European powers and in emulation of their urban
mode of life the seeds of the revolutions and wars which had
plagued that continent.I 7 Indeed, the minuteman who forged his
plowshare into a musket for employment at Lexington and Concord has given way to a new Minuteman, reminiscent of its earlier counterpart in name only. This missile, product of the complex planning and fantastic budgets requisite to national defense
in this century, symbolizes our accelerating pace towards a Garrison state.
The great frontier has long since vanished.18 Where buffalo
once roamed and the good black dirt craved by hardy souls once
14. Cf. Nichols, "Federalism versus Democracy," in Federalism as a
Democratic Process, supra note 1, at 50-51.
15. Snyder & Furniss, American Foreign Policy 54-59 (1955). See generally Lippmann, Isolation and Alliance (1952).
16. See his Farewell Address, reprinted in 13 Writings of George Washington 277 (Ford ed. 1889).
17. See Jefferson's letter to President Monroe, October'24, 1823, in The
Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 708-10 (Koch &
Peden ed. 1944). Illustrative of the frequent aspersions which Jefferson cast upon city-life is the following: "I think our governments
will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they remain
chiefly agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant
lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another
in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe." Quoted in Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 27 n.3.
18. In addition to the well-known "Turner Thesis" [ see sources cited in
notes 12 & 13 supra) respecting the significance of the decline of the
frontier in American history, reference should be made to Presidentelect Roosevelt's famous Commonwealth speech in San Francisco in
1932. He said, inter alia: " [ E] quality of opportunity as we have
known it no longer exists. Our industrial plant is built; the problem
just now is whether under existing conditions it is not overbuilt. Our
last frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically
no more free land. More than half of our people do not live on the
farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by cultivating their own
property. There is no safety valve in the form of a Western prairie
to which those thrown out of work by the Eastern economic machines
can go for a new start. . . . We are now providing a drab living for
our . • . people." Quoted in Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 329-30.
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abounded, there now sprawl vast urban-industrial complexes.
Man's self-reliance, buttressed by vast expanses of unclaimed
land and his own strong back, has given way to reliance upon
impersonal forces over which he has no control.19 The inevitable
frustrations ensuing from compelled and accelerating propinquity
with his fellow man has entailed increasing demands upon government to right the wrongs, to mitigate the inequities, imagined or
real, which he formerly resolved by merely moving on. The augmentation of governmental activity thus occasioned, symptomizes
our current plunge towards a Service State.
The new wine swells in its fermentation, threatening to
burst the bottles which contain it. This, indeed, is a critical
question of our times. Can our time-honored precepts of a free
people and limited government persist in the path of the twin assault of international involvement and mass demands precipitated
by the new conditions of this century?
B. In Local Perspective

The magnitude of the question posed may very well obscure,
by sheer weight of its national dimensions, cognate developments

at the local level. Yet as a forest fire necessarily destroys individual trees as well as the woodlands which they compose, so
do the new conditions, though national in scope, entail consequences to communities of less than national breadth. Thus, the
current applicability of the theoretical grease serving to lubricate and render operative the various vehicles of local government is, in this regard, as deserving of serious inquiry and appraisal as is its more customary consideration at the national
level.
In this connection, an additional facet of the concept of limitation as employed by the framers should be noted-i.e., the federal structure, itself. By the nation-state-city division, governmental power was trisected vertically as well as horizontally and
an additional bulwark erected in the effort to protect against the
eventuality of absolutism.2° Currently, however, and incidental to
19. See generally Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-1898 (1933).
20. See generally Pound, supra note 1. It is significant that although the
supremacy of the states under the Articles of Confederation gave way to
the supremacy of federal law under article VI, paragraph 2 of the new
Constitution, the states were far from being eviscerated under the new
system. See The Federalist Nos. XLIV-XLV, supra note 1, The extent
of their reserved power was made explicit by the ninth, tenth, and
eleventh amendments to the Constitution. See Douglas, A Living Bill
of Rights 17-18 (1961); and Reed, "Introduction to Symposium on
Federal-State Relations," 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 991-93 (1959), for a
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the prevailing trends in the direction of the so-called Gari'ison
and Service State, we hear plaints of encroachment by the federal
government upon the states' traditional spheres of authority,21
The augmentation of national power and the atrophy of states
rights, which is said to be a natural consequence thereof, has
occasioned a still additional slogan of opprobrium. Thus, the opponents of the alleged vertical realignment of powers lament that
our government is rapidly becoming a Centralized State.
It does not follow, however, from the increased activity of
government at the national level that the respective spheres of
authority and activity by the lesser governing units are thereby
contracted. The point is, and this is overlooked by many, authority itself has greatly expanded. Hence, from the proposition that
the federal government's slice is much larger now in absolute
terms, it does not follow that the state and local governments'
relative shares are that much less. In fact, in absolute terms,
they, just as much as the federal government, have assumed functions and prerogatives in proportions inconceivable to our forefathers.22
The reasons for the augmentation of local governmental activity, as well as that of the states, resemble those at the national level. Self-defense, effected nationally in the form of military
capability and the various other contrivances addressed to the
protection of our borders against external aggression, operates
locally through the police power and is directed to the protection
of health, welfare, and morals internal to the community
Footnote pontinued
statement of the necessity and value of state verility and activity in
these crucial times. On the present day responsibilities of the states
to our governmental structure, see McNamera, "The Challenge of a
Federal-State Partnership," Crihfield & Smothers, "The States in
the Federal System," and Dwinell, "State Responsibility in a Federal
System," appearing respectively at 996-1010, 1018-36, and 1037-44 of
34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. (1959).
21. The animadversions in this regard are legion. E.g., the congressional debate on unemployment compensation, appearing in 105 Cong. Rec.
4644-72 (1959). See also remarks of ex-President Eisenhower before
the Michigan Constitutional Convention, reported in N .Y. Times, Dec.
14, 1961, p. C33, col. 3. Contra, Anderson, The Nation and the States,
Rivals or Partners (1955).
22. Rottschaefer, The Constitution and Socio-Economic Change 96-144
(1948); Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in the United
States 44 (1946); "The States and the American Federal System," 31
State Govt. 67 (1958); and Dwinell, supra note 20, at 1039-40.
0
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served.23 The provision. of services, illustrated at the national
level by. Social Security, has, of course, numerous local counterparts. Illustrative are the provision of schools, hospitals, and
sewage disposal.
The point is that many of the same conditions occasioning
demands upon the federal government are operative locally as
well, in some cases more so. The swelling metropolitan areascharacteristic of our contemporary urban mode of life2 4 -with
their consequent crowds and cramped living quarters, spawn conflicts and problems on a scale unimaginable in the nineteenth
century. Disease was not much of a problem to farm families
isolated by many miles from an afflicted neighbor, but what if
infectious calamity strikes a multi-unit apartment house in modern day New York City? The aged constituted little problem in
the early days of our republic. Assuming Grandfather was able
to survive the high mortality rates of those times, there was always room on the farm for him to live and always chores for
him to do to make him feel useful. But what happens to this
serene picture with the protraction of life expectancy, the specter
of compulsory retirement, and his children crammed into two or
three room flats ?25
The result is that threats to internal peace and well-being
as well as local needs and social requirements have generated
demands upon local governments just as the threat of external
aggression and mass unemployment have occasioned similar solicitousness nationally. Indeed, local governments have become
miniature monoliths of authority and activity in their own rights.26
23. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 26 S.Ct. 341 (1906);
City of Albany v. Anthony, 262 App. Div. 401, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 963
(1941).
24. See generally The Exploding Metropolis (1958), published l:)y the editors of Fortune. See also Adrian, Governing Urban America 1-29
(1955); and The States and the Metropolitan Problem 3-22 (1956),
published by the Council of State Governments.
25. And, of course, this group is, in the main, financially unable properly to care for itself, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare estimating that "three-fifths of all persons aged 65 and over
had less than $1,000 in money income in 1958." Social Security Bulletin, June 1959, p. 8.
26. See Report of the Committee on State-Local Relations, published by
the Council of State Governments 1-8 (1946). For a discussion of
the plethora of services currently afforded and restrictions currently
imposed, see MacCorkle, American Municipal Government and Administration 466-573 (1948). But see Hearings on Federal-StateLocal Relations, Federal Grants-in-Aid, H.R. No. 2533, Committee
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Transferring attention now from the realm of needs and
demands to that of theory, it is significant that our political
models at the national level have been fashioned to the service
of our state and local governments as well. At least is this true
theoretically, as is revealed by even cursory perusal of state
constitutions and legislation, in addition to city charters and ordinances and especially the court decisions endeavoring to construe
them. Such sources are replete with references to popular sovereignty ,27 enumerated powers,28 the separation of powers,29
checks and balances,30 and of certain prohibitions or actions
government is constrained to undertake or can do so only in the
framework of specified procedural safeguards guaranteed to the
populace31-in a word, the very epitome of the concept of limited
government.
Footnote continued

27.
28.

29.

30.
31.

on Government Operations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 47 (1958), for a
statement of the increasing inability of local governments adequately
to cope with such local problems. See Connery & Leach, The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas (1960); and Hutchison, Metropolitan Area Problems: The Role of the Federal Government
(1961), for a discussion of the efforts of the Federal Government to
mitigate the consequences of state-local impotency in this regard.
Cf. the language of the court in City of Covington v. Reagan, 284
S.W. 2d 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
E.g., Jayhawk Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Topeka, 176 Kan. 517,
271 P .2d 769 (1954), which held the city of Topeka to be without statutory authority to obligate itself to extend water mains into a subdivision until certain statutory requirements had been met.
The Federal Constitution does not require the several states to observe in their internal organization the limitations imposed by the
separation of powers doctrine. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 28 S. Ct. 178 (1908). Most states however, contrary to the federal government, explicitly provide in their constitutions for such separation. E.g., Tex. Const. art. II, § 1: "The powers of the government of the State of Texas shall be divided into
three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those who are Legislative to one;
those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial
to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of
these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to
either of the others . . . .11
Anderson & Weidner, State and Local Government 306-07 (1951).
E.g., Wis. Stats. ch. 227, § 227.09 (1951), which requires, in regard
to contested administrative proceedings, a 11 full, fair, public hearing
after reasonable notice." And, of course, the state constitutions are
uniform in containing a Bill of Rights, generally in the very first
article, reserving, thereby, to the people of an area of activity which
the state might not transgress. E.g., N.Y. Const. art. I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF LIMITATION

9

Tangentially, it should be noted that in our political order
we emphasize grassroots democracy .32 Popular government is
incapable of survival in the absence of an enlightened, responsible populace. And the latter is, of course, germinated and nurtured at the local level, where everyday wants and needs are
most acute, where demands for political activity or inactivity are
most direct and their effects are most felt. If the system miscarries here, may we really expect it to achieve viability and
vitality in the more remote national context ?33
Hence, if the problem of a dichotomy between political theory and new conditions persists in the proportions suggested, it
would seem particularly appropriate of study at the local level, at
the grassroots. Before, however, foraging with some considerable effort among the grassroots of our government, consideration
should be given to the concept of limitation at the national level.
C. An Insight into Current Meaning
1. Preventing Absolutism
The needs and demands of modern society inexorably impel
big government; and, as suggested above, this is as true at the
local and state levels as at the national. The question is whether
the continued growth of governmental activity necessarily means
the abandonment of the concept of limitation. Phrased in this
manner, the answer would seem to depend upon what limited government actually means. If the meaning be that "that government
governs best which governs least, "34 then expanded activity would,
of course, require elimination of the limitation concept. If, however, the meaning be procedural, limiting the method rather than
the quantity of governmental activity, then expansion of the government's role in society should not read limitation out of our
governmental framework.
The answer as to which meaning should prevail, I would
submit, is to be gleaned from that root idea of the progenitors
of our government, the prevention of absolutism either of the few
32. For a discussion of the various theories of local self-government
that have held currency in this country, see Adrian, supra note 24,
at 48-66.
33, MacCorkle, supra note 26, at 19.
34. This view is, of course, not without devotees today. E.g., Goldwater,
The Conscience of a Conservative (1960).
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or of the many.35 Indeed, the framers were well aware of the
tyranny of both types of absolutism, as the excesses of the pre1789 French aristocracy as well as of the unbridled democracy
of the revolutionary period were close at hand. And, of course,
on the philosophical plane, the prevention of absolutism was the
only means of accomplishing the desideratum of maximum selfassertion and freedom of the individual.36
2. The Mission of Administrative Law
As theoretically traumatic as it may seem to some, it is
nevertheless true that government may need to be active to prevent absolutism. How else, to give just two examples, was the
aristocracy of wealth-the unscrupulous robber bal'onry37 of the
turn of the century-to be dealth with; and, how else was the
mob-rule of depression panic38 to be resolved absent outright political anarchy and social anomie? On the other side of the same
coin, increased governmental activity appears requisite to secure
the very maximum self-assertion and freedom of the individual
35. See generally Hofstadter, supra note 5, at 3-17. Primary source
material is available in the first volume of John Adams' Defence of
the Constitutions of the Government of the United States of America,
appearing in Volume IV of his Works (Adams ed. 1851). Therein,
Adams averred that aristocracy and democracy should be made to
neutralize each other. To that end, each element was to be given
its own house of the legislature, and over both houses should reign
a strong chief executive armed with the veto power. The split assembly would thus contain within itself an organic check and would,
under the governance of the executive and the influence of an independent judiciary, be capable of self-control. The inevitable tendency
of the few and the many-the rich and the poor-to plunder each other
would thus, in Adams' thesis, be kept in hand. This, of course, was
the design of our Constitution. See generally Beard, An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913).
36. Douglas, supra note 20, at 17.
37. The term is taken from Josephson, The Robber Barons (1934). The
antitrust laws and securities regulation represent but two of the numerous areas in which government currently operates to check the
"economic royalists" or "malefactors of wealth" characteristic of
the times of which Josephson wrote. See generally Weissman, The
New Wall Street (1939).
38. On the seriousness of the situation and the steps taken by way of
amelioration, see generally Hacker, American Problems of Today
(1938); Mitchell, Depression Decade (1947); Rauch, History of the
New Deal, 1933-38 (1944); and Seldes, The Years of the Locust

(1933).
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traditionally associated with weak government.39 The right of
workers to organize for the promotion of their common interests
guaranteed py the Wagner Act40 and the enforcement of civil
rights following from Brown v. Board of Education41 and the implementing decisions and statutes which succeeded it, constitute
but two of the many activities undertaken by government to secure the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution but impossible
of consummation absent such governmental essays.42 Thus, positive government proves necessary in both meeting the actualities
of current needs and demands and in realizing the principal objectives of the framers in their attempts to deter absolutism and
achieve the maximum self-assertion and freedom of the individual.
But big or active government does not mean unrestrained
government.43 Indeed, it is precisely the vigorous and monolithic
governing mechanism that is in most need of restraint. 44 Otherwise, the creation of man intended to serve his needs becomes a
Frankenstein monster, threatening his very existence as a free,
assertive being. To forestall the eventuality of such a contingency
is the task of administrative law.45 By this means, and the due
39. Illustrative of the numerous current apologias of "positive government" is McCarthy, Frontiers in American Democracy (1960).
40. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U .S.C.A. § 151 et~.
41. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
42. It was, of course, the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt which first
undertook, in this country, the concept of "positive" government on a
grand scale. See Schlesinger, The New Deal in Action, 1933-39
(1940). For a contemporary statement, see McCarthy, supra note 39,
43. See generally Duguit, Law in the Modern State 32-67 (1919).
44. 1n· this age of necessary bigness, fear of the abuse of its consequent
incidence of power has been the subject of considerable thought and
writings. Illustrative are Galbraith, American Capitalism-The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952); and Croly, The Promise of
American Life (1909).
45. Such is not meant to suggest that administrative law is the individual's sole insulation in this regard, nor that its provision is the only
task of this body of the law. Indeed, so long as free elections continue to characterize our political process, the individual will possess a strong weapon in his own defense. And the facilitation of
governmental objectives, non-suited to judicial resolution, constitute
a principal contribution of the administrative mechanism. Nevertheless, the averment in the text is thought justified, especially in the
light of the compelling comment of Justice Douglas: "Unless we
make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a
monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion. Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of
liberty." New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884, 72 S. Ct.
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process clauses of our federal and state constitutions, we have
sought to limit governmental excesses and thereby to insulate the
individual from the arbitrary intrusions of an impersonal government. This, after all, is the objective from the perspective of
individual safeguards. Big or active government is not the evil;
rather the danger persists in arbitrary or capricious government
regardless of size. Smaller government poses less of a problem
in this regard than big government, but with the· necessity of the
latter it becomes all the more imperative to achieve the limitation in a different manner.

Footnote continued
152, 153 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644, 70 S. Ct. 357, 364-65 (1950); Schwartz,
"Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal Order," 30
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1390, 1390-94 (1955); and Frankfurter, Foreword, 41
Colum. L. Rev. 585, 586 (1941).

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL AND STATE

A. Federal Law

1. Threshold Problems
In describing, albeit very generally, the principal protections a<:corded to the individual under the aegis of administrative
law, at least two rather basic problems are encountered at the
outset. To begin with, it is certainly arguable that the limitation
doctrine itself is at the least jeopardized, if not outright decimated,
by the ever-augmenting proliferation of the administrative organism. The concentration of functions in a single agency-whic;:h
makes its own rules, conducts its own investigations, and prosecutes as well as judges and sentences violators of such self-determined proscriptions46-is anything but consonant with traditional notions of the separation of powers.47 Indeed, such apparent antinomy constituted a principal ground for the early judicial
assaults upon this "headless fourth branch"48 of our government,49
and remains as a source of continuing agitation for reform.50
46. The leading defense of the concentration of powers in the administrative process appears in Landis, The Administrative Process
(1938). Illustrative of the criticisms such proposed combination have
occasioned is Schwartz, "The Administrative Agency in Historical
Perspective," 36 Ind. L.J. 263 (1961). See also in this regard FTC
v. Klesner, 280 U.s. 19, 25, 50 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1929); In re Larsen, 17
N.J. Super. 564, 574, 86 A. 2d 430, 435 (1952) (concurring opinion);
and Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 55 (1941).
47. Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and its Present-Day Significance, especially 50-95 (1953).
48. Description employed by the President's Committee on Administrative Management 32 (1937), and ridiculed in Landis, supra note 46,
at 49.
49. E.g., A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
55 S. Ct. 837 (1935). See generally Schwartz, Introduction to American Administrative Law ch. 2 (1958). Cf. Springer v. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48S. Ct. 480 (1928); and Klein
v. Barry, 182 Wis. 255, 196 N.W. 457 (1923).
50. E.g., Recommendation No. 51 of the Report of the Congress on Legal Services and Procedure (1955), of the Hoover Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. See also
Jaffee, "Basic Issues: An Analysis," 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1272, 1278-89
(1955).
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Contradiction, however, is a matter of context in political
theory no less than in the physical sciences. Just as the combination of chemical ingredients may either blend nicely or erupt
violently depending upon the solvent employed, so do political devices prove compatible or disruptive depending upon the philosophical perspective in which they interact.
The concentration of functions so characteristic of the administrative mechanism is undoubtedly at loggerheads with the
separation doctrine if the latter itself be understood to constitute
the elan vital of our governing structure. If, however, the doctrine be viewed rather as a means of achieving a greater goal
(as opposed to identification with the pristine objective itself),
then, from the broader perspective of seeking to limit absolutism
and secure maximum individual self-assertion, the contradiction
disintegrates. While in most instances the doctrine serves faithfully the broader objective enunciated, in others, conditions so
operate as to require disperate means. In order that the latter
means or devices, however, lacking the enforced disipline of trifurcated authority, do not feed the engines of absolute and impersonal power, still other checks, more amenable to the circumstances, must be fashioned. Thus, the administrative agency,
devised to cope with new conditions, yet requiring for its proper
exercise the excision of traditional safeguards,51 impels, all the
more, limitation of a different sort. To fill the chasm, by containing administrative power within the banks of fair procedure,52
is the aspiration of administrative law.
A second problem, at least ostensibly so, is evidenced by
the fact that the limitation in this regard is, for the most part,
imposed by the government upon itself. Self-limitation through
. statutory self-proscription is quite a different matter from the
limitation contained in constitutional confinement to the exercise
solely of enumerated powers.53 Indeed, what greater opportunity
for arbitrary action could be imagined than when the principal
check upon its exercise is its own self-restraint?
In this regard, however, it must be remembered that under
our system governmental power is not concentrated but, on the
51. Cf. Pound, Administrative Law 26 (1942). See generally Landis.
supra note 46.
52. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 45.
53. Cf. Language of the court in Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co.,
160 F. 2d 259, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1947). The annals of failure are replete with such endeavors at self-restraint, or self-regulation. By
way of illustration, the NIRA experience of the early Roosevelt Administration readily comes to mind. See, in this regard, Johnson,
The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (1935).
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contrary, is widely diffused. Whereas self-restraint hardly proves
sufficient as a brake to the heavy foot of the absolute monarch,
restraint in the form of one branch or department of government
serving to check an entirely different branch or department is
something else again. Legislative determination of agency jurisdiction and function,5 4 together with judicial review of activities
conducted pursuant thereto,55 render the hypothesized self-restraint, at least under our system, not at all incompatible with
the limitation idea. Hence the separation doctrine is not altogether eviscerated by the administrative process. External checks
by the other branches continue to operate on the agencies, though
concentration of functions is the rule internally.
In addition to the broader framework of legislative and judicial
oversight, specific doctrines of administrative law have evolved.
Of comparatively recent vintage,56 the procedural safeguards thus
embodied constitute the very essence of the individual's insulation against arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. Such is
not, of course, to suggest an ideal situation. Administrative law,
even at the federal level, is still in the developmental stages, as
criticisms and recommendations for modification and reform continue to abound in both officiaI57 and nonofficiaI58 sources.
54. The agency canhot act without the confines of congressionally declared intent, and the authority delegated is itself subject to the requirement of reasonably precise standards. Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
55. Black, The People and the Court 39-54 (1960).
56. Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 3 (1951). In fact,
comprehensiveness of the administrative guarantees had to await the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 60 stat. 237,
5 U .S.C. §1001. The best textual treatment of this act is still
Schwartz, "The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation," 29
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1173 (1954). For a capsule presentation of the Act by
Section No., together with the various State Acts and the Model Act
based upon it, see Appendices 1-IIl infra.
·
57. E.g., the reports of the Committee on Legislative Oversight, The
Hoover Commission and that of Mr. Landis. Special Subcommittee
on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Independent Regulatory Commissions, H.R. Rep.
No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959); Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government, Report on Legal Services and Procedure (1955); and Report on Regulatory Agencies to
the President-Elect (1960) [published as a committee print by the
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) .] , comprehensively reviewed in McFarland, 11 Landis' Report: The Voice of
One Crying in the Wilderness," 47 Va. L. Rev. 373 (1961).
58. E.g., ABA Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure, Report, 81 A.B.A. Rep. 491 (1956); Hector, "Problems of the CAB and
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Nevertheless, considerable headway has been achieved, which justifies elaborating, at least in broad outline, the •progress that has
been made.
2. Definition; A Basic Distinction
As a starting point to such inquiry, Professor Cooper's definition would appear particularly salutary in both demarcating
relevant subject-matter and in affording a modus operandi for
present discussion. In his words:
The subject is generally thought to embrace the activities of
those administrative agencies which, either by adjudiciating
judicial questions or by prescribing general rules and standards of conduct, act as little courts or little legislatures in
regulating individual activities. It includes those aspects of
constitutional law which pertain to limitations on the powers
of such agencies, and embraces as well questions of practice and procedure before such agencies, and also questions
relating to judicial review of the determinations and orders
of such agencies,59
Constitutional limitations, rules of practice and procedure, and
judicial review-administrative law's focal categories as enunciated above-, each possesses its own peculiar faculties for delimiting the exercise of absolute power.
Before, however, proceeding to consider in turn the safeguards afforded by each category, a basic distinction of administrative law should be noted. As suggested in the foregoing definition, two principal functions are performed by agencies: adjudication and rule-making.60 The distinction is a crucial one from
the vantage of private rights; for the whole structure of individual interaction with the administrative process, for example, the
availability of a formal hearing,61 is dependent upon the classification.
Owing to its importance, many attempts have been made by
way of differentiation. Illustratively, Mr. Dickinson observed:
Footnote continued
the Independent Regulatory Commissions," 69 Yale L.J. 931 (1960);
and Schwartz, supra note 46.
59. Cooper, supra note 56, at 4.
60. Note the distinctions indicated in §§ 4 (Rule-making) and 5 (Adjudication) in the AP A.
61. Infra notes 91-94, and accompanying text.
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What distinguishes legislation ( rule-making] from adjudication is that the former affects the rights of individuals
in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding
before the legal position of any particular individual will be
definitely touched by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity.62

Accordingly, where agency action is particularized, e.g., in
the grant or revocation of licenses,63 its essentially adjudicative
character should command more·-or-less judicialized procedure.64
As the Supreme Court said with regard to agency discretion in a
federal licensing case:
[ TJ his must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be exercised after fair investigation, with such a
notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant
as would constitute due process.65
On the other hand, generalized action, e.g.:; the promulgation of a
tax ruling or regulation,66 while having particular effects upon
those who must pay, is less demanding of procedural safeguards
to individual interests.67 In its concern with policy and its purely practical aspect of collecting necessary public revenues "without the interruptions and delays that might be caused by elaborate
procedure of individual notice and lengthy hearings on questions
of valuation,"68 formal adjudicative techniques are forsaken.
62. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 21
(1959). According to Justice Holmes, the distinction was as follows:
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on the other
hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making
a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210, 226, 29 S. Ct. 67, 69 (1908).
63. Se'e generally Forkosch, Administrative Law 143-76 (1956).
64. E.g., Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 s. Ct. 752
(1957). See also § 9(b) of the APA; and Note, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 383
(1961). State law is generally contra. Infra notes 153-54, and accompanying text.
65. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123,
46 S. Ct. 215, 217 (1926).
66. See generally Cooper, supra note 56, at 59-62.
67. Under the APA, notice and limited participation rights are available,
however, in rule-making cases. Infra notes 122-24.
68. Cooper, supra note 56, at 59.
--
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Perspective thus provided, attention is now directed to the
principal limitations upon administrative government, or-stated
alternatively-the basic safeguards afforded by the doctrines of
administrative law to individual rights.

3. Specific Safeguards
a. Constitutional Limitations
Traditionally, the principal substantive guarantees bestowed
by the Constitution have clustered generally around two topics,
namely the concept of the separation of powers and the due process requirement of notice and hearing. With the qualification of
external checks noted above,69 the import of the former is fundamentally historical, its value being confined for the most part
to the academician.70 Due to its continued relevance at other
levels of governmental activity, however, some discussion is
thought appropriate at this point.
The basic manifestation of the separation doctrine in this
context is the maxim against delegated power. Thus, what the
people had invested in the Congress by the Constitution-so the
theory goes-could not be re-delegated to a separate, unelected
body.71 And, of course, the offense to the doctrine was compounded where adjudicative and executive functions were merged
with legislative or rule-making authority in the same body.72 As
the venerable Blackstone had observed:
In all tyrannical governments, the supreme magistracy,
or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws is
vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body
of men; and wherever these . . . powers are united together
there can be no public liberty. 73

In matter of historical fact, however, the black-letter proscription of delegated power (delegata potestas non potest delegari)74 as well as the requirement of rigid separation of which it
69. Supra notes 54 & 55, and accompanying text.
70. Cooper, supra note 56, at 27-28.
71. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 53
S. Ct. 42 (1932).
72. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
73. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 146 (7th ed. 1775).
74. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498 (1873). See generally Emke, "Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari; A Maxim of American Constitutional Law," 47 Cornell L.Q. 50 (1961).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL AND STATE

19

is an offshoot have simply failed to survive the ravages of time.
Indeed, delegation of legislative and judicial power, though frequently softened by the appellative "quasi, "75 is, at this date, uniformly acknowledged as proper and, in fact, as a necessary ingredient of modern government.76 It is true that even today delegation may not amount to an abdication of the legislative function. Thus:
Under American theory, grants of authority to the executive branch must be limited by prescribed standards.
The discretion conferred must not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits. There must be an ascertainable legislative intent to which the exercise of the delegated
power must conform. 77
·

Nevertheless, the "gradual process of inclusion and exclusion" by
which black letter rules assume content has, in this instance,
been almost entirely weighted on the side of exclusion, i.e., judicial vindication of the authority delegated on the ground that the
standards prescribed were specific enough so as not to violate
the apposite proscription. 78 Even the standard of "public interest" in the Communications Act has been upheld as not so vague
and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. In language typical in
these cases, the Supreme Court said:
It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to
guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirements it imposes, and the context of the provision in question, show the contrary.79
75. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law 495-96 (3d ed. 1951). See
generally Wade, "'Quasi-Judicial' and Its Background," 10 Camb.
L.J. 216 (1949).
76. As one author concluded: "The survey of congressional delegations
since the Schechter case indicates that if the opinion was intended
to raise any substantial barriers to delegation of legislative power
by Congress it has failed to achieve its goal. . . . Practical necessity seems the only limitation left as far as delegability is concerned." Nutting, "Congressional Delegations since the Schecter
Case," 14 Miss. L.J. 350, 366 (1942).
77. Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775,
779 (1953).
78. E.g., Yak.us v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944). For
an analysis of the bases of validation, see Cooper, supra note 56, at
41-44.
79. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226, 63
S. Ct. 997, 1014 (1943). It seems doubtful, however, whether a
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To complete the emasculation of the non-delegability rule,
the virtual certainty of judicial condonation suffers no attenuation
from the concentration of powers in a single agency. 80 The
Hoover Commission Task Force reported:
[ W] hen agencies are established to explore a new area of
regulation, it is expedient to combine in them all the powers which are needed to achieve maximum effectiveness,
even at the cost of consolidating judicial and legislative
functions.81

Footnote continued
standard such as that contained in the Communications Act really
furnishes an effective legislative guide. As it has been stated by
Professor Davis, "telling the agency to do what is in the public interest is the practical equivalent of instructing it: 'Here is the
problem. Deal with it.'" Davis, Administrative Law 46 (1951).
80. See language of Justice Jackson in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S.
470, 487-88, 72 s. Ct. 800, 810 (1952) (dissenting).
81. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure 241
(1955). It is true that although, constitutionally, powers may be
combined in a single agency, some degree of separation is required
within the agency in cases of adjudication where Section 5 of the
Administrative Procedure Act is applicable. In such instances, Section 5(c) requires an internal separation between those officials who
hear and decide and those who investigate or prosecute, theoretically
removing from the latter a favored position insofar as their opportunity to influence decisions in which they are interested is concerned. Indeed, in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41, 70
S. Ct. 445, 450 (1950), Justice Jackson declared the fundamental purpose of the APA to be "to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge."
Such, however, seems to fall far short of its object. As the New
Jersey court said: "The crux of the matter lies in the concentration
of functions. . . . [ C) an there be a practical separation of prosecuting and deciding where both are subject to one ultimate authority."
In re Larsen, supra note 46 at 576, 86 A. 2d at 435-36. This question is left unanswered by Section 5(c) of the APA constituting one
of its principal lacunae. "Though the Act is a long step forward,"
stated one of this country's most distinguished jurists, "the internal
separation of presecuting and adjudicatory functions in an agency inevitably falls short of giving the individual the protection to which he
has been traditionally entitled in all justiciable controversies. One
wonders, indeed, if the individual can ever be given adequate protection, human nature being what it is, when the prosecuting and adjudicatory functions are still subject to the control of the same agency heads." Vanderbilt, supra note 47, at 93. The inadequacy of the
current situation appears patent in the situation of Marcello v. Bonds,
349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955). See Schwartz, 1955 Annual Survey
of American Law 104-05. On the problem of personal friendships
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Thus, neither delegation 82 nor the combination of functions would
appear to afford the individual any significant constitutional protection as against impingement by the federal government.83
The due process requirements of notice and hearing, however, stand on a somewhat different footing. 84 After a period of
temporary retreat from the general eighteenth-century mandate
of notice and hearing in all administrative proceedings, 85 the
Footnote continued
and group loyalty within the agency, see Henderson, The Federal
Trade Commission 84 (1924). Complete separation of the investigative and adjudicative functions by the establishment of an administrative court was, indeed, one of the principal recommendations of
The Hoover Commission. See Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, Report to the Congress on
Legal Services and Procedure 84 (1955). See, also, Nutting, "The
Administrative Court," 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1384 (1955); and Schwartz,
supra note 46. Were such suggestions heeded, the separation doctrine might once again constitute the bulwark against arbitrariness
that it was once its privilege to occupy.
82. On the problem of subdelegation within agencies and the occasions
upon which courts will undertake invalidation, see Grundstein, "Subdelegation of Administrative Authority," 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 144
(1945).
83. But see supra notes 54 & 55, and accompanying text.
84. It should be mentioned that many statutes, independent of constitutional requirements, provide for notice and hearing. Cf. Vanderbilt,
supra note 47, at 90; and Netterville, "The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Interpretation," 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 16
(1951). In such cases, and absent a waiver of the rights authorized
[see Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F. 2d 298 (D.C. Cir, 1952)],
notice and hearing must be accorded even where 11 due process"
would not otherwise so direct. See Dickinson, supra note 62, at 295.
The importance of the "due process" provision, of course, resides
in the fact that many statutes do not require such notice and hearing. E.g., the Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 997 (1938), 49 U.S.C.
§401 (1946), as amended, 63 Stat. 579 (1949), 49 U.S.C. §401 (1952).
That "due process," nevertheless, may still require a hearing in the
Board's rule-making procedure, see CAB v. American Air Transport, Inc., 201 F. 2d 189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 4, 73
S. Ct. 2 (1952).
85. On the eighteenth century experience, see Mott, Due Process of Law
216-40 (1926). In the nineteenth century, the well-nigh compulsive
veneration of the doctrine of separation of powers led to the labeling
of the administrative activity as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative
and of according and hearing in the former instance but not in the
latter. See generally Davis, "The Requirement of Opportunity to be
Heard in the Administrative Process," 51 Yale L.J. 1093 (1942).
Though the reasons for the atrophy of the requirement, at least as
regards quasi-legislative activity, are many ( Cooper, supra note 56,
at 55-67), perhaps the most cogent statement is that of Holmes:
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proclivity is once again in the direction of acknowledging the old
guarantees. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) even
legislative or rule-making activities are subject to the requirements of antecedent publicity and the right of participation by interested persons.86 Where adjudication is involved, the Act requires that the agency concerned accord full judicial-type requirements of formal notice and hearing.87 And, in the latter instance, this means a real hearing (as contrasted with the mere
formalism of a proceeding before an agency tool in judicial robe)
to insure which "a special class of semi-independent subordinate
hearing officers 11 88 is provided.89
Though the Act thus extends the notice and hearing guarantee even beyond the ambit of due process, the savings clause
(permitting exemption from the requirement where a particular
Footnote continued

86_-

87.
88,
89.

"Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption." Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of
Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445, 36 S. Ct. 141, 142 (1915).
See § 4. There are, of course, exceptions-the principal ones being
where it is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest" to so provide, and where the rules promulgated are only
interpretative or matters of procedure internal to the agency concerned. See generally Schwartz, supra note 56. This provision is
especially significant in view, of the fact that, "in legislation, or
rule-making, there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever." Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, 694 (9th Cir.
1949).
See §§ 5, 7, 8, and 11. It is true, however, that the notice requirement has been somewhat watered down by the courts. CAB v. State
Airlines, 338 U.S. 572, 70 S. Ct. 379 (1950).
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128,
132, 73 S. Ct. 570, 573 (1953).
See § 11. By this means, at least such was the intention of the APA
[ Fuchs, "The Hearing Examiner Fiasco under the Administrative
Procedure Act," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1950).], the "unlovely situation" ( McCarran, "Three Years of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act-A Study in Legislation," 38 Geo. L.J. 574 (1950)] of the
hearing officer-the Judge, if you will-as a subordinate of a policing
agency, depending upon the agency for his promotions, etc., and with
the inevitable personal friendships among investigating and prosecuting officers [ Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,
supra note 88, at 131, 73 S. Ct. at 572) might be obviated. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495, 71 S. Ct. 456, 468
(1951). Unfortunately, some difficulty still persists in the attainment
of both independence and competence of the trial examiners. Thomas,
"The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and
the Administrative Process," 59 Yale L.J. 431 (1950).
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enabling act so provides)9 0 renders a rather substantial gap in
the safeguard. In such an event, the task becomes to ascertain
whether the administrative undertaking in question is one to which
the fifth amendment guarantee of due process will attach. The
resolution of this question is, of course, dependent upon the substantive content which the courts have poured into this most
changeable of constitutional concepts at the particular moment.
As must seem evident, answer to the question unfortunately
can be made only generally and without much predicative value to
future cases. There has been some tendency to distinguish between judicial and legislative activities, requiring notice and
hearing in the former type of case and not in the latter ;91 This
approach, however, is too often eschewed by the courts to serve
as a basis of confident predictability .92 Indeed, if generalization
can be made at all in this regard, it is that individual decisions
represent in esse the results of a particular judicial balancing of
the policy considerations involved. As one author observed:
The essential problem in every case is that of weighing the
relative merits of a public interest in prompt action against
the respondent's private interest that the hand of the law be
stayed until he has fully argued the equities of his particular position. Sometimes the balance is plain-for example,
the public necessity of expeditious collection of the public
revenues obviously outweighs the individual taxpayer's desire to avoid payment of a contested tax until the validity
thereof has been finally determined by a court of last resort. Conversely, the right of a doctor to continue the practice of his profession, pending determination of charges that
he improperly advertised, clearly outweigh the public interest in curtailing such instances of asserted unethical conduct.93

Where no such clear-cut determination can be made, such other
factors as the degree of discretion accorded to the agency, the
substantiality of property interest in question, the relative advantages as between administrative and judicial procedure in getting at the truth in the type of situation involved, and the

90. See § 7(a). See, in explanation, Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1222-24.
91. E.g., Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of
Colorado, supra note 85, at 445, 36 S. Ct. at 142; and Philadelphia
Co. v. SEC, 175 F. 2d 808, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1948),
92. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 799-808.
93. Cooper, supra note 56, at 88.
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opportunity for judicial review are weighed in to tip the scales
either in favor of or in opposition to the requirement.94
The content of the due process clause in regard to the requirements of notice and hearing in the federal administrative
process may thus be seen to comprise a facet of the broader inclination of the current Supreme Court to seek accommodation
between private rights and social purposes in the so-called balancing of the interests involved. 95 Perhaps no more specific
statement of the requirement is possible. Although the guarantee
now appears to have an ad hoc character, the judiciary occasionally has expressed the guarantee in positive terms such as the
following:
It is elementary also in our system of law that adjudicatory
action cannot be validly taken by any tribunal, whether judicial or administrative, except upon a hearing wherein each
party shall have opportunity to know of the claims of his
opponent, to hear the evidence introduced against him, to
cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence in his own
behalf, and to make argument. This is a requirement of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.96
True, the guarantee may, upon judicial testing in a particular case, be vindicated. But in a different situation, the "balance" may compel a contrary result. Fortunately, on balance-to
use the magic word-the tendency is to revitalize the old guarantee. 97 And, of course, independent of the due process guarantee, the APA requires notice and the opportunity to be heard

94. Id. at 89-90. In some cases, the "privilege-right" distinction has
been employed to deny a hearing. Thus, immigration is said to be a
privilege, not a right, and not within the due process guarantee.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct.
309 (1950). The same has been held true of government employment.
Bailey v. Richardson 341 U.S. 918, 71 S. Ct. 669 (1951).
95. E.g., language of the court in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79
S, Ct. 804 (1959).
96. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 91. See also in this regard
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Corp., 351 U.s. 192, 202, 76
S. Ct. 763, 770 (1956). Where allowed, the right is to an oral hearing. Standard Airlines v. CAB, 177 F. 2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
and Schwartz, supra note 77, at 812-15.
97. See generally Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804, 72 s. Ct. 47 (1951);
Riss & Ct. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907, 71 S. Ct. 620 (1951); and
CAB v. American Air Transport, Inc., supra note 84.
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before an independent judicial officer in a very substantial portion of administrative cases.98
b. Rules of Practice and Procedural Limitations
This category is divisible into two subcategories, corresponding to the two general classifications of activity undertaken
by the agencies. Inasmuch as adjudicative practice and procedure
differ substantially from that involved in rule-making (i.e., legislative) activity, separate treatment is thought appropriate. In general the APA controls the procedural safeguards afforded; and
the text in this section is, in consequence, directed to its provisions. Where by definition, "saving clause," etc., the Act is inapplicable, reference will have to be directed to the specific
statute and agency practice involved.
Where adjudication is at issue, the tendency, at least since
the advent of the APA, is to require a full judicial type proceeding. 99 Such includes, as has been indicated previously, notice and
hearing and the separation within the agency of the investigating
and prosecuting functions from that of the adjudicative or decision-making.100
Pretrial conduct in administrative adjudication has pursued
a course similar to that of the so-called "liberalizing tendency"
of the Federal Rules.101 Thus, although section 5 (a) of the Federal Act seems to require rather stringent notice requirements,
the Supreme Court has been loath to strike down administrative
complaints on grounds of insufficiency ,102 Indeed, Justice Brandeis's dissenting view in the famous Gratz case, 103 rejecting the
formal notice requirements of a case at law, reflects the judicial
98. The very existence of the APA, as a declaration of legislative policy,
has had its effects in broadening the "due process" guarantee even
where the Act by its terms is inapplicable. See, e.g., language in
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 81.
99. Ibid.
100. Of course, complete separation is not required by the APA. As the
New Jersey court commented: "That statute embodies the theory
of internal separation, leaving the function with the agency but providing safeguards to assure their insulation from one another and
to further the independence of personnel engaged in judging." In re
Larsen, supra note 46, at 576, 86 A. 2d at 436.
101. Cf. Kuhn v. CAB, 183 F. 2d 839, 841-42 (D.C. Civ. 1950).
102. E.g., American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F. 2d
782 (7th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
103. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 430, 40 S. Ct. 572, 575-76 (1920).

26

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

sentiment at this time.104 On the other hand, informal prehearing conferences redound to the benefit of private parties in administrative proceedings even more than in judicial, saving time
and expense where by nature such matters are of the essence.105
Agency discovery powers indicate, at least historically,
somewhat of an imbalance as against private litigants. In addition to their vast resources, both manpower and financial, agencies are typically endowed by statute with rather broad powers
of investigation.106 Subpoena enforcement, however, especially as
regards imprisonment for contempt, has traditionally been denied
to the agencies, 107 thereby affording to the recalcitrant party his
day in court on the question of the prospective invasion of his
privacy _108 And in amelioration, to some extent, of the imbalance of resources, section 6 (c) of the Federal Act requires federal agencies to issue subpoenas to any party upon a statement
showing the general relevance and reaonable scope of the evidence, and further requires that denial of such an application
must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor.
Regarding the administrative trial itself, the basic requirements of trial procedure in the courts are, of course, not imposed upon administrative tribunals.109 In the interest of brevity
and speed, and with the justification of expertise in the activity
at issue, the agencies are left free to work out their own hearing
procedures-subject, of course, to the mandate that the fundamental
104. E.g., CAB v. State Airlines, supra note 87.
105. See generally Cooper, supra note 56, at 114-24.
106. Davis, supra note 79, at 93. Significant recent cases illustrating
this point are Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S. Ct. 1502
(1960); and CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 77 S. Ct. 804 (1957).
Investigatory powers are not inherent, however, and accrue only
where statute so provides. Cf. § 6(b) of the APA. "In obtaining information, the agencies normally have available at least four methods of discovery: (1) investigation of books and records; (2) requiring the appearance of witnesses and the production of documents by subpoena; (3) requiring the furnishing of reports; and
(4) physical inspections." Cooper, supra note 56, at 127.
107. E.g., United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 76 S. Ct. 281 (1956);
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S. Ct. 1125 (1894); and Langeberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892). See also Sherwood, "The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas," 44 Colum.
L. Rev. 531 (1944).
108. E.g., Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 67 S. Ct. 918 (1947); and
SEC v. Tung Corp. of America, 32 F. Supp. 371 (D. Ill. 1940).
109. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437

(1940).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL AND STATE

27

requirements of fair play and decency be observed.110 Thus, the
hearing officers must be impartial, and the time, place, and manner of the hearing must not be unduly prejudicial to the parties.ill
Section 6 (a) of the Federal Act accords the right to be heard by
counsel; Section 7 (c) provides the right "to conduct such crossexamination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of
the facts;" by judicial decision 112 the right is afforded to be apprised of the specific files or records upon which the decision is
to be made; 113 and under Section 8 (b), agency decisions must be
accompanied by findings.114
Though not "narrowly constrained by technical rules as to
the admissibility of proof, 11115 administrative tribunals hesitate to
ignore them in the adjudication of judicial questions. As explained
by one author:
While often freed by statutory provision from the necessity of following- the common-law rules of evidence-or,
as it is not infrequently expressed, the technical rules of
evidence-most agencies in practice, and often by specific
agency rule, apply the fundamental principles of relevancy,
materiality, and probative force in a manner not unlike that
of equity courts. Partly, this results from their constant
consciousness of the necessity of supporting all findings by
"substantial evidence," in order to avoid the possibilities of
judicial reversals of their determinations, and partly, the
tendency is a reflection of their appreciation of the innate
wisdom of the general rules as worked out in the courts.116
The observation possesses official buttress in the requirement of
the Federal Act that decision must be based upon the whole
record and be "in accordance with the reliable, probative, and
110. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 23, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999 (1938).
111. See § 5(a) of the APA. Cf. NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F. 2d 562, 563
(5th Cir. 1943).
112. United States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 44 S. Ct. 565
(1924).
113. In this connection it is noteworthy that the requirements of the
Jencks rule have been imported into administrative law. NLRB v.
Adhesive Products, Inc., 258 F. 2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1958).
114. Such, of course, is indispensable to the adequacy of judicial review. International Union of Electrical Workers v. United States,
280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Civ. 1960).
115. ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 569 (1904). See in
explanation Justice Black's opinion in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683, 705, 68 S. Ct. 793, 805 (1948).
116. Cooper, supra note 56, at 180.
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substantial evidence. 11 117 And, although mitigated to some extent
by the expansion of the doctrine of official notice, the basic principle of the "exclusiveness of the record" still inures to the benefit of the private litigant.118
Finally, so as to approximate as closely as practically possible the requirement of the first Morgan case119 that the one
who decides must hear, the Federal Act provides for recommended decisions by the hearing officers in those cases where, by
statute, decision-making is not vested in the agency head.120
These decisions, in turn, become final in the absence of appeal.
Directing attention now to rule-making, it has already been
indicated that there is, in such event, no constitutional requirement of notice and hearing.121 Nevertheless, Section 4 of the
Federal Act has imposed, for the first time in our law, certain
mandatory requirements in rule-making. General notice must be
published in the Federal Register and interested persons must be
afforded the opportunity to participate.122 Though somewhat diluted by the exceptions of interpretative rules, procedural rules
and pre-emptive statutes, the "guarantee to the public [ of] an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process"12 3 certainly
represents an improvement over pre-APA practice. And, where
formal rule-making is concerned, i.e., where rules are "required
by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, " 124 the adjudicatory techniques described above
supplant the less formal requirements ordained for ordinary rulemaking. In such event, the rules as issued must be based upon
the record made in an adversary judicial-type hearing, with all
the added guarantees thus occasioned.
117. See § 7(c) of the APA. See, in this regard, Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 54 S. Ct. 692 (1934).
Professor Schwartz has argued that § 7(c) imports the "legal residuum rule into federal administrative law." Schwartz, supra note
56, at 1262. Contra, Davis, supra note 79, at 459.
118. Schwartz, 1956 Annual Survey of American Law 79.
119. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481, 56 S. Ct. 906, 911-12
(1936).
120. See § 8 of the AP A.
121. Supra note 73.
122. On the requirement of antecedent publicity, see Airline Pilots Ass'n
v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960). That the "right to participate" safeguard, however, may prove illusory, see Lansden v.
Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948).
123. Attorney General's Manual on the APA 26, quoted in Schwartz,
supra note 56, at 1195.
124. See § 4(6) of the AP A.
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c. Judicial Review
The category of judicial review is divisible into two aspects: (1) its availability and (2) its scope. General limitations
upon the availability of judicial review persist in the familiar
legal doctrines of primary jurisdiction, the exhaustion of administrative remedies, and estoppel for failure to utilize administrative remedies.125 In addition, Section 10 of the Federal Act
limits availability "so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion." 1 26 Though the statutory provision includes cases of implied preclusion,127 "Mere failure to provide for judicial intervention is not conclusive; neither is the presence of language
which appears to bar it."128 Indeed, even statutory attestations
of the finality of administrative decisions are not controlling
where substantial private rights are thereby impaired. As the
Supreme Court observed: "We cannot readily infer that Congress
departed so far from the traditional concepts of a fair trial when
it made the actions of the local boards 'final'. • • •"129
Neither is the private litigant without redress in cases of
board agency discretion, Section 10 (e) (B) (1) providing that reviewing courts are to set aside agency action found to be an
"abuse of discretion." Thus, although an ascertainable judicial
disinclination to substitute its own judgment for the discretion of
administrators is clearly in evidence,130 the availability of
125. See generally, in this regard, Stason, "Timing of Judicial Redress
From Erroneous Administrative Action," 25 Minn. L. Rev. 560
(1941). See also United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59,
77 S. Ct. 161 (1956); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303
U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938); Croydon Syndicate v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 72. N.Y.S. 2d 846, 848-49 (1947); and McFarland & Vanderbilt, Administrative Law 662 (2d ed. 1952).
126. Airline Dispatchers Ass'n v. NMB, 189 F. 2d 685, 688 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
127. E.g., Switchman's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297,
64 S. Ct. 95 (1943); Kirkland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 F. 2d
529 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F. 2d 714 (2d Cir.
1948); and Mechanics Educational Society v. Schauffler, 103 F. Supp.
130 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
128. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.s. 229, 233, 73 s. Ct. 603, 605 (1953).
The leading case on this proposition is Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 64 S. Ct. 559 (1944).
129. Estep v. United States, 327 U.s. 114, 122, 66 S. Ct. 423, 427 (1946).
Cf. Davis, supra note 79, at 835.
130. E.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464,
50 S. Ct. 389 (1930).
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judicial review remains a significant factor in the vindication of
private rights.131
The scope of review is generally said to depend upon the
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact.132
Questions of law are fully reviewed upon the independent judgment of the reviewing court.133 The Federal Act, according to
Justice Frankfurter,
. . .direct(s] that courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of. . .decisions
than some courts have shown in the past. Reviewing courts
must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate
the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on
them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within
reasonable grouncts.134
Review of questions of fact, on the other hand, is governed by
the substantial evidence rule.
The court looks only to see if the administrative answer to
the factual question is supported by substantial evidence; it
is not concerned with the weight of the evidence.135
The difficulty, of course, is that the "law-fact" classification is inexact, wanting of a clear-cut dividing line in any particular case.136 In the words of one observer:
131. As Justice Douglas observed: "Tolerance of judicial review has
been more and more the rule as against the claim of administrative finality." Union Pac. R.R. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 619, 79 S.
Ct. 1351, 1361 (1959) (dissenting opinion). See also Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S. Ct. 180 (1958); and United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., supra note 96.
132. Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 510, 71
S. Ct. 470, 473 (1951) (dissenting opinion). On such niceties of this
general distinction as the doctrines of jurisdictional fact and of
constitutional fact, see Schwartz, supra note 77, at 857-61.
133. See § l0(e) of the APA.
134. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S. Ct.
456, 466 (1951).
135. Schwartz, supra note 56, at 1255. See also Jaffe, "Judicial Review:
'Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,"' 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1233, 1235-36 (1951).
136. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, the distinction "is often not
an illuminating test and is never self-executing." Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671, 64 S. Ct. 1240, 1244 (1944). See
generally Isaacs, "The Law and the Facts," 22 Colum. L. Rev. 1
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The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the
point where the court chooses to draw the line between public interest and private right.137
Nevertheless, it is the court, in a contested adversary proceeding,
that makes the decision,138 The private party has his day in
court, with right of appeal, no mean nor empty guarantee, indeed.
B. State Practice

1. In General
If the inapplicability of the APA to certain administrative
activities-by definition, preclusion or exemptionl39-occasions
some degree of disharmony of practice at the federal level,140
the fifty states, without the benefit of such a unifying act,141 exhibit divergency run rampant. Even within a given state, practices vary, one agency being compelled by statute to afford
Footnote continued
(1922). On the application of particular statutory terms or concepts to specific states of fact, the rule of Gray v. Powell [ 314
U.S. 402, 62 S. Ct. 326 (1941)] that the question is to be treated
more like one of fact than one of law, is now firmly ingrained in
federal law. See Schwartz, American Administrative Law 121
(1950). A recent case illustrating the point is NLRB v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 76 S. Ct. 383 (1956).
137. Dickinson, supra note 62, at 55. For a statement of general guidelines, as opposed to the questionable "law-fact" dichotomy, in determining the availability and scope of judicial review, see Cooper,
supra note 56, at 341-50. Included are such considerations as
whether the conduct is of public business or the regulation of private business, whether the legislative or judicial function is involved, the extent of the statutory grant of discretion, the character
of the administrative procedure (i.e., whether summary), and the
experience and repute of the agency involved.
138. On the broadening scope of review, see, e.g., Snyder v. Buck, 75 F.
Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), vacated on other grounds, 179 F.2d 44
(D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S. 15 (1950); Fischer v. Haeberle, 80
F. Supp. 652 (E.D. N.Y. 1948); Unger v. United States, 79 F. Supp.
281 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
139. Supra note 90.
140. E.g., hearings were declared requisite in deportation cases [ Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 81] but not in alien exclusion
cases [United states ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70
S. Ct. 309 (1950)].
141. The Uniform Commissioners have, however, prepared a uniform
act, summary treatment of which appears in Appendices I-III of
this Monograph.
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hearings, another doing so on a discretionary basis, and still
another not doing so at all. Such, of course, renders general descriptive commentary a most difficult task. As one commentator
observed: "[T]here is possibly no more trackless morass in the
whole range of American legal bibliography than the administrative materials of the states." 142 With the caution, then, of careful consultation of relevant statutes of the jurisdiction in issue to
ascertain the particular procedures prescribed, some attempt will
now be made to indicate the general patterns that, nevertheless,
do appear discernible.

2. Ascertainable Patterns
a. Constitutional Limitations
Although no requirement is imposed upon the states to observe the desider"atum of separation of powers, such is generally
prescribed explicitly by the state constitution.14 3 Thus, the problems of merged functions and of delegation and standards arise
in this context as well.
The idea of concentrated functions in state agencies followed
generally the evolution at the federal level, no real controversy
now existing as to constitutionality in either case.144 The law of
delegation, however, has developed differently, and continues to
have a good deal of vitality in the states to this date. True, delegation is now regarded as proper in itself by state courts,145 as
opposed to early judicial justifications as merely "filling up the
details" of legislation.146 But the point of difference with federal
practice is that whereas in the former the requirement of standards has been all but emasculated,147 in the states it has proven
a good deal more tenacious. As the New Jersey court stated:
142. Abel, "The Double Standard in Administrative Procedure Legislation: Model Act and Federal Act," 33 Iowa L. Rev. 228, 244 (1948).
Among the more useful of the state materials that are available are
the following: Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the state of
New York (1942); Judicial Council of California, Tenth Biennial Report to the Governor and Legislature (1944); Heady, Administrative
Procedure Legislation in the States (1952); Ohio Administrative Law
Commission, Report to the Governor (1945); and Texas Civil Judicial
Council, Administrative Procedure Laws in the United States, A
Comparative Study (195 7).
143. Supra note 29.
144. See generally Davis, Administrative Law 27-30 (1959).
145. See language in Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A. 2d 385 (1952).
146. Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. v. Clinton, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
147. Supra notes 78 - 89, and accompanying text.
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If no standards are set up to guide the administrative agency in the exercise of functions conferred on it by the legislature, the legislation is void as passing beyond the legitimate bounds of delegation.148

There are, of course, state cases in which rather broad grants
of authority have been upheld.149 Nevertheless, in general, the
requirement remains of great significance at this level.150
By the fourteenth amendment, "due process" becomes a requirement of state governments no less than the federal. 151 Indeed, the requirement would seem of double strength in its appearance in state constitutions as well. Yet, though twice confirmed, its content or substance, as manifested in specific requisites of notice and hearing in a particular case, is, if possible,
even less certain as a guarantee of individual rights than nationally. Perhaps the best example of the inadequacy of the constitutional guarantee-both federal and state-in this context occurs
with regard to business licensing.152 For due process to attach,
personal or property rights must be involved. So, by characterizing licenses as privileges, the states have read the notice and
hearing requirements right out of the constitutions.153 Typically,
the Iowa court observed: "[A] license to handle, sell, or otherwise dispense beer, wines, and other malt or spiritous liquors is
a privilege granted by the state and in no sense a property right.•'154

148. State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation, 2 N.J. 335, 353,
66 A. 2d 616, 625 (1949). This does not suggest, of course, that
grants of authority will be invalidated merely because the standard
prescribed is general in terms ( e.g., Ratliff v. Lampton, 187 P. 2d
421 (Cal. App. 1947), aff'd, 32 Cal.2d 226,195 P.2d 792 (1948)).
But delegations unconfined by any standards will generally be
knocked down. E.g., Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of
State of New York, 298 N.Y. 184, 81 N.E. 2d 80 (1948); and State
v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Federation of New Jersey, 2 N.J. 335, 66
A. 2d 616 (1949).
149. E.g., Ward v. Scott, supra note 145. Usually even here, however,
procedural safeguards are required for validation. Downey v.
Grimshaw, 410 Ill. 21, 101 N.E. 2d 275 (1951).
150. Schwartz, supra note 77, at 782. In this connection, it should be
noted that State Legislatures retain a high degree of legislative
oversight. See generally Howe, Legislative Review of Administrative Rules (1956).
151. Cf. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954).
152. See illustratively Monaghan, "The Constitution and Occupational
Licensing in Massachusetts," 41 Bost. U.L. Rev. 157 (1961).
153. Davis, supra note 144, at 139-42.
154. Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W. 2d 785 (1953).
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Of course, not all the states take this view,155 Nevertheless, absent a state administrative procedure act,156 notice and hearing
in state licensing cases may be denied without constitutional offence.157
b. State Procedure Acts
Where by constitution, general legislation or special statute,
hearings are prescribed, the question arises as to the procedures
to be employed in the conduct thereof. And, as might be expected, it is here that state practice-both internally and in comparison with other states-is most disparate. In fact, so dissimilar
are state practices, from discovery procedures to the requirement that findings conform to a record, 158 that about all that can
be meaningfully stated by way of general reference is that specific state statutes and decisions must be consulted to ascertain
procedural limitations in any given fact-situation. 159 In this context, procedural rights are, of course, subject to the whim of
legislators and the caprice of administrators.
Some obviation of this unfortunate situation exists in the
action of the sixteen states which have enacted administrative
procedure acts more or less on the federal model,160 Even here,
155. As the California Court stated: "Law contemplates justice whether
it is granted as a privilege or recognized as a vested right . . . .
[ T] he right to engage in the sale of beverages. • .may not be arbitrarily denied by the Board of Supervisors without a hearing or an
opportunity on the part of the petitioner to present the merits of
her application to the licensing tribunal." Fascination, Inc. v.
Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 270, 246 P. 2d 656, 662 (1952),
156. E.g., the Massachusetts Act provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, no agency shall revoke or refuse to renew
any license unless it has first afforded the licensee an opportunity
for hearing. . • •" Mass. G.L.A. ch. 30A, § 13 (1961).
157. Davis, supra note 144, at 141. The well-nigh universal academic
condemnation of this practice is stated in Gellhorn, Administrative
Law 278 (2d ed. 1947). The attempt of the Uniform Law Commissioners
to intrude upon this practice is indicated in §§ 1(4) and 14 of the
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1961.
158. Cf. language in Matter of Sorrentino v. State Liquor Authority, 10
N.Y. 2d 143, 176 N.E. 2d 563 (1961) (right to copy of hearing officer's report).
159. See generally Texas Civil Judicial Council, supra note 142.
160. Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 41-1001 to 41-1008 (1956)); California
[Cal. Gov't Code § § 11370 to 11529 (1953)]; Colorado [Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 3-16-1 to 3-16-6 (1953) J ; Illinois [ Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10 § 3,
and §§ 264 to 279 (1956)]; Indiana [Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 63-3001 to
63-3024 (1961)); Maryland [Md. Ann. Code art. 41, §§ 244 to 256

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL AND STATE

35

procedure differs widely. The California Act, for example, is
even more comprehensive than that of the federal government,
providing for a central panel of hearing officers to serve all of
the state's agencies.161 Contrawise, the limitations imposed by
the Illinois Act are for the most part confined to the provision
for judicial review.162 The specific practices prescribed by these
states are indicated in the Appendices to this monograph, so no
more detailed treatment is thought necessary at this point.
Granting the divergencies that exist, however, it should be
kept in mind that uniformity is not an end in itself; this, indeed,
is one of the justifications for the existence of states in the first
place. The goal, rather, consists in the safeguard of individual
rights. General legislation at the state level-where in existenceseems to serve this end, flexibility being afforded as between
states, with fairly uniform and virile safeguards in effect internally _163
c. Judicial Review
Even with regard to the availability and scope of judicial
review, the rule of dissimilarity holds reign in state practice.
Rudimentary principles as to the exhaustion of remedies, noninterference with discretion reasonably exercised, and the "lawfact" dichotomy,164 have been borrowed from federal law. However, sufficient divergency exists to caution careful scrutiny of
Footnote continued
(1957)]; Massachusetts [Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 30A, §§ 1-17 (1961)];
Michigan [ Mich. Comp. Laws-Mich. Adm. Code §§ 24.101 to 24.110
(1954)]; Minnesota [Minn. Stat. Ann. §§15.0411 to 15.049 (Supp.
1962)]; Missouri [Mo. Ann. Stat. §§536.010 to 536.140 (1953)];
North Dakota [ N.D. Cent. Code §§ 28-32-01 to 28-32-22 (1960)];
Ohio [ Oh.io Rev. Code §§119.01 to 119.13 (1953)]; Oregon [ Ore.
Rev. Stat. §§ 183.310 to 183.510 (1961)]; Pennsylvania [Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 71, §§1710.1 to 1710.46 (1962)]; Virginia [Va. Code Ann.
§§ 9-6.1 to 9-6.14 (1956)]; and Wisconsin [ Wis. stat. Ann. §§ 227 .01
to 227 .26 (1957)] . For a graphic treatment of similarities and differences, see Appendices I-III infra.
161. On the success of the California experiment see Heady, "State Administrative Procedure Laws: An Appraisal," 12 Pub. Ad. Rev.
10, 15 (1952); and Nathanson, "Recent Developments in State Administrative Law," 33 Iowa L. Rev. 252, 290 (1948).
162. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10, §§ 264-79 (1956).
163. See generally Preparatory Note to Uniform Commissioners' Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act 8 (1961).
164. Supra notes 125-37, and accompanying text.
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particular state concepts prior to any undertaking in this regard
as well.
Caution is also in order in the selection of the appropriate
form of action. While some states have abolished, by constitution or by statute, the old prerogative writs and have instituted
in their stead a solitary means for controlling administrative action, the great majority adhere to the old common law writ practice of using extraordinary remedies such as mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, etc.165 Selection of the wrong
writ in a particular case may, in this instance, occasion the time
and expense of starting all over again or even of being barred
remedy altogether, 166 e.g., due to laches. 167
Further illustrating the divergency, the doctrine of prior
resort (that is, judicial disinclination to accept jurisdiction upon
issues which could have been presented in the first instance to
an administrative body), though followed in many states, has been
repudiated by others. Some courts decline to apply the doctrine
where to do so would involve irreparable injury •168 Still others
apply the principle to newer agencies, but adhere to established
practices in the case of older agencies where more extensive judicial intervention has traditionally been permitted.169
Even the substantial evidence rule and Ben Avon doctrine
have found disparate reception by the states. Thus, some states
today probe beyond the reaches of review allowed in the federal
courts and approximate in scope something more akin to the
"weight of the evidence."170 And, some reject the "constitutional
fact" doctrine propounded in the Ben Avon case,171 which required, upon raising of a constitutional issue, provision for a fair
opportunity "for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for
determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law
and facts." 172 (Emphasis added.)
165. E.g., Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 Wis. 444 (1872).
166. See generally Davis, supra note 144, at 443-49.
167. See generally Davison & Grundstein, 1957 Supplement to Cases and
Readings on Administrative Law 1-29.
168. Bell Tel. Co. of Penn. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A. 2d 912 (1941).
See generally Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric
Co., 59 R.I. 29, 193 Atl. 879 (1937).
169. See generally Cooper, supra note 56, at 316-17.
170. E.g., language in Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 70 A. 2d 77 (1949).
171. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 s.
Ct. 527 (1920).
172. Id. at 289, 40 S. Ct. at 528. See in this regard the language in
Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep't of Public utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.
2d 811 (1949).

ADMIN1STRATIVE LAW: FEDERAL AND STATE

37

By way of a final word on individual safeguards, it should
be kept in mind that there is not necessarily a right to judicial
review at all. Indeed, in a great many situations, statutory attestations of the "finality" of administrative determinations have
been held by the courts to preclude, judicial review altogether.173
C. Models, Problems, and a Question Resolved
For a number of reasons the capsule treatment of the administrative practices of federal and state presented herein is
thought justifiable in a study entitled "Administrative Law and
Local Government." To begin with, the lack of systematization
and consistency in local practice renders intelligible comentary
next to impossible without some means of classification (or, at
least, guidelines) by which to arrange the mass of pertinent subject matter. 174 Hopefully, this difficulty is obviated in the delineation, albeit in broad outline, of the rather well-defined body of
federal-and, to a lesser extent, state-practfce. Thereby convenient pegs are provided on which to hang the local law.
Secondly, of course, the federal law is the model towards
which state and local practice strive. True as it certainly is
that the federal law reflects shortcomings and inadequacies, the
ideal is, nevertheless, in evidence in the drift of current improvements and recommendations. Even the shortcomings are
relevant to local practice, in pinpointing areas likely to be of
concern at this level as well.
A third benefit derived from the foregoing treatment is that
a means is presented by which to assess or evaluate local practice. In addition to the value inherent in comparative analysis in
and of itself, a technique is thus evinced to determine the extent
of individual safeguards against governmental excesses as manifested at each of the three levels of our administrative process.
Most important, however, is the answer afforded by such
presentation to the broader policy questions posed earlier in this
monograph. Clearly, the development of federal administrative
law demonstrates that big government does not necessarily mean
unlimited government. Though expediency has required abridement of the old safeguard of the separation of powers, executive
government-swelling, in response to modern conditions, to immensities of size and power inconceivable to our forebears173. Cf. "privilege-right" dichotomy in occupational-licensing, supra
notes 152-57, and accompanying text.
174. Cf. Abel, supra note 142.
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continues to be limited through the procedural guarantees evolved
in the doctrines of administrative law. Limitation remains the
touchstone of our political order. Its new form consists not in
the fetters of compelled inactivity but in a positive government
canalized within substantial procedural banks to keep it from
overfiowing. 175

175. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 45.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL

A. Introduction
1. The Problem Posed

The manner in which the limitation doctrine is being fashioned to the service of the individual has been demonstrated, although sketchily, re the federal-and, to a lesser extent, stategovernment. Equally important to limitation in our system, however, is local or municipal government. It cannot be gainsaid
that the surfeit in size and activity at this level as well raises
a specter of tyranny just as significant to individual rights as
any that could be imagined at higher levels. In the words of the
Kansas court, "It has twice been said that the tyranny of the
American system of government very largely consists in the action of municipal authorities."176 And, of course, from the viewpoint of direct effect, the action of local authorities in allowing
or disallowing a permit to use a public hall or a license to engage in a lawful business, in imposing a local sales tax or a
special assessment upon specific property-holders, in granting a
variance or upholding an exception to a zoning ordinance, or in
effecting an annexation, is much more likely to impinge upon the
free choice and activity of individual citizens than are the more
distant activities of the federal agencies, or even those in the
state capitol.I 77
2. Method of Approach
Individuals constantly come into contact with governmental
action. Any catalog of categories of special contact, which by
reason of frequency and/or intensity would appear to warrant attention, should certainly include local police ordinances and activity ,178 as well as municipal liability, or its absence, in matters
176. Smith v. Hosford, 106 Kan. 363, 366, 187 Pac. 685, 686 (1920),
177. In this connection, the discussion at notes 32-33 supra, and accompanying text, should be consulted.

178. See generally Antieau, "The Constitutional Rights of Persons
Charged With Violating Municipal Ordinances," 48 Geo. L.J. 1
(1959). Reference should also be made to Pock, Consolidating Police Functions in Metropolitan Areas (1962).
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of tortl 79 and contract.180 For example, the actions of police officers in the prevention and detection of crime, of necessity,
come into conflict with time-honored and long reputed notions of
the privacy of self and home. Much has been written, especially
since the advent of Naziism and the solidification of Soviet Communism, of the despotic character of the police state and its derogation of the inherent worth of the individual. Illustrative is
George Orwell's 1984 with its frightening picture of giant television sets and hovering helicopters prying into every crook of the
citizenry's daily life. To forestall such eventuality, certain restrictions, e.g., the fourth amendment, prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, have been erected to limit police activity
in its interaction with individual rights and interests. Examples
could be multiplied in this regard.
The instant focus, however, is upon administrative practice,
in particular those organs and activities of government operating
in a context of merged as opposed to separated powers. It is
here (whether federal agency or local board) that the traditional
safeguards have been extirpated, and attention should thus be focused to determine the present extent and future prospects of
limited government in achieving the balance of interests sought.
Areas of more appropriate import to this study are such
as the following: the award, renewal and revocation of licenses,
permits and certificates; the grant of franchises; the imposition
of taxes and special assessments; the enactment and administration of zoning ordinances; annexation measures and their implications; eminent domain proceedings; and certain limitations upon
civil rights. In these areas, local boards (or the governing body,
itself, e.g., the city council) operate in the manner of the federal
agencies. Invested with legislative, judicial and administrative
powers, they exercise legislatively delegated authority (from the
state legislature, and generally again by local ordinance), in general or specific application, with or without judicial review as
the statute or ordinance may provide.
Limitations of space preclude any meaningful consideration
of all the areas above-mentioned. Some attention of a general
nature has been afforded to certain of them in other issues· of
the Metropolitan Area Survey. In particular, the materials in
Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States, and Sengstock,
Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem, will be
179. For recent developments in this area, see Burrus & Neuman, "Municipal Tort Liability," in Belli, Trial and Tort Trends 651 (1959).
180. See generally 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law 635-714 (1958).
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drawn upon in the generalizing chapter to follow. To put the instant work in concrete focus, however, the categories of permits,
licenses, and certificates and of special assessments have been
selected for detailed treatment.
The selection of these two areas is thought especially justified, in the light of the materials contained in the first two chapters of this work. In addition to their peculiar sensitivity to the
individual-state conflict, the areas selected may be seen to embrace both of the principal functions of modern government alluded to above, i.e., protection (licenses) and service (special assessments).181 Similarly, opportunity is afforded to examine local
administrative practice from the perspective of both its adjudicative (determination to grant or withhold a license) and legislative
(determination of "necessity" of a special assessment) aspects.182
Thereby, matters of immediate and particular concern to the individual, i.e., his choice of a profession or business and special
pecuniary exactions, may be seen in the light of the two principal
activities of administrative bodies, providing, it is hoped, a basis
of generalization to the broader subject of individual safeguards
or governmental limitations in the local context as a whole.
The scope of present inquiry thus defined, it goes without
saying that the entire fields of licenses and permits and of special assessments as embraced in typical treatises on municipal
corporations are without the purview of this work. Attention is
focused rather upon the individual, his rights and remedies, as
they are manifested in interaction with the administration of local
licensing and assessment law.
B. Permits, Licenses, and Certificates
1. Nature and Purpose

Incidental to the reappraisal and innovation in political theory occasioned by the quake of new conditions-alluded to abovel83
-has been the rejection, at least in practice, of laissez faire attitudes towards the conduct of business. The social interest protection against potential fire hazards or activities corruptive of
morality as strip shows, for example, has been balanced against
the individual interest in making a living or pursuing an occupation of one's choice. The prevalence of the social or general
181. Supra notes 15-19, and accompanying text.
182. Supra notes 60-68, and accompanying text.
183. Supra note 14, and accompanying text.
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interest in this regard constitutes the basis for economic regulation in our system (governmental limitations upon entry into and
continuation of business activity.) Justified under the police power, the basic means of such regulation in the local context is the
provision for licenses, permits, and certificates.184 The power of
government in this respect, however, is not untramelled. The requirements for its legitimate operation and the safeguards inuring
to the individual in his conflicts therewith, constitute the raison
d'etre of this section.185 The treatment is more or less chronological, commencing with application procedures and concluding
with redress available upon revocation.

2. Application, Conditions, and Issuance
a. Application
The first step in obtaining a municipal license or permit to
enter upon a particular business or occupational activity, is ordinarily the filing or presentation of an application to a designated
official, board, or department. Relevant statutes, charters, and
ordinances must be consulted carefully and every effort made to
comply with requirements as to the form of the application, the
manner and place of filing, and the conditions imposed. Although
not subject to the formal strictures requisite to a complaint at
law (substantial compliance ordinarily sufficing and irregularities
being waived upon issuance),186 certain elements, e.g., those affecting jurisdiction or prescribing legitimate conditions, are of
the essence and denial is sustainable for noncompliance.187
184. The terms are, herein, used more or less synonomously. Technically, "the term 'license' is more commonly employed to designate
official municipal authorization of a continuing business or activity
while the term 'permit' is more commonly, but not strictly, used
to refer to municipal authorization of an act or activity that will be
completed, the permit thereby being executed or terminated. . . .
Certificates of registration, approval, occupancy and the like are
issued in various instances and have in general the effect of a permit." 9 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 8 (3d ed. 1950).
185. Of course, permits have relevance to non-business activity as well,
e.g., the usage of a public hall for meetings or of the streets for
parades. See generally in this regard, 9 McQuillan, supra note 184,
at 368-77. Due to limitations of space, however, the emphasis,
herein, will be upon business and occupational licensing.
186. City & County of Denver v. Spiegleman, 76 Colo. 307, 231 Pac. 204
(1924).
187. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Davis, 194 Okla. 84, 147 P. 2d 135 (1942)
(requirement of filing of proof of title as prerequisite to granting
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Additionally, time and expense contingent upon correction, amplification, or litigation, even if successful, counsels judicious regard for the forms and procedures ordained. 18 8
b. Fulfillment of Conditions
Often provision is made by statute or by ordinance that
certain conditions be fulfilled by the applicant as prerequisites to
issuance. If reasonable in effect and reasonably incident to a
public purpose within the ambit of police power activity,189 the
condition is valid and adherence on the part of the applicant is
necessitated. As the Kentucky court stated:
The imposition of a condition to the granting of a license for police regulation, as distingUished from a license
for revenue, is by no means novel or confined to one class.
We have the familiar exactions of proof of professional
qualifications, of evidence of fitness for certain trades, of
the right of inspection and condemnation of dairy products
and other foodstuffs, and the numerous sanitary and fire
prevention regulations, as well as those controlling ·similar
conditions. Each of these is a limitation on the liberty of
Footnote continued
license to drill for oil); Miller v. City of Memphis, 181 Tenn. 15,
178 S. W. 2d 382 (1944) (Jukeboxes limited to reputable establishments).
188. Depending upon the particular ordinance involved, the requirement
may be of elaborate, formal, and documented application, or the
procedure may be informal and even oral. See generally City of St.
Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, 31 S. w. 1045 (1895). Some ordinances may require notice of the application, even to the extent of
publication. Schroeder Holding Co. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 177 Md. 186, 9 A. 2d 220 (1939). A protest procedure
may also be provided by statute or ordinance. Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 181 N.E. 786 (1932). In such
cases the giving of notice has been held to be a condition to the
vesting of jurisdiction in the local authorities to grant the license
applied for. Acme Development Co. v. Bureau of Licenses, 87 R.I.
11, 137 A. 2d 422 (1957).
189. The requirement is that the condition prescribed be reasonably related to the activity to be permitted; so that certain conditions,
valid as to some types of activity, would not be valid as to others.
For example, physical examination would be reasonably related to
a permit to engage in the milk business, but would be unreasonable
as a requirement for an auctioneer's license. Cf. People ex rel.
Schulz v. Hamilton, 97 Misc. 437, 161 N.Y.S. 425 (1916), rev'd other
grounds, 188 App. Div. 783, 177 N.Y.S. 222 (1919).
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earning a livelihood and holding and using one's property as
he desires. Nevertheless such regulations have withstood
attack as being the result of arbitrary and unreasonable action and others have not even been questioned. In all instances where there is such an authorized condition attached,
an applicant is not entitled to the license by merely paying
or tendering the fee or tax demanded.190

One of the principal categories of conditions is that of good
moral character. Thus, such activities as soliciting fundsl.91 and
auctioneering,192 as well as the operation of taxicabs,193 junkyards,194 poolrooms,1 95 and jukeboxes,196 have been subjected to
the requirement of character references 197 or endorsements on
the application.1 98 Justification under the police power is not
difficult in such cases. Poolrooms, for example, with their peculiar sensitivities in regard to the corruption of youth, lay themselves open to such measures in the interest of public morality.
Of similar effect is the condition of absence of conviction
of certain crimes.199 Junk dealers200 and taxi drivers,201 among
others, have been subjected to this requirement. Such conditions
are generally justified on the ground of safeguarding the public
from fraud. 202
A third category of conditions which an applicant may encounter in seeking a license or permit persists in requirements
190. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 235 Ky. 265, 271, 30
S.W.2d 968, 971 (1930).
191. In re Porterfield, 63 Cal. App. 2d 518, 147 P. 2d 15 (1944).
192. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2 d 313,
300 P. 2d 177 (1956).
193. Pratt v. City of Hollywood, 78 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1955).
194. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, supra note 190.
195. State ex rel. Reedhead v. City of Olympia, 122 Wash. 239, 210 Pac.
371 (1922).
196. Miller v. City of Memphis, supra note 187.
197. DeRoos v. Chapman, 106 N.J.L. 6, 147 Atl. 570 (1929).
198. In re Birkerstaff, 70 Cal. 35, 11 Pac. 393 (1886) (indorsement of
five persons).
199. In Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, supra note 192, a
California court, in holding "good moral character" and "absence
of conviction of a felony'' to be "permissible licensing requirements," went so far as to state that there is not even a "requirement that the conviction be restricted to that class of felonies
which is specially related to the profession licensed." Id. at 325,
300 P. 2d at 185.
200. Dening v. Cooke, 162 Misc. 723, 295 N.Y.S. 724 (1937).
201. Cf. Red Star Motor Drivers' Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 244 Mich.
480, 221 N.W. 628 (1928).
202. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, supra note 192.
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for demonstration of financial responsibility, i.e., the filing of an
indemnity bond or financial security. Typical cases include licenses to peddlers,203 amusement parks,204 pawnbrokers,205 fuel
dealers,206 a messenger business,207 plumbers,208 and auctioneers.209 So long as such constitutes a reasonable requirement
for the protection of the public210 (e.g., where persons wishing to
engage in hazardous activities are required to contribute to a
fund to compensate those suffering injuries from such dangerous
operations) and is reasonable in amount211 (i.e., not so high as
to be prohibitive) the condition is valid and the bond must be
posted.
An applicant for a building permit is ordinarily subjected
to a number of especial conditions. Such usually include the submission of plans and specifications,212 and the demonstration of
compliance with the building codes.213 Also, the seal of an architect may be required,2 1 4 as may be the approval of a fire commissioner.215 Such requirements are clearly sustainable under
the police power (e.g., the interest of the public safety in detecting the use of inferior materials or construction in a manner
203. State v. Harrington, 68 Vt. 622, 35 Atl. 515 (1896).
204. Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N.E. 110 (1932) (miniature
golf course).
205. City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29 (1985).
206. Sverkerson v. City of Minneapolis, 204 Minn. 388, 283 N.W. 555
(1939).
207. Portland v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 75 Ore. 37, 146 Pac. 148
(1915).
208. Rock v. Philadelphia, 127 Pa. Super. 143 (1937), aff'd, 328 Pa. 382,
196 Atl. 59 (1938).
209. Hirsch v. City & County of San Francisco, supra note 192.
210. See, in application, State ex rel. Howell v. Schiele, 153 Ohio St.
235, 91 N.E. 2d 5 (1950) (determination of financial responsibility of
bondsman upheld).
211. Bryan v. City of Malvern, 122 Ark. 379, 183 S.W. 957 (1916) (bond
of $1000 to operate billiard hall void).
212. In Karl Wolsey Co., Inc. v. Building Inspector of Bedford, 324 Mass.
419, 422-23, 86 N.E. 2d 644, 646 (1949), the Court stated: "Doubtless, this is a reasonable and necessary provision in any adequate
plan regulating the erection of buildings. 'The requirement for submission to a public officer of proposed buildings showing location,
size, material and details of construction has a rational connection
with public welfare.'"
213. People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E. 2d 839
(1948).
214. City of East Lansing v. Meridian Township Building Inspector, 332
Mich. 96, 50 N. W. 2d 730 (1952).
215. People ex rel. Fiberloid Corp. v. Walsh, 119 Misc. 510, 196 N.Y.S.
536 (1922).
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which might create a fire hazard 21 6) and failure in their performance justifies denial of the permit.217
For certain licenses (e.g., to deal in, distribute or handle
milk for human consumption) blood and health tests may .be required.218 Clearly relevant to the public health (e.g., in detecting
contagious diseases such as typhoid) such requirements are embraced readily by the police power and the applicant denies them
at his peril.
A common condition to the issuance of licenses and permits to engage in certain occupations and activities is the necessity of a demonstration of education, skill, or competence regarding the activity to be permitted. In this connection, examinations
have been required of applicants for taxi licenses,219 as well as
for those of general contractors,220 moving picture operators,221
stationary engineers,222 journeyman plumbers,223 electricians,224
installers of gas appliances,225 harbers,226 etc. In addition to
the requirement of justification under the police power, the examination must be reasonably incident to the activity to be permitted,227 as well as reasonable in administration and application.228 But if such requirements are met, the applicant is obliged
to comply.
Miscellaneous conditions which have been upheld include an
undertaking to provide a fronting road 229 and sewage facilities in
216. Cf. Lazich v. City of Butte, 116 Mont. 386, 154 P. 2d 260 (1944).
217. People ex rel. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 332 Ill. App. 500,
76 N.E. 2d 201 (1947). For a detailed treatment of building permits,
see 9 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 478-529.
218. Cf. People v. Hamilton, supra note 189.
219. Red Star Motor Drivers' Ass'n v. City of Detroit, supra note 201.
220. State ex rel. Reynolds v. City of St. Petersburg, 133 Fla. 766, 183
So. 304 (1938).
221. Gandy v. Borras, 114 Fla. 503, 154 So. 248 (1934).
222. City of St. Louis v. Meyrose Lamp Manufacturing Co., 139 Mo.
560, 41 s. w. 244 (1897).
.
223. City of Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 Pac. 1010 (1930).
224. Cf. Richardson v. Coker, 188 Ga. 170, 3 S.E. 2d 636 (1939).
225. Cf. Portsmouth Stove & Range Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 156 Md. 244, 144 Atl. 359 (1928).
226. Grisbord v. Philadelphia, 148 Pa. Super. 91, 24 A. 2d 646 (1942).
227. For example, it would be unreasonable to subject an applicant for a
license to engage in electrical construction to be examined to ascertain the expectancy that he will complete a contract. Richardson
v. Coker, supra note 224.
228. Standards governing particular determinations must be reasonably
specific and action taken thereunder must not partake of arbitrariness, whim, or caprice. See infra notes 380-84, and accompanying
text.
229. In re Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDMDUAL

47

building permit cases,230 and of junk yard proprietors to keep
records of their purchases231 and to submit such to the police,232
as well as to refrain from hiring minors233 or from purchasing
materials from them.234 The latter is, of course, justified in
terms of the susceptibility of junk yard operations to the disposal of stolen goods.
c. Investigation and Inspection
In addition to examination as to technical skill and health
indicated in the preceding section,235 certain types of licenses
and permits may require that the applicant agree to submit his
property to investigation or inspection. For example, provision
has been made for search of premises as a condition to a junk
yard license,236 and of vehicles to determine whether they are
"proper or safe" relative to their operation for hire.237 Approval of a fire commissioner may be required in order to obtain a
permit or license to store highly combustible materiaI.238 Further, provision may be made for periodic inspection, with fees
charged to cover the costs of inspection. 239
Such requirements, if reasonable, must be complied with,
and it is no defense to assert constitutional rights as to searches
without warrants. As the Kentucky court stated:
It cannot be gainsaid that those whose business and
operations are covered by the challenged ordinance may voluntarily waive the production of a search warrant. . . . In
consideration of the license to carry on a business of potential danger to the public welfare, the applicant is required to yield to measures designed to protect the public
interest. It is the surrender of a right for a privilege.240

Noncompliance with appended conditions (ascertained by such inspections) is, of course, grounds for revocation,241 which makes
230. River Forest State Bank v. Village of Hillside, 6 Ill. 2d 451, 129
N.E.2d 171 (1955).
231. City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543, 201 S.W. 870 (1918).
232. Ibid. See also City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, supra note 205.
233. Shurman v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 1, 95 S.E. 698 (1918).
234. Ibid.
235. See notes 218-28 supra, and accompanying text.
236. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, supra note 190.
237. Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N.E. 687 (1918).
238. People ex rel. Fiberloid Corp. v. Walsh, supra note 215.
239. Grisbord v. Philadelphia, supra note 226 (barber shops).
240. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, supra note 190, at
271-72, 30 S.W. 2d at 971.
241. Friedland v. Ingersoll, 249 App. Div. 623, 291 N.Y.S. 32 (1936) (curb
permit).
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of the inspection device a potent weapon in the arsenal of municipal regulation. Limitations, or counter-weapons of the individual,
are discussed in a latter section.
d. Payment of Fees
Accompanying the application and such other documents and
attestations as may be required, the applicant must ordinarily
include a designated fee. The fee schedules, both as between
different activities in the same municipality as well as the same
activity in different municipalities, are infinitely variable. Illustratively, the following have been sustained judicially: a license
fee of $50 for itinerant vendors242 or for peddlers, hawkers and
solicitors;243 fees of $30 per year244 or $3 per day for hawkers
and peddlers; 245 charges of $150 per year for peddling;246 fees
of $25 per day for the first ten days and $10 per day thereafter
on itinerants holding special sales of damaged goods;247 license
fees of $5 per week for hawking and peddling;248 charges of $500
monthly on itinerant vendors;249 fees of $10 per week or $50 per
year for hawking coffees, teas, spices, etc.;250 and fees ranging
from $2 to $200 per year on transient traders. 251
If valid, and the presumption favors validity,252 ·payment
constitutes a prerequisite to issuance. To be valid, the exaction
must be authorized either expressly or by implication,253 must
242. Nieman-Marcus Co. v. City of Houston, 109 S.W. 2d 543 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937).
243. People ex rel. Ellis v. Cowdrick, 150 Misc. 285, 268 N.Y.S. 825
(1934).
244. City of Alma v. Clow, 146 Mich. 443, 109 N.W. 853 (1906).
245. In re White, 43 Minn. 250, 45 N.W. 232 (1890).
246. People v. Riksen, 284 Mich. 284, 279 N.W. 513 (1938).
247. State ex rel. Lawson v. Woodruff, 134 Fla. 437, 184 So. 81 (1938).
248. People v. Baker, 115 Mich. 199, 73 N.W. 115 (1897).
249. Levin v. City of Asbury Park, 9 N.J. Misc. 515, 154 Atl. 742
(1931).
250. City of Muskegon v. Zeeryp, 134 Mich. 181, 96 N.W. 502 (1903).
251. People v. Grant, 157 Mich. 24, 121 N.W. 300 (1909).
252. Detroit Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Detroit, 267 Mich. 405, 255 N.W.
217 (1934). The burden is upon the protestant to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of the charge. Ross v. City of Kansas City, 328
S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1959).
253. Though often explicitly provided by statute or charter, Arms v. City
of Chicago, 314 Ill. 316, 145 N.E. 407 (1924), even absent an express grant, the exaction of reasonable charges may be implied
from the licensing power. Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St.
Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943). Nevertheless, some
authorization must exist or the fee will be struck down. Lamere
v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 552, 6~ N.E.2d 863 (1945).
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be "reasonably commensurate with the actual cost to the municipality for special services rendered," 254 must not be so high as
to be "oppressive and confiscatory,"255 and must not unduly burden interstate commerce,256 nor offend the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the laws. 25 7 If the fee be impregnable on these counts, the applicant will be required to pay.
e. Procedures for Granting or Rejecting
Having completed the application, fulfilled the requisite conditions, and paid the necessary fees, the applicant must not await
the decision of the designated board or official. It should be
noted that where by statute, charter, or ordinance a certain body
is invested with decision-making power, such may not be delegated to others, even to aids of the designate. 258 Such a delegation, where possible of demonstration by a contesting applicant,
constitutes grounds for judicial intervention.259 On the other
hand, inspection or examination by subordinates (with or without
recommendations) is totally permissible, so long as the ultimate
decision is made by the body authorized.260 Neither may the requirement of approval or endorsement (e.g., by a certain number
254. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, 312 Pa.
311, 316, 167 Atl. 891, 892 (1933). The crucial point here is that
the fee must be related to the cost of issuing the license and of
exercising police supervision. It "cannot be used as a source of
revenue." City of Prichard v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 369, 17
So.2d 451, 454 (1944). For example, a fee of three hundred dollars
per year for each bicycle used in vending ice cream, was held to
far in excess of the cost of regulation and was invalidated. Gurland v. Town of Kearny, 128 N.J.L. 22, 24 A.2d 210 (1942). On the
other hand, reasonable relation, not mathematical exactitude, is all
that is required. Rutherford v. City of Nashville, 158 Tenn. 499,
79 S.W.2d 581 (1935) (driver's license). In determining reasonableness, the courts have indicated that they will scrutinize all the circumstances and necessities of the case, including type of business,
size of the city, costs of supervision, etc. [People v. Riksen,
supra note 246] , and will pay particular attention to fees imposed
upon comparable businesses and activities. Gilbert & Sentinel Sales
Corp. v. Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. 432, 120 A.2d 114 (1956).
255. Id. at 437, 120 A.2d at 117. Fees assessed as against comparable
businesses as well as "the share left to the business after the tax"
[ Ibid.] constitute the factors to be assessed in ascertaining whether
the fee is confiscatory.
256. Infra notes 389-92, and accompanying text.
257. Infra notes 393-98, and accompanying text.
258. Cf. Assaid v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, 18 S.E.2d 287 (1942).
259. Cf. Amusement Enterprises, Inc. v. Fielding, 189 Misc. 625, 64
N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1946).
260. In re Hitchock, 34 Cal. App. 111, 166 Pac. 849 (1917).
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of landowners abutting the premises of an applicant for a liquor
or junk yard license) be assailable as improper delegation, such
being said to constitute a mere procedural requisite in the application process.261
The decision-making procedure may or may not involve a
hearing, there being no constitutional right to such in licensing
cases. 262 The constitutional requirement, of course, is that a
person cannot be deprived of property without due process of
law,263 and it has been held that the right to pursue a useful occupation or business is a property right within the protection afforded.264 Nevertheless, the courts have been wont to enforce the
requirement where not provided specifically, claiming that a license is not a right, but a privilege.265 In typical language the
West Virginia court said:
The operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways is not a natural right, nor is license to do so a contract, or property right, in a constitutional sense. It is
merely a conditional privilege . • . . 266
Though not required, however, statutes and ordinances frequently provide that hearings be held in such cases.267 The
261. E.g., Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 37 Sup.
Ct. 190 (1917); and Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich, 499, 286
N.W. 805 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 620, 60 Sup. Ct. 470
(1940). On the other hand, some courts have held the delegation
improper. E.g., Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.
2d 699 (1940).
262. 3 Antieau, supra note 180, at 392.
263. The constitutional guarantee devolves upon municipalities as agents
of the states through the fourteenth amendment.
264. Cf. Cutsinger v. City of Atlanta, 142 Ga. 555, 83 S.E. 263 (1914).
Of course, if the activity is one which the state can prohibit altogether-e.g., prize fighting or wrestling-then no right exists. E.g.,
Ward v. Drennon, 201 Ga. 605, 40 S.E.2d 549 (1946).
265. See generally 9 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 24-26.
266. Nulter v. State Road Comm'n of West Va., 119 W. Va. 312, 317, 193
S.E. 549, 552 (1937). The rationale, though persisting tenaciously in
the courts, has been the subject of considerable disfavor on the part
of the commentators. E.g., Gellhorn, Administrative Law 278 (2d
ed. 1947); Davis, supra note 85, at 1093, 1118-25 (1942); and
Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 775,
807-08 (1953).
267. E.g., Wilson v. Township Committee of the Township of Union, 123
N.J.L. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (1939); and Buffalo Cremation Co., Ltd. v.
Murch, 222 App. Div. 447, 226 N.Y.S. 477, aff'd, 249 N.Y. 531,
164 N.E. 572 (1928).
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provision may be permissive or mandatory, and denial where not
specifically required affords the applicant no grounds for redress.268 Public hearings may be necessitated where the activity
to be permitted has wide-spread and noxious effects upon the
community.269 Such protest procedures also, of course, depend
entirely upon the governing statute or ordinance.270
Hearings, where provided, are administrative proceedings
and not subject to the formal strictures of a case-at-law.271
Thus, rules of evidence, representation by counsel, etc., may be
abnegated where not provided by statute. The hearing must, however, be fair, and adequate opportunity afforded to make a case,
both by way of positive argument and rebuttal of the charges of
others.272
Generally, the requirement is that the entire body charged
with decision-making be present and pass upon the application;273
however, some statutes provide that a smaller number, or committee, suffices. 274 The mandate of fairness, of course, compels
that the designate board be impartial, but untimely objection (i.e.,
subsequent to the taking of the vote) has been held to waive the
applicant's relief in the matter.275
Upon compliance with all the prerequisites, the applicant
is entitled to reasonable promptness in consideration and decision.
Such may be compelled judicially .276 Finally, the applicant himself would be wise to ascertain whether the form of the license
and the officer who issued it are proper, there being no estoppel
against the government for its own errors.277

268. Such follows from the privilege-right distinction alluded to above.
If there is no right to a hearing, but a board in its discretion may
allow one or not, to disallow-without more-will not be construed
as an abuse of discretion.
269. Barnard v. Metropolitan Ice Co., 278 Mass. 441, 180 N.E. 308
(1932).
270. Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, supra note 188.
271. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and County of San
Francisco, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4 (1943).
272. Perpente v. Moss, 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E. 2d 726 (1944),
273. King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
274. Carr v. City of El Dorado, 217 Ark. 423, 230 S.W.2d 485 (1950).
275. Ibid.
276. Wilson v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 403, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 6, aff'd, 277 N.Y.
720, 14 N.E.2d 820 (1938).
277. Cf. Buffalo Red-I-Mix Concrete Corp. v. Foell, 1 App. Div.2d 702,
147 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (1955).
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3. Enforcement Proceedings
If the applicant proceeds in an activity or business prior to
issuance, or after rejection of his application, he will be subject
to municipal enforcement proceedings. The type of action to
which the violator will be subjected, of course, depends upon the
relevant statute or ordinance; and as might be expected, such
vary widely. Thus, a suit in equity might be forthcoming by way
of an injunction, either permanent278 or temporary,279 to restrain
continued violation. Or an action at law may be brought by the
city to collect license fees as a debt.280 Even the levy upon and
sale of property has been upheld where specifically authorized by
statute or charter .281
License violations may also occasion penalties, enforced
civilly by an action in debt282 or criminally by fine and imprisonment for refusal to pay •283 The latter have been held not to
be debts within constitutional provisions prohibiting imprisonment
for debt; 28 4 rather, the courts have stated, such is only a necessacy method of enforcing payment of the fine.285
Defenses against such proceedings are limited. Of course,
the method employed by the municipality must be authorized by
statute or ordinance,286 the courts indulging in a rather strict
reading (especially where penal) in such cases.287 Further, penalties cannot be unreasonable, excessive, cruel, or unusual; 288 and
where enforcement is by a criminal prosecution, the customary

278. Bush v. City of Jasper, 247 Ala. 359, 24 So.2d 543 (1945).
279. Beene v. Bryant, 201 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
280. Cf. Shepherd v. Little Rock, 183 Ark. 244, 35 S.W.2d 361 (1931).
IT no adequate procedure is provided by statute or ordinance for
collecting the fee, debt is generally the only action that can be
taken. City of Lexington v. Wilson, 118 Ky. 221, 80 S.W. 811
(1904). The theory is that the authority to require authorization
implies the power to impose some sanction. City of Emporia v.
Becker, 76 Kan. 181, 90 Pac. 798 (1907).
281. Carson v. Mayor & Council of Forsyth, 94 Ga. 617, 20 S.E. 116
(1894). But where unauthorized, levy and sale is improper. Johnson v. Armour & Co., 31 Fla. 413, 12 So. 842 (1893).
282. Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Atlantic & P. Tel. Co., 109 Fed. 55
(E.D. Pa. 1901).
283. Rosenbloom v. State, 64 Neb. 342, 89 N.W. 1053 (1902).
284. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934).
285. City of Chicago v. Morell, 247 Ill. 383, 93 N.E. 295 (1910).
286. 3 Antieau, supra note 180, at 408. This, of course, is subject to
the qualification stated at supra note 280,
287. City of Holton v. Tatlock, 77 Kan. 376, 94 Pac. 204 (1908).
288. Village of Utica v. Rumelin, 134 Neb. 232, 278 N.W. 372 (1938).
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rules of criminal procedure, such as the quantum of proof and
traditional constitutional safeguards, apply .289
On the other hand, whereas the statute of limitations constitutes a bar to municipal enforcement proceedings,290 laches
does not.291 Neither does actual knowledge by the city of violations over a substantial period of time work estoppel against municipal action,292 And, of course, where enforcement is by civil
proceedings, constitutional safeguards attendant to criminal prosecutions are not applicable.293
Specific defenses to a license enforcement proceeding generally follow lines suggested in a following section; that is, the
substantive grounds for attacking a denial. However, the unsuccessful applicant would be wise in pursuing one of the specific
remedies available (for example, mandamus) rather than to begin
business operations and await action by the local authorities. As
the Connecticut court observed:
He could not thus assume to take the law into his own
hands, and pursue the business without a license, because
a license had been wrongfully refused. His remedy, if he
had any, would be to apply by mandamus to compel the
board to grant him one,29'4

4. Remedies Available Upon Denial
a. Administrative Relief
Frequently, recourse to, and review by, an appellate administrative body is available to the unsuccessful applicant. 295
Such redress usually is available in respect to liquor licenses 29 6

289. Atlantic City v. Turner, 67 N.J.L. 520, 51 Atl. 691 (1902).
290. Cf. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co.,
73 N.J.L. 175, 63 Atl. 906 (1906), aff'd, 74 N.J.L. 774, 67 Atl. 113
(1907).
291. Cf. In re Application for Certificate of Occupancy, 32 North. Co.
Rep. 31 (Pa. 1949),
292. City of Cleveland Heights v. Colowe, 97 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio App.
1950).
293. Village of Utica v. Rumelin, supra note 288, On the implications
to personal rights of the civil-criminal classification generally, see
Antieau, supra note 178.
294. State v. Orr, 68 Conn. 101, 111, 35 Atl. 770, 772 (1896).
295. E.g., Cook v. Howard, 155 Md. 7, 141 Atl. 340 (1928).
296. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So.2d 387 (1947).
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and building permits.29 7 As provided by statute, charter, or ordinance, however, the use of such appeal boards298 may extend
to other activities, and local laws should be consulted to ascertain the relief available and the means to be employed in its re-

alization.
The appellate body may procede de novo, rehearing and reassessing all the evidence and making its own decision thereupon.299 Though the existence of discretion in granting or denying licenses renders the proceeding quasi-judicial in effect,300 the
body is, nevertheless, an "administrative tribunal," and in reaching decisions must act in that role.301 To withstand judicial assault, the decision must, of course, be reasonable. This is true
regardless of the degree of discretion conferred.302
The proceeding, being administrative in character, is not
subject to the formal requirements of a case at law.303 Nevertheless, the provisions of the statute or ordinance respecting, for
example, permissible time for appeal, are applied literally, and
no relief is accorded to a party filing after the statutory timeperiod has expired.3 04
Where such administrative relief is prescribed, the normal
rule of exhaustion of remedies applies to preclude prior resort
to the courts.305 On the other hand, the local board ordinarily
cannot consider the invalidity or unconstitutionality of the ordinance under which it is acting.306 Where the attack is on the
latter ground, it is not necessary to appeal first to administrative bodies, direct resort to the courts being immediately available.307
297. Gibbs Building & Construction Co. v. Town of Belleville, 100 N.J.
Eq. 240, 135 Atl. 333 (1926).
298. Sometimes council committees, rather than separate boards, constitute the reviewing body. Permenter v. Younan, supra note 296.
299. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City & County of San
Francisco, supra note 271.
300. Ibid. See also Jaffarian v. Murphy, supra note 204.
301. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City & County of San
Francisco, supra note 271.
302. Cf. Mangiello v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 6 N.J. Misc.
536, 142 Atl. 179 (1928).
303. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City & County of San
Francisco, supra note 271.
304. Hall v. Leonard, 260 App. Div. 591, 23 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1940).
305. Cf. State ex rel. Russell v. Board of Appeals of Village of Prairie
du Sac, 250 Wis. 394, 27 N.W.2d 378 (1947).
306. Clark v. Greenlee, 287 Ill. App. 474, 5 N.E.2d 278 (1936).
307. State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 209 Wis. 63, 243 N.W. 317 (1932).
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b. Judicial Redress
(1) Standing
The availability of judicial recourse is, of course, contingent upon standing. Thus, to be able to compel or oppose issuance (or to attack such by way of protest), it is requisite that
the complainant be a proper party plaintiff.308 And, in accord
with traditional notions, the necessity is that he be "aggrieved"
in the sense of ascertainable injury to his personal or property
rights.309
The typical situation in which difficulty arises in regard to
this requirement occurs where the plaintiff has made no application, or at least has not been turned down. In such event, as
well as where exception provisions are applicable, the courts
generally dismiss on the ground that the complainant has suffered no injury,310 Typically, the United States Supreme Court
has observed:
It seems somewhat doubtful whether the plaintiff in
error is in a position to raise the question of the invalidity
of the ordinance because of the alleged arbitrary power of
the mayor to grant or refuse it. He made no application
for a license, and of course the mayor has not refused it.
Non constat, that he would have refused it if application had
been made by the plaintiff in error. Whether the discretion
of the mayor is arbitrary or not would seem to be unimportant to the plaintiff in error so long as he made no application for the exercise of that discretion in his favor and was
not refused a license,311
To safeguard the right to judicial recourse, application to
the proper authorities is, therefore, imperative; and, upon refusal, such must be pleaded by the protesting applicant,312
(2) Specific Remedies
Having secured the right, the next step is to select the appropriate action. Careful scrutiny of statutes and ordinances is
advisable since exclusive remedies are frequently prescribed.
308. City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 45 Ohio App. 511,
187 N.E. 312 (1933).
309. Aliotta v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill. 418, 59 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
310. E.g., staub v. City of Baxley, 94 Ga. App. 18, 93 S.E.2d 375 (1956);
and Beene v. Bryant, supra note 279.
311. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 635 (1900).
312. Ibid.
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Also, care must be taken to appear within certain time-periods,
where the statute so provides.313
Mandamus. This most frequently utilized of the remedies
available is not dependent upon statutory authorization, it being
regarded as within the inherent powers of the courts.31 4 Where
issuance is mandatory or merely ministerial, and the applicant
has complied with all the requirements relevant thereto, mandamus is proper in the event of denial whether the statute so provides or not.315 Additionally, even though vested with considerable discretion, licensing authorities cannot act arbitrarily316 or
merely because of caprice or whim.31 7 In such event, the writ
lies to compel issuance.318 Finally, where the ordinance at issue is void, e.g., as constituting a denial of equal protection of
the laws,319 mandamus is sometimes available to secure municipal authorization.320
In accord with the general rule, the writ lies only upon
proof of a clear legal right to the license and upon demonstration that no valid ground existed for its denial by the licensing
authority .3 21 For this reason, where discretion is authorized,
the remedy is unavailable absent unreasonable and arbitrary action by the licensing body.322 As stated by the New York court:
In considering the power to issue a mandatory order
for license, permit or consent, the courts must take into
consideration the limits of the discretion which under the
statute or ordinance is vested in the administrative

313. State ex rel. Campagna v. City of Baton Rouge, 32 So.2d 82 (La.
App. 1947).
314. Permenter v. Younan, supra note 296.
315. Ibid.
316. State v. Town of Oak Harbor, 48 Wash.2d 839, 296 P.2d 1004 (1956).
317. City of St. Louis v. Meyrose Lamp Mfg. Co., supra note 222.
318. State v. Town of Oak Harbor, supra note 316.
319. McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga. 334, 43 S.E.2d 247 (1947).
320. State v. City of Defiance, 99 Ohio App. 398, 133 N.E.2d 392 (1955).
Attack on the grounds of imprecise standards is thus permissible
by mandamus. State ex rel. Triangle Fuel Co. v. Caulfield, 355
Mo. 330, 196 S.W.2d 296 (1946). The same would be true of an attack based upon unreasonable conditions. Richardson v. Coker, 188
Ga. 170, 3 S.E.2d 636 (1939). On the other hand, some courts have
stated that where the ordinance is totally void, mandamus is improper because in such event no license is necessary. E.g., Larkin
Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).
321. Pruzam v. Valentine, 282 N.Y. 498, 27 N.E.2d 25, aff'd, 258 App.
Div. 791, 15 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1940).
322. Smith v. City of Whitewater, 251 Wis. 313, 29 N.W.2d 37 (1947).
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body. • • • The courts may not interfere with discretion
as to when exception shall be made, nor formulate standards to be used in the exercise of that discretion; they may
interfere only when it is clearly shown that refusal is based
solely upon grounds which as a matter of law m~ not control the discretion of the [ administrative body] .3 3
And, the fact that others have been granted permits under similar circumstances has been held to be immaterial on the question of arbitrariness.324
Where a mere privilege (as opposed to a legal right325) is
involved, mandamus is unavailable, as issuance can be denied at
will. Further, unfulfilled but valid conditions preclude use of the
writ;326 as does the existence of another quick, specific legal
remedy.327 Finally, mandamus will be denied where issuance
would bring about violation of some other statute or ordinance.328
Though limitations thus exist as to its use, the writ, upon
proper application and the fulfillment of statutory conditions, affords a significant counterweight to government power as manifested in arbitrary and capricious executive action.
Injunction. Whereas mandamus is generally employed positively, i.e., to compel issuance, the injunction is ordinarily available to complete the picture by affording negative relief in restraining the enforcement of license or permit requirements,
fees or taxes, etc.329 Of course, to succeed in an action in
equity, grounds for equitable jurisdiction must be demonstrated.
Such would normally include inadequacy of remedy at law,330 irreparable injury, or multiplicity of suits. 331
323. Larkin Co. v. Schwab, supra note 320, at 334-35, 151 N.E. at 639.
324. Meadows v. Town Clerk of Saugus, 333 Mass. 760, 133 N.E.2d 498
(1956).
325. I.e., where the activity is one which the State can prohibit entirely,
e.g., a beer license. Phillips v. Head, 188 Ga. 511, 4 S.E.2d 240
(1939).
326. Deehan v. Johnson, 141 Mass. 23, 6 N.E. 240 (1886).
327. Lindquist v. City of Lindsborg, 165 Kan. 212, 193 P .2d 180 (1948).
328. Spur Distributing Co. v. City of Burlington, 216 N.C. 32, 3 S.E.2d
427 (1939).
329. E.g., American Bakeries Co. v. City of Huntsville, 232 Ala. 612,
168 So. 880 (1936); Aliotta v. City of Chicago, supra note 309; and
Mims v. City of Ft. Worth, 61 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
330. Availability of the legal remedy of mandamus may, therefore, preclude injunctive relief. Coker v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 473, 198
S.E. 74 (1937).
331. Cf. D. Gottlieb & Co. v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. App. 523, 97 N.E.
2d 468 (1950).
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Even the federal courts may be petitioned to restrain discriminatory fees or otherwise unconstitutional ordinances.
Such cases are rare, however, particularly where the order
sought would regulate the issuances to conduct business of a public nature in the city .333 In any event, the unconstitutionality
must be clear.334
Money Had and Received. In proper cases, an action quasi
ex contractu is permissible for recovery back of a fee or tax.
Absent payment under duress, e.g., to prevent seizure of person
or property,335 the action is supportable only by statutory authorization.336 Payment under protest, however, is not sufficient
even where the ordinance is void;337 there must be actual or
threatened compulsion.338 On the other hand, recovery back has
been allowed on a proportionate basis where the ordinance was
subsequently revoked by the municipality. 339
The rationale of the remedy was well stated by the Minnesota court as follows:
To permit defendant to retain that sum would be unconscionable enrichment of it at the plaintiff's expense. Hence, recovery quasi ex contractu is properly allowed.340
As to excessive fees paid pursuant to an illegal contract, however, recovery back is precluded under normal equitable principles of "unclean hands." 341
Miscellaneous Remedies. As provided by statute, certiorari
may be proper in certain cases;342 although it would appear to
be inferior to mandamus in that municipal authorities cannot be
332. Bradford v. City of Somerset, 138 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1943).
333. Gaines Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 123 F .2d 104 (7th
Cir. 1941).
334. Ibid.
335. Home Ins. Co. v. City of Birmingham, 236 Ala. 41, 180 So. 783
(1938).
336. Moore v. Village of Gilbert, 207 Minn. 75, 289 N.W. 837 (1940).
337. Noyes v. State, 46 Wis. 250, 1 N.W. 1 (1879).
338. Barker Bros., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 603, 76 P.2d
97 (1938).
339. Cf. Chamberlain v. City of Tecumseh, 43 Neb. 221, 61 N.W. 632
(1895). Contracts between cities and licensees regarding payment
back have been honored by the courts. Town of Columbia City v.
Anthes, 84 Ind. 31 (1882).
340. Moore v. Village of Gilbert, supra note 336, at 77, 289 N.W. at
838.
341. Krueger v. City of Hatton, 75 N.D. 489, 28 N.W.2d 749 (1947).
342. Aldee Corp. v. Flynn, 72 R.I. 199, 49 A.2d 469 (1946).
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compelled to act in the former instance,343 Declaratory judgment
actions have, in certain circumstances, been upheld;3 44 as have
actions under civil rights statutes where the validity of the ordinance or municipal denials thereunder interfered with the exercise of constitutional rights of national citizenship.3 45 Finally, if
one wishes to subject himself to incarceration, the writ of habeas
corpus is available to test the validity of the committing ordinance.346
Action for Damages. This remedy is unavailable as against
either the municipality347 or its officers,348 Since the issuance
or rejection of permits and licenses is a governmental function,349
even wrongful or arbitrary action by the licensing authority affords no legally enforceable claim for damages.350 Nor does
negligence in the inspection procedure, causing financial loss to
the applicant, occasion such relief absent specific statutory provision.351
The arsenal of counterweights to governmental power, as
manifested in the exercise of the authority to regulate by license,
is thus seen to be stocked with a variety of legal weapons. Caution must be exercised in their deployment, however, to ascertain
the proper time and operation of each, as well as its particular
utility in accomplishing the end sought. This means careful examination must be made of the statutes, charters, and ordinances
pertinent to the particular activity at issue.

(3) Trial and Appeal
Assuming standing and the selection of an appropriate form
of action, the complainant's case will proceed to trial, where the
343. Ibid.
344. E.g., Glackman v. City of Miami Beach, 159 Fla. 376, 31 So.2d
393 (1947); Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113
Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943); City of Corpus Christi v. Crow, 204
S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
345. Cf. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939).
346. Ex parte Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 122 Kan. 33, 250 Pac. 1056 (1926).
An additional remedy, which although of importance to local administrative law as a whole is of very limited value in regard to licensing, is the writ of prohibition, which issues to restrain action
in excess of jurisdiction. E.g., State ex rel. Townsend v. Ward, 70
Minn. 58, 72 N.W. 825 (1897).
347. Cf. Chism v. City of Tulsa, 192 Okla. 366, 136 P.2d 409 (1943).
348. Jaffarian v. Murphy, supra note 204.
349. Wasserman v. City of Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258 N.W. 857 (1935).
350. Roerig v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231, 175 N.W. 542 (1919).
351. Mead v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 72 (1873).
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general rules of judicial process, e.g., as to pleading and proof, 352
prevail. Usually, class suits are available to parties with identical interests on the theory of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.353
Ordinances requiring permits or licenses,354 as well as the
fees or taxes imposed,355 are presumptively valid, and the burden is upon the party asserting invalidity to demonstrate the nonexistence of the facts upon which the decision was based or that
denial was in excess of authority or constituted an abuse of discretion by the licensing authority .356
Courts differ as to the strictness of construction to be applied to such ordinances. Generally it is held that licensing provisions are to be accorded "reasonable constructions," permitting
of liberality in application.357 Others, however, and particularly
in the presence of penal provisions, impose strict construction on
the ground that such ordinances are in derogation of the common
law.358 Constructions and interpretations of the licensing authorities are given great weight by the courts.359
Usual rules as to trial practice and procedure apply •360
Hence, attendance and testimony of witness is compellable by
subpoena,361 failure of compliance being punishable by contempt
proceedings.362 The usual "fact-law" dichotomy persists in license cases,363 though the courts have differed as to whether
reasonableness in regard to a license fee was a question of fact
and for the jury,364 or a question of law and thus for the court.365
Generally, disputed questions of fact passed upon by the licensing
352. Cf. Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distributing Co., 202 Ga. 559,
43 S.E.2d 704 (1947).
353. Willkie v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 444, 58 N.E. 1004 (1900).
354. City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra note 254.
355. Helena v. Russwurm, 190 Ark. 601, 79 S.W.2d 993 (1935).
356. Silverman v. Department of Health of City of New York, 252 App.
Div. 678, 300 N.Y.S. 979 (1937).
357. Saxe v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 307 Mass. 495, 30 N.E.2d
380 (1940).
358. Cutaio v. Board of Health of City of Elizabeth, 36 N.J. Super. 565,
116 A.2d 646 (1955).
359. South Jersey Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Burnett, 125 N.J.L.
105, 14 A.2d 487 (1940). Such is, nevertheless, only persuasive.
McNeil v. Omaha, 160 .Neb. 301, 70 N.W.2d 83 (1955).
360. Cf. Townley v. Bruckman, 168 Misc. 422, 5 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1938).
361. In re Costello, 50 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1944).
362. Cf. Application of O'Leary, 50 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.
1944).
363. Hawkins v. City of Prichard, 249 Ala. 234, 30 So. 2d 659 (1947).
364. Daily v. City of Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281, 77 S.W.2d 939 (1934).
365. City of Burlington v. Unterkircher, 99 Iowa 401, 68 N.W. 795 (1896).
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authority are not subject to inquiry. On the other hand, the sufficiency of proof to justify the administrative decision is justiciable.366
The cardinal rule of judicial review in these cases was well
stated by the New York court:
The courts may not interfere with discretion as to
when exception shall be made, nor formulate standards to
be used in the exercise of that discretion; they may interfere only when it is clearly shown that refusal is based
solely upon grounds which as a matter of law may not control the discretion of the [body] .367
And, of course, the burden is upon the complaint to show that the
action "was so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a clear
abuse of discretion. 11 368 In this regard, the trial assumes the
character of a reviewing court rather than a trial de novo, 369 the
substantial evidence rules generally governing the scope of judicial action.370
The character of the ultimate judgment or decree will, of
course, depend upon the action employed and the practice of the
community. Ordinarily, however, while a court may void an ordinance, it may not modify it by substituting a different requirement or fee.371
Appeal to higher courts is generally permissible by certiorari. In such event, the general law and practice of appeal and
error controls.372
c. Substantive Grounds
Having indicated the procedural remedies available to the
unsuccessful applicant, the question remains of the substantive
366. City of Chicago v. Kirkland, 79 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1935).
367. Larkin Co. v. Schwab, supra note 320, at 334-35, 151 N.E. at 639.
368. State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514,
522, 75 N. W.2d 780, 786 (1956). The statement of reasons by the
licensing authority may [Amperse v. Common Council of City of
Kalamazoo, 59 Mich. 78, 26 N.W. 222 (1886)] or may not [State ex
rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, supra] influence the court
on the question of whether the administrative action was unreasonable.
369. Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 47 Cal.2d 11, 300
P.2d 831 (1956).
370. Deane v. Edgeworth Borough Board of Adjustment, 172 Pa. Super.
502, 94 A.2d 112 (1953).
371. City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra note 354.
372. See generally Alabama Gas Co. v. City of Montgomery, 249 Ala.
257, 30 So.2d 651 (1947).
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grounds upon which such attack may be predicated. Generally,
two categories of argument are available: (1) invalidity of the
ordinance on its face; and (2) invalidity of municipal action thereunder. These will now be considered in turn.
(1) Invalidity of Ordinance

Unreasonableness. As indicated above,3 73 licensing ordinances, as expressions of the police power, will be held unreasonable absent a clear tendency to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Such, indeed, is a requirement of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.374 Illustratively, the Oklahoma court stated:
There is no legal or logical presumption to be indulged
that only those presently licensed to sell raw milk in Oklahoma City are qualified or could qualify to engage in that
business without endangering the health of the inhabitants,375
This rule of reason applies as well to require clarity and certainty as to persons to whom it applies and as to what obligations
exist thereunder.376 Finally, the due process prerequisite will be
violated where the ordinance is so vague as to permit its unbridled and arbitrary application.377
Delegation and Sufficiency of Standards. After a period of
initial judicial confusion in attempting to distinguish between cases
of "true" and "quasi" delegation,3 78 the courts are agreed that
ordinances may no longer be invalidated solely on the ground of
delegation of legislative and/or judicial functions to administrative
bodies such as licensing authorities.379 Rather, the crux of the
requirement is the existence of ascertainable standards whereby
to guide and adjudge administrative determinations.380 As the
Michigan court stated the rule:
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Supra note 189.
City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245 Minn. 325, 71 N.W.2d 855 (1955).
Oklahoma City v. Poor, 298 P .2d 459, 460 (Okla. 1956).
Minnis v. City of Fort Worth, 61 S. W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
Hague v. C.I.O., supra note 345. Of course, the presumption favors
validity. City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, supra note 374.
378. Cf. language of the court in Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92
Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738 (1896).
379. Cf. language of the court in State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection
Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
380. Gross v. Allan, 37 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A.2d 275 (1955). The requirement of standards exists as well in cases of delegated authority to fix fee-schedules. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v.
City of Philadelphia, supra note 254.
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Reasonable regulations and a uniform rule of action in
its determination are essential to the validity of a municipal
ordinance. It cannot be left to the arbitrary decision of an
administrative officer or board.381
Illustratively, the standards of "fit and responsible" and "worthy"
have been held insufficient as guides to the granting of licenses
to solicit funds for charitable purposes.382
The requirement, it should be emphasized, is a strict one
as applied to local boards. The Michigan court phrased the rationale as follows:
Without definite standards an ordinance becomes an
open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool for
the suppression of competition through the granting of authority to one and the withholding from another.383
Even where the licensing authority is the local governing body
itself (e.g., the city council) the requirement may not be vitiated.384
Of course, the courts will not demand the impossible in licensing statutes. Thus, where circumstances render impracticable the establishment of very explicit standards, the ordinance
may, nevertheless, be upheld. This, indeed, was the ground posited by a New York court, in a frequently cited case, for upholding a rather broad grant of discretion of Buffalo officials in isusing licenses for the sale of meat. The court stated:
It will be observed that in some of the cases adverted to

the test upon which the discretion of the mayor was to be
exercised was defined in the Act or ordinance creating the
authority, while in others there was no limitation placed
upon it. It does not follow that the omission to prescribe
the bounds of authority carries the conclusion that it is
vested arbitrarily in the official or body to whom it is
committed. The difficulty of defining in a given case what
standard shall be applied in the disposition of the petition
and the fact that the conservation of the public health is
381. Harrigan & Reid Co. v. Burton, 224 Mich. 564, 571, 195 N.W. 60,
63 (1923).
382. Hoyt Bros., Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 260 Mich. 447, 249 N.W.
509 (1932).
383. Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich. 693, 700, 75 N.W.2d
25, 28 (1956). Ordinances concerned with the possible censorship
of faith and ideas are especially suspect, the requirement of explicitness of standards being commonly invoked in such cases. E.g.,
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S. Ct. 1148 (1948).
384. City of Houston v. Freedman, 293 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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the basis for the existence of the authority, indicate the
reason for the absence of the definition; but it is no warrant for the inference that the power is an arbitrary one,
to be exercised in ruthless disregard of the rights of any
class or individual. The discretionary authority must rest
somewhere, and experience has shown that its lodgment
in some body or official of the municipality is more efficacious than to leave it with the legislature, to whom the
local situation may be unknown.385

Also, where a tradition of regulation has been established
(e.g., with respect to meat and milk), courts have read standards
into statutes whereby to uphold their validity .386 And finally, in
the licensing of activities particularly subject to especial police
surveillance (e.g., dealers in secondhand goods), rather broad
standards have been validated as constituting a special class of
regulated activity .38 7
In spite of these exceptions, the requirement that definite
standards be stated usually prevents arbitrariness in municipal
licensing.3 88
Commerce Clause. License requirements or fees that burden interstate commerce are invalid as violating the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Typical cases include
registration and fees imposed upon out-of-state solicitors3 89 and
interstate truckers.390 In either case, if the exactions are so
onorous as to impede commerce, the ordinances will be struck
down. Where reasonable, however, (i.e., only slightly burdensome,391 or where the local interest outweighs the national)392
an ordinance will not be invalidated on this ground.
Equal Protection. Although classification is permissible in
municipal licensing ordinances, to be valid they must be reasonably
385. City of Buffalo v. Hill, 79 App. Div. 402, 406, 79 N.Y. Supp. 449,
452 (1903). See also State ex rel. Altop v. City of Billings, 79
Mont. 25, 255 Pac. 11 (1927).
386. E.g., Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923).
387. Ex parte Holmes, 187 Cal. 640, 203 Pac. 398 (1921).
388. E.g., City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E.2d 317 (1937);
Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S.W.2d 283 (1935); American
Cancer Society, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 94 Ohio App. 131, 110 N.E.
2d 605 (1952); and City of Texarkana v. Mabry, 94 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936).
389. Nafziger Baking Co. v. City of Salisbury, 329 Mo. 1014, 48 S.W.2d
563 (1932).
390. Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 57 S. Ct. 439 (1937).
391. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 136 F.
Supp. 476 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
392. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 69 S. Ct.
463 (1949).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL

65

nondiscriminatory against particular persons or classes of persons. 393 As a California court observed:
The municipality may classify business where there is
an intrinsic, natural and reasonable ground for such distinction, and may impose a different license burden on the
different classes. It cannot classify, except on such basis,
and cannot tax some falling within a class while exempting
others of the same class.31}4
Exemptions are permissible (e.g., to farmers peddling their own
wares3 95 and disabled veterans396), but where such constitute unwarranted favoritism they will be invalidated.397 Classifications,
to be upheld, must be "genuine and substantial ••• as distinguished
from. • .merely capricious and arbitrary"398; this is a requirement both of due process and equal protection of law.
Freedom of Religion and Communication. Ordinances requiring permits or licenses to use the public streets for parades399 or loud-speakers,400 public halls for meetings,401 or as
prerequisites to soliciting funds for religious purposes,40 2 cannot
accord to the licensing authority the power of censorship. Reasonable requirements in the interest of the public safety, health,
or welfare are, of course, unassailable.403 On the other hand,
the expression of particular ideas or religious beliefs can neither
be proscribed by ordinance directly, not limited indirectly by the
unbridled discretion of a licensing official. As the Supreme Court
put it: "The power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance reveals its vice. 11 404
Conflict with State Law. Finally, a local ordinance may be
invalid on its face due to a conflict with state law. Proscribed
393. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 67 S. Ct.
1062 (1947).
394. Kelly v. City of San Diego, 63 Cal. App. 2d 638, 644, 147 P .2d 127,
131 (1944).
395. Cf. State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313 (1939).
396. E.g., Kelly v. City of Jefferson, 178 Ga. 427, 173 S.E. 133 (1934).
397. Soares v. City of Santa Monica, 38 Cal. App. 2d 215, 100 P .2d
1108 (1940).
398. City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, supra note 374, at 331, 71 N.W.2d at
859.
399. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762 (1941).
400. Saia v. New York, supra note 383.
401. Cf. Hague v. C.I.O., supra note 345.
402. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232, 163 P.2d 704
(1945).
403. Cox v. New Hampshire, supra note 399.
404. Saia v. New York, supra note 383, at 562, 68 S. Ct. at 1151.
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activities, e.g., gambling,405 and any activities specifically precluded by state constitution406 or statute407 may not be licensed
locally. In the absence of explicit pre-emption, however, the
states vary widely as to duplicatory licensing, necessitating careful scrutiny of the particular law of the forum where a case
arises. Thus, although the general rule appears to be that state
licensing of a particular activity or occupation does not preclude
complementary action by municipal authorities, some jurisdictions
rule to the contrary. Illustratively, an Ohio court has held that
state permits to operate liquor stores implied a legislative intention that nothing further be required to engage in the activity,
thereby prohibiting duplicatory licensing at the municipal level.408
(2) Invalidity in Application

Assuming the ordinance to be valid on the face, relief may,
nevertheless, be forthcoming where municipal action thereunder
is arbitrary or unreasonable.409 In the leading case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,410 the Supreme Court of the United States described
the requirement as follows:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution. 411
405. State ex rel. Sergi v. City of Youngstown, 68 Ohio App. 254, 40
N.E.2d 477 (1941).
406. Cf. State v. Pehrson, supra note 395.
407. City of Lincoln v. Dehner, 268 Ill. 175, 108 N.E. 991 (1915).
408. Compare Spisak v. Village of Solon, 68 Ohio App. 290, 39 N.E.2d
531 (1941), with Smith Co. v. Town of Elsmere, 308 Ky. 442, 214 S.W.
2d 765 (1948). See also 3 Antieau, supra note 180, at 376-77, and
cases cited therein.
409. The cases rejecting municipal action under licensing and permit
ordinances are, indeed, legion. E.g., City Council of City & County
of Denver v. United Negroes Protective Ass'n, 76 Colo. 86, 230
Pac. 598 (1924); Meyers v. Houghton, 137 Minn. 481, 163 N.W. 754
(1917); Coyne v. Prichard, 272 Pa. 424, 116 Atl. 315 (1922); City
of Mobridge v. Brown, 39 S.D. 270, 164 N.W. 94 (1917); and Congregation Committee of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City and Council of
Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
410. 118 U.S. 356, 30 S. Ct. 220 (1886).
411. Id. at 373-74, 30 S. Ct. at 227.
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In applying the rule, the Court held invalid municipal action under
an ordinance requiring perm its to use wooden buildings in the
laundry business in San Francisco, as constituting a naked discrimination against Chinese residents. Even granting considerable discretion, its exercise must be predicated upon "some reasonable foundation in fact, justifying its exercise. 11 412 On the
other hand a mere showing of issuance of permits or licenses to
others in similar circumstances is not sufficient to secure judicial reversal on grounds of unreasonable application.41 3
All the surrounding factors, including the attitude of neighbors, is within the judicial purview in ascertaining reasonableness. 414 Although reasons may not be required to accompany denials,415 their existence strengthens judicial respect for the decisions of the licensing body 416 and makes the task of the complainant in establishing unreasonableness that much more difficult.
Although reasonably exercised discretion (even where such
is widely bounded) is unassailable, arbitrary and discriminatory
determinations are thus seen to invest the injured party with
grounds for judicial redress just as effective as if the ordinance
were invalid on its face.
5. Renewal
Inasmuch as permits and licenses usually are issued for
limited periods only, renewal is necessary to lawful continuation
of the activity permitted.417 The rules indicated above with regard to application, specific remedies, trial and appeal, etc., generally apply to renewals just as to the original request. Similarly, renewal fees are assailable when unreasonable, disproportionate to policing costs, or confiscatory .418
A basic point in renewal cases deserving especial emphasis
is that the grant of a license confers no vested right, either in
property or in contract, to continue the activity in perpetuity. 419
In fact the very requirement for renewal implies the limitation.
412. State ex rel. Hardman v. Town of Glenville, 102 w. Va. 94, 97, 134
S.E. 467, 468 (1926).
413. Cf. Reininger Zoning Case, 362 Pa. 116, 66 A.2d 225 (1949).
414. French v. Cooper, 133 N.J.L. 246, 43 A.2d 880 (1945).
415. Rowland v. State, 104 Ohio St. 366, 135 N.E. 622 (1922).
416. Cf. State ex rel. Johnson v. City of Charleston, 91 W. Va. 318, 112
S.E. 577 (1922).
417. Cf. Kurowski v. Board of Adjustment of City of Bayonne, 11 N.J.
Super. 433, 78 A.2d 429 (1951).
418. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P .2d 72 (1935).
419. State ex rel. Hoffman v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88, :n So.2d 52 (1947).
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Generally, renewals can be turned down on those grounds
sufficient to warrant revocation420 or forfeiture, 421 or on the
basis of a change of policy embracing legitimate police power
purposes.422 On the other hand, arbitrary denial is not sustainable, and the denial or a renewal is likely to be held arbitrary
where the license was issued many times previously and no reasonable basis appears manifest for the current refusal.423 The
scope of judicial oversight is, as in original request cases, the
"arbitrary and capricious" rule.424

6. Revocation
a. In General; Grounds
As stated above, the grant of a license confers no vested
right in the licensee of a nature that the municipality cannot, in
the interest of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, revoke or suspend for cause. 425 Generally the same rules apply to
govern the discretion of officials in revoking as in issuing licenses. 426 Such necessarily includes the requirement of ascertainable standards reasonably related to the police power, and· of
reasonable, unarbitrary action thereunder.427
Unless specifically revocable at pleasure by the municipality, legal grounds must be posited for its validation.428 Such
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

425.

426.
427.

428.

Librizzi v. Plunket, 126 N.J.L. 17, 16 A.2d 280 (1940).
Zicherman v. Driscoll, 133 N.J.L. 586, 45 A.2d 620 (1946).
Ibid.
Katz v. Moss, 184 Misc. 133, 55 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1944).
Zicherman v. Driscoll, supra note 421. Special rules as to the effect of appreciable property interests and particular types of activity, e.g., the liquor business, are the same as for revocation and
are discussed infra at notes 440-43 and accompanying text.
Such is usually authorized by statute or ordinance [ Richardson v.
Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 57 S.W.2d 797 (1932)), but has been implied
from the power to issue. McKenzie v. McClellan, 62 Misc. 342,
116 N.Y.S. 645 (1909).
Richardson v. Reese, supra note 425.
Middleton v. Kavenedas, 298 Ky. 296, 182 S.W.2d 896 (1944). All
of the substantive grounds suggested above by which to attack refusal of issuance would apply here as well. See notes 373-416
supra, and accompanying text.
Cf. Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distributing Co., supra note 352.
Generally, statutes and ordinances authorize revocation for causes
enumerated or for instances of specified misconduct. Burley v.
Mayor, Counsellor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 307,
34 A.2d 603 (1943). In the public interest, however, revocation is
permissible even absent specific authorization. Southern Pacific
Co. v. City of Portland, 227 U.S. 559, 33 S. Ct. 308 (1913).
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grounds commonly include material misrepresentations in the application,429 issuance through mistake or inadvertence,430 unfair
or fraudulent practices by the licensee,431 issuance without authority432 or under an invalid ordinance,433 issuance in violation of an
ordinance, 434 and violations of terms and conditions of the licensing ordinance,435 Where, on the other hand, no such cause may
be found to exist, the licensee must evidently be worthy of continuing in business and revocation is impermissible.436
b. Rights of Licensees

(1) Effect of Reliance; Noxious Activities
In addition to the requirements of unarbitrary action under
reasonable statutes and the existence of legal grounds as preconditions to revocation, certain rights may arise respecting conduct
of the activity by which to attack municipal action taken in abridgment thereof. Thus, it has been stated that while no vested right
inheres in a license so as to tie the hands of the local boards,
certain types of permits (e.g., authorizations to build) acquire
something of a vested right after expenditure of large sums or
undertaking of substantial construction in reliance on the permtt.437
429. Ramundo v. Murdock, 265 App. Div. 526, 39 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1943).
430. Howe Realty Co. v. City of Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W.2d
904 (1940). Neither estoppel [ Alexander Co. v. Owatonna, 222
Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244 (1946)] nor laches [ S. B. Garage Corp.
v. Murdock, 185 Misc. 55, 55 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1945)) is available
against the government in such event, even where substantial expenditures have been incurred. Building Commission of City of
Detroit v. Kunin, 181 Mich. 604, 148 N .W. 207 (1914).
431. Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 402.
432. Cf. City of San Antonio v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 27 S.W.2d
868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
433. City of Martinsburg v. Miles, 95 W. Va. 391, 121 S.E. 285 (1924).
434. Cf. Edge v. City of Bellaire, 200 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
435. Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N.E. 718 (1905). Of
course, a change in the ordinance may contructively revoke a license, at least where substantial expenditures have not been incurred
in reliance on the prior law. Davis v. Mayor & Aldermen of City
of Savannah, 147 Ga. 605, 95 S.E. 6 (1918).
436. Burley v. Mayor, Counsellor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis,
supra note 428.
437. Russell Dairy Stores, Inc. v. City of Chippewa Falls, 272 Wis. 138,
74 N.W.2d 759 (1956). Such rights have been variously described
as property rights [ Burton v. Lefevre, 72 R.I. 478, 53 Atl. 2d 456
(1947)], contract rights [Katz v. Moss, supra note 423) and a license coupled with an interest.
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In such circumstances, both substantial expenditure 438 and the
absence of notice 439 are imperative to secure the right.
Somewhat of a double standard obtains in this regard, however. Businesses or activities which are potentially harmful, or
which might be outlawed altogether (e.g., the sale of intoxicating
liquors) fall without the ambit of the rule. Vested rights are
never said to exist in such cases, not even upon substantial expenditures; 440 and so long as not arbitrary or capricious, revocation is permissible at will.441 Even in these cases, however,
a particular licensee cannot be singled out and his authority cancelled without cause. 442 Finally, the basis for revocation must
affect all in the class equally or suffer invalidation as abridging
equal protection of the law.443
(2) Notice and Hearing

As was stated above with regard to original issuance, there
is no due process right to notice and hearing in revocation
cases. 444 At least, summary revocation is permissible where
specifically a part of the statute or ordinance,445 or where revocation is authorized at the pleasure of the licensing board. 446
Also, where necessary to protect the public health, safety, morality, or general welfare, summary revocation is recognized.447
Usually, however, in the latter instance, a subsequent judicial
hearing is afforded on the propriety of the peremptory action and
the amount of damages.448

(:

~

438. Cf. Winn v. Lamay Realty Corp., 100 N.H. 280, 124 A.2d 211 (1956).
439. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 S.2d 274 (Fla. 1955).
440. State ex rel. First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 136
Fla. 788, 187 So. 148 (1939).
441. Grubb v. Mayor & Aldermen of Morristown, 185 Tenn. 114, 203
S.W.2d 593 (1947).
442. Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distributing Co., supra note 352.
443. William Fox Amusement Co. v. McClellan, 62 Misc. 100, 114 N.Y.S.
594 (1909).
444. City of San Antonio v. Robert Thompson & Co., 30 S.W.2d 339
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
445. Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269
Pac. 1043 (1928).
446. State ex rel. First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, supra
note 440.
447. People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 189 N.Y. 187, 82
N.E. 187 (1907).
448. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306,
29 S. Ct. 101 (1908).
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Where summary revocation is not authorized on one of the
above grounds, notice and hearing are normally required. 449 Especially is this likely to be true where substantial expenditure,
work, or obligation has been incurred under the license.450 The
rationale for broadening the protection accorded subsequent to
the grant of the license was well-phrased by a Texas court as
follows:
The revocation, or suspension, of a license to follow a
lawful occupation is necessarily penal in its effect, and its
imposition by a tribunal as the consequence of offensive
misconduct involves all of the elements of a judicial proceeding, 451
Generally, notice and hearing are required by statute or ordinance in such cases.452 Even if no express requirements exist,
however, reliance plus substantial investment apparently raises
the protection to the status of constitutionally guaranteed right. 453
Where obliged constitutionally or by statute, the requirements governing notice, hearing procedure, standards, matters of
proof, etc., follow lines indicated above with regard to original
issuance and will not be discussed further at this point. Of similar effect are the rules governing remedies available and substantive grounds of attack.
C. Special Assessments

1. Nature and Purpose
The conditions of modern cities necessitate constant improvements. Indeed, the national complex, once almost exclusively
agricultural, has so altered in form that today close to sixty-five
per cent of our population resides in cities or towns. 454 The
consequent urban sprawl has, in turn, generated the demand for
new streets, retaining walls, sidewalks, sewers and drains,
449. City of Texarkana v. Brachfield, 207 Ark. 774, 183 S.W.2d 304
(1944).
450. New York Southern Coal Terminal Corp. v. Woolley, 35 N.Y.S.2d
443 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1942).
451. Wichita Electric Co. v. Hinckley, 131 S.W. 1192, 1193 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1910).
452. E.g., Flood v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 25 Ga. App. 455,
103 S.E. 720 (1920).
453. City of Texarkana v. Brachfield, supra note 449.
454. I.e., of 2,500 or more population. Adrian, Governing Urban America
16 (1955).
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lighting systems, water pipes, parks, etc. The provision of such
services, of course, entails considerable expense, the result of
which is a conflict between the general interest in securing the
improvement and the individual interest in being obliged to pay.
Though, as in the case of licenses, the public interest has prevailed to the extent of validating pecuniary exactions from the
populace where expressly authorized by statute,455 a complement
of individual rights remains. The purpose of this section is to
ascertain the limitations upon government and the extent of individual safeguards with respect to the special assessment technique of local financing.
Although the purpose of the special assessment is the financing of municipal services, not every improvement may be
funded in this manner. The requirement is that the advantage
accruing to the assessed property owners be primarily local as
opposed to beneficial to the community as a whole.456 As the
Arkansas court exposited the requirement:
If we look for the technical or legal meaning of the
phrase "local improvement," we find it to be a public improvement, which, although it may incidentally benefit the
public at large, is made primarily for the accommodation
and convenience of the inhabitants of a particular locality,
and which is of such a nature as to confer a special benefit upon the real ,Eroperty adjoining or near the locality of
the improvement. 57

Additionally, it should be kept in mind that local governments
possess no inherent power to levy special assessments. Statutory
authorization must be explicit,458 and local action pursuant thereto must strictly accord with statutory requirements.459
By way of a final word before proceeding, it should be emphasized that the practices of local governments vary widely in
this regard. No attempt is made herein to catalogue the great
455. Kansas City v. Jones Store Co. 325 Mo. 226, 28 S.W.2d 1008 (1930);
and City of Wichita Falls v. Williams, 119 Tex. 163, 26 S.W.2d 910
(1930).
456. City of Waukegan v. DeWolf, 258 Ill. 374, 101 N.E. 532 (1913).
457. Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 37, 55 S.W. 955, 957 (1899).
As to what improvements are regarded as "local," see generally
14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 72-108.
458. Anderson v. City of North Miami, 99 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1957); Daniel
v. Smith, 179 Ga. 79, 175 S.E. 240 (1934); City of Charlotte v.
Kavanaugh, 221 N.C. 259, 20 S.E.2d 97 (1942).
459. State ex rel. Wheless Inv. Co. v. City of Shreveport, 142 So. 641
(La. App. 1932); and Marquette Homes, Inc. v. Town of Greenfield,
244 Wis. 588, 13 N.W.2d 61 (1944).
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diversity, nor would such listing seem imperative to the objectives of the present work. Rather, attention is focused upon!!£!_cal procedures in effecting and enforcing such assessments and
the remedies of the individual with respect thereto, that is, governmental limitations and individual safeguards. As to a specific
problem in a particular jurisdiction, the statutes and ordinances
of the locality must be consulted.
2. Procedures in Effecting
a. Preliminary Resolution or Petition
Typically, special assessments are initiated either by resolution of intention by the governing bocty460 or a statutory board461
of the municipal corporation, or by petition of the property owners directly affected. 462 Whatever method is provided, strict
compliance with the statutory procedure is necessitated, defective
execution voiding the assessment. 463 Indeed, where statutes require a resolution, its absence is deemed jurisdictional, 464 permitting judicial inquiry at any stage in the proceedings and precluding the otherwise potent defense of estoppel.465
The purpose of the resolution is to inform interested parties of the prospective improvement and assessment. Notice, of
course, to be effective must be published; and such publication
must clearly indicate the nature, kind, and character of the improvement contemplated, 466 as well as, occasionally, the estimated amount of the assessment. 467 Ordinarily, a waiting period
then ensues to permit protest by affected land owners. By statute
or ordinance the provision is generally made that if a certain
number of the property owners-usually two-thirds or a "majority" (more than half}-object to the proposed assessment, no further action may be taken under the resolution. Those objecting
to the assessment would, in this event, circulate a petition contesting the assessment among the property owners in the proposed
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

E.g., Michigan Stat. Ann. § 5.1827 (1949).
E.g., Wisconsin Laws ch. 275 (1931).
E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 429.03 (1945).
City of Alexandria v. Shevnin, 240 La. 983, 126 S.2d 336 (1961)
(petition by property owners).
Partridge v. Lucas, 99 Cal. 519, 33 Pac. 1082 (1893).
Infra notes 568-70, and accompanying text.
Escott v. City of Miami, 107 Fla. 273, 144 So. 397 (1932).
City of Mattoon v. Stump, 414 Ill. 319, 111 N.E.2d 551 (1953).
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district, If the required number of signatures are obtained, the
assessment is defeated.468
Where initiation occurs by way of petition rather than by
resolution, the local board or governing body determines the validity of the procurement of the necessary signatures. 469 Although
most courts deny finality to this determination,470 some states
preclude judicial inquiry in holding that a finding of sufficiency
of the petition is unassailable by collateral attack. 471
From the vantage of the individual property owner, redress
at the initial stage of the assessment procedure is thus confined
to mustering solidarity of attitude and action by those similarly
situated. Such is effected either by securing the statutory protest figure to thwart the potential assessment in the case of resolutions, or by failure of fulfillment of the statutory signature requirement in the case of petitions.
b. Assessment Districts
Typically, the next step is the establishment of the assessment, improvement, or taxing district.472 The method of determining the boundaries of the district is often explicitly prescribed
by statute or charter.473 Legislative delegation to local officials
of the authority to construct their own formula (e.g., block-byblock, parallel lines, etc.) for demarcating the boundaries, however, is not invalid as an abdication of the legislative function.
On the contrary, rather broad grants of discretion to municipal
bodies have, in this regard, been readily sustained by the
courts.474 Nevertheless, such mandatory and jurisdictional prescriptions as are contained in the statute necessitate substantial
468. E.g., Harder v. City of Springfield, 192 Ore. 676, 236 P.2d 432
(1951).
469. Cf. Nichols v. Tallmadge, 260 Mich. 576, 245 N.W. 521 (1932).
470. Steinmuller v. City of Kansas City, 3 Kan. App. 45, 44 Pac. 600
(1896).
471. City of Avis v. Allen, 83 W. Va. 789, 99 S.E. 188 (1919).
472. The legislative power to create such districts is incidental to the
taxing power and is limited only by the Constitution. Cf. Chesebro
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 306 U.S. 459, 59 S.
Ct. 622 (1939). The delegation of this power to municipalities has
been uniformly upheld. E.g., Hartman v. Nimmack, 116 Mont. 392,
154 P.2d 279 (1944). On such special districts generally, see Pock,
Independent Special Districts: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area
Problems (1962).
473. E.g., Bass v. City of Gasper, 28 Wyo. 387, 205 Pac. 1008 (1922).
474. E.g., City of Tulsa v. McCormick, 63 Okla. 238, 164 Pac. 985
(1917).
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compliance, 475 and failure in this regard renders the establishment illegal.476
The usual procedure for creating the district is by resolution of the municipal councU477 or by ordinance. 478 The description of boundaries must be certain and accurate479 and may not
include property not benefited by the improvement. 480 Generally,
the governing body's duty to demarcate boundaries cannot be delegated, although the preparation of initial plans or outlines by city
engineers is permissible. 481 Within these limitations, however,
broad discretion inheres in the municipal body in fixing the bounds
of the district.482 The theory is that the establishment constitutes
a legislative act, and, in consequence, is conclusive absent a
showing of fraud. 483 As the South Carolina court stated:
The Legislature itself may create a district of this
kind and fix its boundaries. Where it does so, the landowners included therein are not entitled to a hearing on the
question of whether their lands will be benefited. Prior inquiry by the legislative body is presumed. 484
And by the Missouri court: "[T] he determination was conclusive,
absent fraud or oppression, and not subject to review by the
courts. 11485
On the other hand, discretion is not unlimited either. Where,
for example, a purely private charge is contemplated under the
guise of setting off an assessment district, 486 where action is
without any regard to benefits derived,487 where the boundaries
are uncertain, 48 8 or in the extent of fraud or demonstrable
475. Marret v. Jefferson County Construction Co., 161 Ky. 845, 171
s.w. 396 (1914).
476. City of St. Louis v. Koch, 169 Mo. 587, 70 S.W. 143 (1902).
477. E.g., Bass v. City of Casper, supra note 473.
478. E.g., In re Eighth Avenue Northwest, Seattle, 77 Wash. 570, 138
Pac. 10 (1914).
479. Whitney v. Common Council of the Village of Hudson, 69 Mich. 189,
37 N.W. 184 (1888).
480. Lipscomb v. Lenon, 169 Ark. 610, 276 S.W. 1088 (1925).
481. Cf. Scofield v. City of Lansing, 17 Mich. 437 (1868).
482. Seested v. Dickey, 318 Mo. 192, 300 s.w. 1088 (1927).
483. Schaer v. Little Rock, 179 Ark. 68, 14 S. W.2d 237 (1929).
484. Mills Mill v. Hawkins, 232 S.C. 515, 529, 103 S.E.2d 14, 20 (1957).
485. Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, Inc., 361 Mo. 504,
512, 235 S.W.2d 355, 359 (1950).
486. Lipscomb v. Lenon, supra note 480 (auditorium).
487. Hanscom v. City of Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N.W. 739 (1881).
488. Whitney v. Common Council of Village of Hudson, supra note 479.
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mistake, 489 judicial inquiry is permissible. Where review is thus
available, the typical remedy is an injunction. 49 0
c. Finding of Necessity
Although not required by federal 491 or state492 constitutions,
statutes or charters frequently provide for the filing, at this
stage, of plans, specifications and cost estimates. 493 The purpose of the filing, where authorized, is to afford notice of the
prospective assessment. Ordinarily, in such event, a public hearing on the question of the necessity of the improvement follows
the giving of notice;494 and whether the hearing be labelled "legislative" or "judicial" it must at least be fair.495 Typically,
this means no more than knowledge plus an opportunity to rebut.496
After the hearing, or in its absence if none is required, the
public body makes a determination of the necessity of the improvement, and then proceeds, by resolution or ordinance, to order the improvement and to indicate the total amount to be assessed.497 Judicial inquiry is severely limited at this stage. As
the New Mexicd court stated:
[T]he city commission is clothed with the power to determine what local improvement is required, its nature, when
it shall be made and the manner of its construction. These
matters are confided to the discretion of the municipal authorities, and this discretion, when honestly and reasonably exercised, its determination is conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the courts except for want of authority or fraud.498
And, in the words of the South Carolina court:

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

State ex rel. Scotten v. Brill, 58 Minn. 152, 59 N.W. 989 (1894).
Engstrom v. City of Wichita, 121 Kan. 122, 245 Pac. 1033 (1926).
Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U.S. 432, 22 S. Ct. 397 (1902).
Hodges v. City of Roswell, 31 N.M. 384, 247 Pac. 310 (1926).
Richardi v. Village of Bellaire, 153 Mich. 560, 116 N.W. 1066
(1908).
E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. §5.1828 (1949).
Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, 170 Cal. App. 2d
637, 339 P.2d 933 (1959).
Cf. Phoenix Brick & Construction Co. v. Gentry County, 257 Mo.
392, 166 s.w. 1034 (1914).
E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. §428.08 (1945).
Shalit v. City Commission of City of Albuquerque, 62 N.M. 55, 59,
304 P.2d 578, 580 .(1956).

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL

77

( TJ he Legislative determination can be assailed under the
due process and equal protection clauses 'only where the
legislative action is arbitrary, wholly unwarranted, a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its arbitrary character a confiscation of particular property.•499

Where fraud or extreme arbitrariness is manifest, however, injunctive relief is available.500
d. Determination of Individual Assessment
The officers or boards by whom the special assessments
are to be made are prescribed by statute or charter. Usually,
the task of inspection and calculation of benefits to individual
properties is delegated to subordinates. Upon completion of the
assessment roll these officials then submit their findings to the
statutory board for review and confirmation. The delegation is
sustained on the ground that examination of the premises constitutes the exercise of merely "administrative" functions.501
The mode of the assessment may be prescribed by constitution, statute, or charter,502 or it may be left to the discretion
of the municipality .503 In any event the determination is considered to be legislative and nonreviewable, absent fraud or patent mistake.504 The ordinance must, however, embody a definite
and just plan,505 prescribing rather definitely the criteria to be
employed by the assessors in making the individual determinations.506 Plans differ widely, and some, for example the "blockby-block" method, have been adopted by some localities and rejected by others.507 Everywhere, however, assessments must be
predicated upon the benefits received by the property from the
improvement; 508 thus, an assessment based upon the costs of the
improvement-i.e., in determining the individual assessment by
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Mills Mill v. Hawkins, supra note 484, at 529-30, 103 S.E.2d at 20.
City of Chicago v. Brown, 205 Ill. 568, 69 N.E. 65 (1903).
Auditor General v. Bishop, 161 Mich. 117, 125 N.W. 715 (1910).
E.g., Village of Milan v. Looby, 320 Ill. 515, 151 N.E. 501 (1926).
E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. City of Leavenworth, 81 Wash. 511
142 Pac. 1155 (1914).
Flynn v. Chiappari, 191 Cal. 139, 215 Pac. 682 (1923).
Panfil v. City of Detroit, 246 Mich. 149, 224 N.W. 616 (1929).
In re Henner, 125 Misc. 472, 211 N.Y.S. 334 (1925).
Compare Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. City of Kingman, 122 Kan.
504, 252 Pac. 220 (1927), with In re Brondell Ave., New York City,
150 N.Y.S. 403 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City 1914).
City of Ft. Myers v. State, 95 Fla. 704, 117 So. 97 (1928).
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dividing the cost of the improvement by the total number of property owners-is invalid.509
Ordinarily, upon completing the initial determination the · assessing officer appends a certificate to the roll, indicating the
manner in which the assessment was made. Where properly prepared, the certificate is usually conclusive as to the procedure
employed 510 but not as to the extent of benefits.511
e. Notice and Hearing
As a rule, before assessments may be finalized against individual property, the owners must be accorded notice thereof,
together with the opportunity to be heard and to contest on
grounds of validity and fairness. 512 Such is sometimes said to
constitute a requirement of due process under both the federal
and state constitutions.513 Unless the requirement is waived,514
failure to give notice and hearing may render the assessment
void whether or not they are expressly required in the enabling
legislation.5 15 Where notice is provided by statute, the requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, and action in contravention
thereof is wholly void.516 Generally, substituted service is sufficient,517 but there is authority contra.518 Where required, the
hearing is not subject to the rigors of a case at law, though
compliance with all statutory requisites is essential; but, it must
at least be fair.519 As a California court reasoned:
Until such facts resting in the minds of the councilmen are presented in the record, the objectors have no
509. Watkins v. Zwietusch, 47 Wis. 513, 3 N.W. 35 (1879).
510. Walker v. City of Detroit, 138 Mich. 639, 101 N.W. 847 (1904).
511. Auditor General v. O'Neill, 143 Mich. 343, 106 N.W. 895 (1906).
But see Walker v. City of Detroit, supra note 510.
512. Jarvis v. Mayor & Council of Berlin, 153 Md. 156, 138 Atl. 7 (1927).
513. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Roosevelt County, 134 Mont. 355, 332
P.2d 501 (1958).
514. Griffin v. City of Waxahachie, 257 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
515. Ulman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 70 Atl.
141 (1890); and Hutchins v. Board of Supervisors of Alcorn County·
227 Miss. 766, 87 S.2d 54 (1956). That the statute itself may be unconstitutional, cf. Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 13 S. Ct. 750
(1893).
516. City of Dubuque v. Wooten, 28 Iowa 571 (1870).
517. Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781 (1885).
518. Meadowbrook Manor, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Park, 258 Minn. 266,
104 N.W.2d 540 (1960).
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means of knowing on what facts the judgment rests so as
to enable them to controvert them. In the instant case the
city relies, in the final analysis, not on the real facts
showing a benefit to the Safeway property-of which there
is none-but rather on the unknown factors which give rise
to the judgment which were locked up in the minds of the
councilmen and not disclosed in the council record. This
does not afford fair play under American standards . . . ,520

It must be emphasized, however, that due process is not
offended in all cases where notice and hearing are not provided.521
At least this seems to be the rule where the council itself imposes the individual assessment.522 As the Florida court said:
The Legislature has entire control over the imposition
of special assessments for local improvements and may itself make the assessments without preliminary hearings as
to benefits, and such procedure constitutes due process of
law in the . . . constitutional sense . . . ,523

At least, however, where a board-as opposed to the local governing body-makes the determination, due process seems to require that the person to be assessed be given an opportunity to
be heard "at some time before the land is finally burdened by
the assessment."524
f. Confirmation, Correction, Revision
The final act necessary to constitute the assessment is confirmation by the officer, board, or tribunal authorized by statute
or ordinance to do so.525 Typically, a correction procedure is
provided at this stage, with the power to make revision outright
or to refer the roll back to the assessing officers, or to annul
the roll and order a new assessment.526 In such proceedings
the only question protestants may raise is whether their property
was assessed more or less than it was benefited, or more or
519. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, supra note 495.
520. Id. at 648, 339 P.2d at 940.
521. Thayer Lumber Co. v. City of Muskegon, 152 Mich. 59, 115 N.W.
957 (1908),
522. Shalit v. City Commission of City of Albuquerque, supra note 498.
523. Town of Gulfport v. Mendels, 127 Fla. 730, 732, 174 So. 8, 9 (1937).
524. Nev-Cal Electric Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. District, 85 F .2d
886, 901 (9th Cir. 1936),
525. Frank v. Mayor & Aldermen of Jersey City, 6 N.J. Misc. 446, 141
Atl. 689 (1928).
526. E.g., Beatty v. Panhandle Const. Co., 275 S.W. 716 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
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less than its proportionate share of the total cost of the improvement, and whether the proceedings preliminary to the improvement were or were not valid.527 Once confirmation is effected,
the determination is deemed conclusive, absent fraud, collusion,
or jurisdictional defect.5 28 All presumptions are indulged in favor
of validity of the assessment.529
Finally, an assessment record is prepared and filed, and
the assessment made an obligation upon individual property owners by ordinance or resolution as local law may require.5 3 0

3. Enforcement Proceedings
a. Actions Available
Upon failure to make the payment assessed, the defaulting
property owner becomes subject to enforcement proceedings as
provided by the statute or charter authorizing the assessment.
The statutory remedy is usually exclusive in the particular
case;531 although as between jurisdictions, great contrariety is
manifest in the remedies prescribed.532
In some states, the special assessment is placed on the tax
lists of the city or county and collected in the same manner as
taxes.533 Thus, summary judgment or an order for sale of the
land might be employed,53 4 as might an execution to enforce an
assessment without suit.535 Still other states provide for action
on a special tax bill536 or certificate of indebtedness.537 In some
527. DeKoven v. City of Lake View, 131 Ill. 541, 23 N.E. 240 (1890).
528. Hale v. City of Minot, 52 N.D. 39, 201 N.W. 848 (1924); and Ex
parte Finley, 246 Ala. 218, 20 S.2d 98 (1944).
529. Rosche v. City of Hollywood, 55 S.2d 909 (Fla. 1952).
530. In the event that the money raised proves inadequate fully to fund
the improvement ,additional pro-rata assessments are ordinarily
permitted by statute. E.g., In re Lower Baraboo River Drainage
Dist. v. Schirmer, 199 Wis. 230, 225 N.W. 331 (1929). Where, however, the inadequacy occurs solely because of nonpayment by certain property owners, additional assessments are generally denied.
Schildknecht v. City of Milwaukee, 245 Wis. 33, 13 N.W.2d 577
(1944).
531. E.g., Kansas City & Travellers Ins. Co. v. Field, 285 Mo. 253,
226 s.w. 27 (1920).
532. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 558.
533. Saline Branch Drainage Dist. v. Urbana-Champaign Sanitary Dist.,
395 Ill. 26, 69 N.E.2d 251 (1946).
534. Cf. White v. City of Williamsburg, 213 Ky. 90, 28 S.W. 486 (1926).
535. City of Waycross v. Cowart, 164 Ga. 721, 139 S.E. 521 (1927).
536. Cf. City of St. Louis v. Stoddard, 15 Mo. App. 173 (1884).
537. Beers v. Johnson, 117 Fla. 593, 158 So. 41 (1934).
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states, collection by means of distress warrants is authorized;538
and in Pennsylvania enforcement is by way of scire facias.539
Suits in assumpsit are common,540 as are foreclosures upon the
lien which practically· everywhere attaches to the property of the
nonpaying owner.541
Sometimes provision is made by statute for the contractor
who makes improvement to enforce collection against the nonpaying property owner. Typical actions, in this event, include
foreclosure proceedings,542 civil suits to enforce the lien at
law,543 or actions in equity.544 Where the statute or charter
authorizing the assessment specifies no procedure for enforcement, an ordinary foreclosure suit in equity is permissible as
inherent to equity jurisdiction.545
Although by no means exhaustive, the foregoing indicates
the great variety of enforcement procedures available as against
the nonpaying property owner. For the pertinent procedures-respecting, for example, jurisdiction and venue, pleadings and evidence, parties plaintiff, etc.-of a particular remedy in a particular jurisdiction, the local law in issue must be consulted. Such
vary widely, precluding any meaningful discussion in a work of
this sort.
b. Defenses of the Property Owner
Defenses, as well as forms of action, may be defined by
statute or by ordinance.546 Caution, therefore, counsels judicious
purview of local law to prevent denial of a defense otherwise
available (e.g., because not timely made).
The general rule is that successful defense must be predicated upon particular injury to the defendent, e.g., an increase
538. Schaefer v. Woodmere Cemetery Ass'n, 256 Mich. 332, 239 N.W.
300 (1931).
539. Vendetti Appeal, 181 Pa. Super. 214, 124 A.2d 448 (1956).
540. E.g., City of South Fulton v. Parker, 160 Tenn. 634, 28 S.W.2d 639
(1930).
541. E.g., Wilson v. City of Medford, 107 Ore. 624, 215 Pac. 184 (1923).
542. Cf. National Exchange Bank v. Smith, 63 Ind. App. 574, 114 N.E.
881 (1917).
543. Town of Medford ex rel. Fuss v. Early, 194 Okla. 566, 153 P.2d
633 (1944).
544. Lamar v. Rivers, 235 Ala. 130, 178 So. 16 (1937).
545. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 562-62.
546. Cf. Farley v. Uvalda Paving Co., 74 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934).
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in general taxes,547 decrease in value of the property,548 or destruction of improvements.5 49 On the other hand, lack of specific
benefit550 and the question of the necessity of the improvement,551
are unavailable by way of defense. Such matters are said to be
legislative and thus without judicial oversight,55 2
Of course, the jurisdictional defense of ultra vires is always available (e.g., where statutory authority was confined to
repair of a street, an assessment for reconstruction constituted
sufficient answer in a suit for collection553). Failure of substantial compliance with the improvement contract may be raised by
way of defense. The theory, of course, is that a person should
not be compelled to pay for that which he has not received-in
this case, the improvement. On the other hand, strict performance is not essential-e.g., failure to begin and complete work
within a time period as stipulated by contract {where the work
was subsequently completed and paid for by the city) was held not
to render the contract a nullity from the beginning.554 Finally,
arbitrary and wilful over-assessment is grounds for successful
defense, although much latitude of discretion belongs to the legislative department, and the courts will not interfere with it unless
there is some manifest abuse.555
Such constitute the three principal grounds for defending
against enforcement proceedings. The specifics are, in esse, the
same as for an attack upon the assessment generally, and will be
discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.556
c. Personal Liability
The states differ widely on the legality of legislation purporting to impose personal liability upon a property owner respecting an assessment levied against his property. In explaining
the rationale for repudiating personal liability, a Texas court said:
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.

Cf. Grecian v. City of Hill City, 123 Kan. 542, 256 Pac. 163 (1927).
Stockman v. City of Trenton, 132 Fla. 406, 181 So. 383 (1938).
Town of Winnfield v. Thomas, 5 S.2d 587 (La. App. 1942).
St. Louis v. Ranken, 96 Mo. 497, 9 S.W. 910 (1888).
Heman v. Franklin, 99 Mo. App. 346, 73 S.W. 314 (1903).
Cf. Duling Brothers Co. v. City of Huntington, 120 W. Va. 85, 196
S.E. 552 (1938).
Parker-Washington Co. v. Meriwether, 172 Mo. App. 344, 158 s.w.
74 (1913).
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Raymo, 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl.
383 (1888).
Haisch v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 435, 38 Pac. 1131 (1894).
Infra notes 615-49, and accompanying text.
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In those states where assessments for improvements
are limited to benefits conferred, the authorities are conflicting on the question whether an assessment may be constitutionally imposed UPon an owner of property benefited,
which may be collected out of any of his property generally; the theory of the cases denying the Power being that
such assessments are purely in the nature of a local tax
for a local improvement, and that to extend the liability of
the owner beyond the value of the lot benefited (uPon which
a lien may be lawfully imposed) is to burden him with the
payment for a benefit in which property owners generally
participate. In other words, that the property of the owner
not especially benefited by the local assessment is affected
by the improvement only, as is the property of all other
members of the community, and that as to it there is no
sound reason for a discrimination in imPosing the burden of
the assessment.557

Contrariwise, the Pennsylvania court stated:
Assessment against the property itself is only a method of
compelling the owner to pay and thus relieve his property
from the charge or lien against it. • • • [ T] he remedy for
the collection of such assessments or taxes, as well as
every other species of tax, is a matter of legislative discretion.558

Thus, in addition to the in rem actions mentioned above, the
possibility exists of an action in personam. Statutory authority
must expressly authorize such procedure,559 however, and, according to an early United States Supreme Court case, nonresident property owners may not be so subjected. 560 Nevertheless,
the liberalization in recent years of the personal jurisdiction requirement may forecast some alteration in this latter rule.
4. Remedies of the Individual
a. Standing, Limitations, Estoppel
Successful attack upon a special assessment, is, at the outset, dependent upon standing. Accordingly, to be a proper party
557.

Eubank v. City of Fort Worth, 173 S.W. 1003, 1004 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915). Texas, however, has expressly upheld the authority of the
legislature to imPose a personal liability. Shambaugh v. Smithey,
59 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
558. In re Vacation of Centre Street, 115 Pa. St. 247, 254, 8 Atl. 56, 59
(1886).
559. Cf. John K. & Catherine Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States,
290 U.S. 89, 54 S. Ct. 38 (1933).
560. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 19 S. Ct. 379 (1899).
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plaintiff it is essential that the complainant be personally injured
by the proceeding.561 It is not enough that a defect exists generally, 562 or that others were unfairly assessed;563 the plaintiff
must demonstrate detriment to himself.
In addition to the general requirement of standing, statutes
and ordinances prescribe a multiplicity of conditions and procedures necessary of compliance to effect relief. Where resort
to an administrative board is provided, this remedy must, of
course, be exhausted prior to judicial assault. 564 In addition,
complaints must be seasonably made. If a time period is spelled
out in statute or ordinance, such is mandatory; and a suit brought
thereafter will, absent fraud, or lack of jurisdiction, be set
aside.565 Even where statutory limitations are absent, the plaintiff must act before expenses are incurred or be barred by
laches,566 Some states go so far as to hold that delay in objecting, even aside from reliance, will constitute a waiver,567 And
finally, estoppel, in many cases, may serve to bar relief (e.g.,
of one who originally petitioned for the improvement,568 who acquiesced in the construction,569 or who accepted its benefits 57 °) .
b. Judicial Redress
(1) Specific Remedies

Injunction. Other than the typical administrative procedure
of objecting before the municipal officers vested with jurisdiction,571 the most common form of rederss in an assessment proceeding is by suit for injunctive relief. Thus:
Equitable relief is frequently sought against an invalid
assessment in the form of an injunction to prevent the sale
of the property assessed to satisfy the assessment, or in
561. Birnie v. LaGrande, 78 Ore. 531, 153 Pac. 415 (1915).
562. Hearne v. City of Catlettsburg, 239 Ky. 592, 40 S.W.2d 293 (1931).
563. In re Twentieth Street Northeast, Seattle, 95 Wash. 5, 163 Pac. 12
(1917).
564. City of Cincinnati v. Board of Education of City School Dist., 63
Ohio App. 549, 27 N.E.2d 413 (1940).
565. Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 121 Okla. 18, 247 Pac. 15 (1926).
566. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Rahway, 3 N.J. Misc. 1105, 130
Atl. 642 (1925).
567. Noyes v. Chambers & DeGolyer, 202 Cal. 542, 261 Pac. 1006 (1927).
568. City of High Point v. Clark, 211 N.C. 607, 119 S.E. 318 (1937).
569. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 105 N.W.
563 (1905).
570. City of Beggs v. Kelly, 110 Okla. 274, 238 Pac. 466 (1925).
571. Manning v. City of Ames, 192 Iowa 998, 184 N.W. 347 (1921).
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the form of a suit to set aside the assessment or the sale
as a cloud upon the title of the owner. Equitable relief is
ordinarily given in such cases if the assessment is a lien
upon the property, and if its existence, or the fact of a sale
to satisfy such assessment, either of them constitutes a
cloud upon the title.572

Of course, such form of action is predicated upon the demonstration of grounds for equitable intervention (e.g., to avoid a
multiplicity of suits or prevent irreparable injury573). And, it
has been held that where the assessment is merely voidable, as
opposed to wholly void, equity will decline enjoinment,57 4 Finally, a clear, quick remedy at law (e.g., certiorari) must be unavailable.575
Contrary to other · remedies, no specific statutory relief by
way of injunction need be spelled out in the statute. All that is
required for equity jurisdiction to attach is that some form of
statutory relief be provided. 576 Where the action is allowed,
normal rules of procedure in equity cases apply.577
Appeal. Although this remedy is not accorded as a matter
of constitutional right,5 78 most assessment statutes expressly
authorize it.579 As to limitations of time,580 the means of perfecting the appeal, notice,581 parties,582 objections,583 etc., individual statutes must be scrutinized. The scope of review is,
likewise, governed by local law, some states holding the general
rules as to appeals in other civil cases to govern.584 Others
permit a hearing de novo.585 Nevertheless, the general rule is
572. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 485.
573. City of Dallas v. Wright, 120 Tex. 190, 36 S.W.2d 973 (1931).
574. Cf. Lenon v. Street Improvement Dist. No. 512, 181 Ark. 318, 26
S.W.2d 572 (1930).
575. Cf. Hodge v. City of Princeton, 227 Ky. 481, 13 S.W.2d 491 (1929).
576. City of Dallas v. Wright, supra note 573.
577. See generally Fairmount Land Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 145 Md. 391, 125 Atl. 796 (1924).
578. Hughes v. Parker, 148 Ind. 692, 48 N.E. 243 (1897).
579. E.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Johnson, 123 Md. 320,
91 Atl. 156 (1914).
580. Thomas Bennett Estate, Inc. v. City of New Haven, 117 Conn. 25,
166 Atl. 680 (1933).
581. Stovall v. City of Jasper, 218 Ala. 282, 118 So. 467 (1928).
582. State ex rel. Conn v. Henderson, 130 Fla. 288, 177 So. 539 (1937).
583. Cf. City of Kankakee v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 257 Ill. 298,
100 N.E. 996 (1913).
584. Haynes Automobile Co. v. City of Kokomo, 186 Ind. 9, 114 N.E.
758 (1917).
585. Cf. Austin v. City of Anniston, 243 Ala. 214, 8 So.2d 410 (1942).
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that the court may not itself make the assessment. Such, it has
been held, would constitute judicial usurpation of a legislative
function. For this reason, remand to the proper municipal authorities with instructions is said to constitute the extent of the judicial purview on appeal.586
Certiorari. This discretionary writ is available in most
states,587 but not in all,588 to test special assessment proceedings. Where allowed, the proceeding is not de novo, but is confined entirely to the record.5 89 According to usual principles,
laches,590 limitations,5 91 and the existence of another remedy59 2
will bar the action. The scope of review is confined to questions
of law,593 though the court may, where manifest inequality exists
on the record, change an individual assessment to accord with
that on similarly situated property of others.594
Recovery Back. Where a payment is made involuntarily and
the assessment subsequently is rendered void, many statutes permit recovery back of the amount paid.595 Absent statutory authorization, the action quasi ex contractu is generally denied,596
although the New York Court allowed recovery by way of assumpsit where no other adequate way appeared possible to protect the
property owner .597 Abandonment of an improvement, before completion and where no substantial benefit accrues to the property
owner, usually sustains the action. 598

586. Cox v. Thurber Brick Co., 86 s.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
587. E.g., Holloway v. Township of Pennsauken, 12 N.J. 371, 97 A.2d
141 (1953).
588. E.g., Whitbeck v. Common Council of Village of Hudson, 50 Mich.
86, 14 N.W. 708 (1883).
589. 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 552.
590. Ploch v. City of Clifton, 126 N.J .L. 199, 18 A.2d 546 (1941).
591. Whittingham v. Township of Millburn, 90 N.J.L. 344, 10.0 Atl. 854
(1916).
592. Cf. Atkinson v. City Council of Newton, 169 Mass. 240, 47 N.E.
1029 (1897).
593. People ex rel. James v. Gilon, 126 N.Y. 640, 27 N.E. 285 (1891).
594. People ex rel. Connelly v. Reis, 109 App. Div. 748, 96 N.Y.S. 597
(1905).
595. Corby v. Detroit, 180 Mich. 208, 146 N.W. 670 (1914).
596. Forest Hill Cemetery Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 303 Mich. 56, 5
N.W.2d 564 (1942).
597. Adrico Realty Co. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732
(1928).
598. Chapman v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 186, 79 P.2d 128
(1938).
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Miscellaneous Remedies. Other actions include suits by
way of abatement for excessive assessments,599 petitions to determine the lawful amount of assessments,600 bills to quiet title,601
the writ of prohibition to halt a levy or collection thereof,602 and
declaratory judgment actions.603 These latter remedies, it must
be emphasized, require statutory authorization; and where such is
absent, they will generally be denied.604
(2) Trial and Appeal

Assuming standing, timely complaint, the absence of estoppel, and selection of the appropriate form of action, the case will
proceed to trial where the normal rules of evidence apply. 605
Every presumption favors validity,606 however, and the burden of
proof is everywhere upon the complainant.607 Further, the standard employed by many courts is greater than mere preponderance
of the evidence;608 indeed, it has been said that only proof of
great force will be sufficient to overturn the assessment.609
Some statutes go so far as to deem municipal determinations (e.g., as to benefits) conclusive.610 In this event, even
proof of great force is insufficient to the complainant, proof of
fraud or extreme arbitrariness then defining the judicial purview .611 In the words of a federal district court:
It has also been generally held that the determination
of assessments by municipal corporations of adjacent

599. City of Lowell v. Lowell Building Corp., 309 Mass. 165, 34 N.E.2d
618 (1941).
600. In re Nemzek, 239 Minn. 351, 58 N.W.2d 746 (1953).
601. Van Zanten v. City of Grand Haven, 174 Mich. 282, 140 N.W. 471
(1913).
602. This remedy, however, is frequently denied. LeConte v. Trustees
& Marshall of Town of Berkeley, 57 Cal. 269 (1881).
603. City of Tallahassee v. Baker, 53 S.2d 875 (Fla. 1951).
604. E.g., City and County of Denver v. Denver Land Co., 85 Colo. 198,
274 Pac. 743 (1929) (declaratory judgment).
605. Cf. Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 154 Wis. 121,
142 N.W. 476 (1913).
606. Snyder v. City of Belle Plaine, 180 Iowa 679, 163 N.W. 594 (1917).
607. E.g., Driscoll v. Inhabitants of Northbridge, 210 Mass. 151, 96 N.E.
59 (1911).
608. State v. Mayor & City Council of Passaic, 51 N .J .L. 109, 16 Atl. 62
(1888).
609. State v. Mayor & Common Council of City of Newark, 48 N.J.L.
101, 2 Atl. 627, (1886).
610. Cf. Broussard v. Oldham, 142 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
611. Driscoll v. Inhabitants of Northbridge, supra note 607.
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property for local improvements is a matter for the city
council acting in its legislative capacity, and that such determination is conclusive, in the absence of fraud or conduct so arbitrary as to be the equivalent of fraud, or so
manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable as to be palpably unjust and oppressive.612

Although not required constitutionally,613 many statutes permit a jury trial in assessment cases.614 In such event, normal
rules as to the division of questions of law and fact between the
judge and jury, respectively, apply. In appeal to higher courts,
the usual procedure incident to appeal of civil actions governs.
c. Substantive Grounds
As in the case of licenses, municipal action in special assessment proceedings may be attacked on one of two categories
of grounds: (1) invalidity of the enabling statute or ordinance or
(2) invalidity in application. These will be considered in turn.

(1) Invalidity of Statute or Ordinance
Ultra Vires. As indicated previously,615 municipal corporations are endowed with no inherent power to fund local improvements by special assessments. Authority must exist, either by
statute or charter. The requirement is, in fact, jurisdictional,
and enacting ordinances must strictly conform therewith.616 As
the Florida court said:
( M] unicipal corporations have no inherent power to levy
special assessments, and in order for such assessments to
be valid they must be made pursuant to legislative authority
and in accordance with the method prescribed by the legislature. 617
Further, the power is "strictly construed, and every reasonable
doubt as to the extent or limitation of such power and authority
612. Kissane v. City of Anchorage, 159 F. Supp. 733, 737 (D. Alaska
1958).
613. City of Tuscaloosa v. Hill, 14 Ala. App. 541, 69 So. 486 (1915).
614. E.g., City of Chicago v. Van Schaack Bros. Chemical Works, Inc.,
33 0 Ill. 264, 161 N.E. 486 (1928).
615. Supra notes 458 & 459, and accompanying text.
616. Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Gough, 54 Ind. App. 438, 102 N .E.
453 (1913).
617. Anderson v. City of North Miami, 99 So.2d 861, 863-64 (Fla. 1957).
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is resolved against the city and in favor of the taxpayer."618 Thus,
absent a statute or in the event of variation in the enacting ordinance, the contesting property owner possesses a potent argument that the proceeding is ultra vires and void.
Public and Local. Municipal financing by this means requires that the . improvement be public in nature, as opposed to
merely private.619 For example, a private driveway could not
validly be constructed with the proceeds from a special assessment; benefit must accrue to the locality as a whole. On the
other hand, the benefit must nof be so general in effect as to
embrace the community at large.620 At least, the "primary" effect must inure to the benefit of the property owners in the immediate locality .62l Otherwise, the improvement must be born
by the citizens of the whole community (i.e., through general
taxes) and not be made a burden upon the locality in which the
improvement is constructed and which received no unique benefit therefrom.622
Though available, however, these grounds, that the improvement was not "public" or not "local," are difficult of substantiation. The reason is that the determinations of municipal authorities in these regards are practically conclusive, being overturned only on very clear proof of fraud or for extreme arbitrariness. 623
Benefit Conferred. To be valid, a special assessment may
not be in substantial excess of the benefit conferred upon the
taxed property. As the Nebraska court said:
That special assessments can only be based upon special
benefits to the property assessed, and that such an assessment beyond the special benefits conferred would be a tal{ing of private property for public use without just compensation . . . is settled law in this state.624
But all available uses of the land may be considered by the assessing authority, the question being "whether the general value
of the property has been enhanced, not whether its present owner
618. Besack v. City of Beatrice, 154 Neb. 142, 145, 47 N.W.2d 356, 357
(1951).
619. Irish v. Hahn, 208 Cal. 339, 281 Pac. 385 (1929).
620. In Shilshole Avenue, 85 Wash. 522, 148 Pac. 781 (1915).
621. Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 273, 274 N.W. 605, 608 (1937).
622. Ibid.
623. Altman v. Philadelphia, 393 Pa. 246, 141 A.2d 592 (1958).
624. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. City of Seward, 166 Neb. 123,
129, 88 N.W.2d 175, 180 (1958).
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receives advantage."625 Market value of the land is the usual
test, in this regard,626 although the courts vary widely as to its
computation (e.g., as to future possibilities and growth of the
community627 ).
Further, inasmuch as the ascertainment of benefits is
deemed a legislative function, the scope of judicial review is
severely constricted.628 In fact, only for fraud or extreme arbitrariness will the municipal determination be overturned. 62 9 The
party attacking an assessment rate on the ground of lack of benefit, in consequence, faces quite a task. To succeed he must
prove that municipal action was so arbitrary as to amount to
confiscation. 630 Where such can be demonstrated, however, relief will be forthcoming.631
Constitutional Grounds. Constitutional restrictions attendant
upon general taxes, are, as a rule, inapplicable to special assessments. Thus, generally speaking, complaint may not be made
that a statute or ordinance is invalid on its face on the grounds
of double taxation, 632 equal protection of the law, 633 or equality
and uniformity of taxation.634
Neither is improper delegation a ground for attack under
traditional separation of powers concepts. Inasmuch as assessments constitute a branch of the general taxing power, the legislature may delegate to local public bodies as it wm. 635 Further,
there is no requirement of explicit standards to govern municipal
action, rather wide discretion often being afforded to the local
authorities.636 And, where the assessment is to be made by the
local governing body, as opposed to a statutory board, there is
not even a requirement of notice and hearing. 637
625. Appeal of Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super. 357,
363-64, 87 A.2d 344, 347 (1952).
626. Ibid.
627. Compare Driscoll v. Inhabitants of Northbridge, supra note 607, with
Gingles v. City of Onawa, 241 Iowa 492, 41 N.W.2d 717 (1950).
628. Quale v. City of Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 25 N.W.2d 699 (1946).
629. Nev-Cal Electric Securities Co. v. Imperial Irr. Dist., supra note
524.
630. Rosche v. City of Hollywood, supra note 529.
631. McKee v. City of Grand Rapids, 203 Mich. 527, 170 N.W. 100 (1918).
632. Cf. Jones v. Holzapfel, 11 Okla. 405, 68 Pac. 511 (1902).
633. Walston v. Nevin, 128 U.S. 578, 9 S. Ct. 192 (1888).
634. St. Benedict's Abbey v. Marion County, 50 Ore. 411, 93 Pac. 231
(1908).
635. Cf. Fitchpatrick v. Botheras, 150 Iowa 376, 130 N.W. 163 (1911).
636. Supra note 498.
637. Supra note 523.
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The above, of course, has reference to the Federal Constitution only. State constitutional requirements are sometimes
contra (e.g., with regard to the due process requirement of notice and hearing638) and should be consulted regarding constitutional arguments in a particular case.
(2) Invalidity in Application

Compliance with Statute. The general rule is that strict
observance of all mandatory and jurisdictional requirements of
the statute and ordinance is indispensable to validate an assessment. 639 Thus, where a legislative body fails to adopt and publish a resolution respecting the proposed improvement, as required by statute, the complainant has an effective grounds for
setting the assessment aside,6 40 The variance, however, must be
substantial, minor irregularities or defects being of no avail to
the property owner. 641
Defective Work. Absent special injury, property owners
may not generally attack a special assessment for defective
work. 642 The majority rule is otherwise, however, for substantial failure of performance by the building contractor. In the
words of a Missouri court:
( SJ ince the burden to pay rests upon (the property owners]
. . .they have a right to insist upon a faithful performance
of the contract and the corporate authorities cannot dispense
with such performance. 643
And again:
[ E] ven though the improvement has been accepted by the
city, failure of substantial performance (but only a substantial performance) within the terms of the contract, if established, will render the tax bill invalid. 644

638. Supra note 520.
639. Union Street Ry. Co. v. Mayor of New Bedford, 253 Mass. 314, 149
N.E. 46 (1925).
640. Doemker v. City of Richmond Heights, 322 Mo. 1024, 18 S.W.2d
394 (1929).
641. Cf. City of Chicago v. Terwillinger, 253 Ill. 395, 97 N.E. 694
(1912). On what requirements are regarded as mandatory and jurisdictional, see 14 McQuillan, supra note 184, at 421-25.
642. Dawson v. Hipskind, 173 Ind. 216, 89 N.E. 863 (1909).
643. McQuiddy v. Brannock, 70 Mo. App. 535, 541 (1897).
644. Scales v. Butler, 323 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo. 1959).
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Fraud or Arbitrariness. Where an individual assessment,
in relation to that imposed upon similarly situated property owners, is grossly disproportionate, successful attack may be possible on the grounds of fraud or extreme arbitrariness.645 The
argument is a difficult one to sustain, however. Municipal officials are presumed to have acted in good faith, 646 and the presumption everywhere prevails that the assessments have been
fairly allocated.647 Only "clear, cogent and conclusive" proof,
amounting, in fact, to a showing of confiscation, will establish this
ground of attack.648 Where such is demonstrated, however, the
assessment will be invalidated. 649

645.
646.
647.
648.
649.

Supra note 631.
Hills v. City of Rahway, 29 N.J. Super. 16, 101 A.2d 563 (1953).
Dickey v. City of Burlington, 247 Iowa 116, 73 N.W.2d 96 (1955).
Supra note 630.
Hatch v. Michigan Central R.R. Co., 238 Mich. 381, 212 N.W. 950

(1927).

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATION: THE LOCAL EXPERIENCE
A. Introduction

As has been indicated, the preceding does not purport to
present a definitive, treatise-like statement of the law of licensing and special assessments. The purpose rather has been to
afford some raw data by which to assess the administrative
practices of local governments. These materials, together with
those on zoning and annexation,650 should-it is hoped-present
sufficient means by which to observe the limitation doctrine in
its local operation. This objective, as well as its corollary of
individual safeguards, constitutes the purview of the present chapter. · The approach is in terms of the categories employed in the
second chapter with regard to administrative limitations in the
federal and state contexts, i.e., constitutional limitations, rules
of practice and procedural limitations, and judicial review.
B. Categories of Protection

1. Constitutional Limitations

a. Separation of Powers
(1) Introduction

The first of the two principal constitutional limitations upon
administrative action is the time-honored doctrine of the separation of powers. As has been mentioned,651 the exigencies of
modern conditions have required its virtual emasculation from
the national and state scenes, pious averrments in court opinions,652 state constitutions,653 and text-books on government654 to
the contrary notwithstanding.
650. I.e., Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States (1961); and
651.
652.

653.
654.

Sengstock, Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problem (1960).
Supra notes 80-83, 144, and accompanying text.
E.g., Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 48 S. Ct. 480 (1928).
See, e.g., the provision of the Texas Constitution quoted at supra
note 29.
Cf. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 3 (1922).
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If, however, the history of the doctrine at these levels has
witnessed-at least in practice-a retreat from the theoretical
schema of Montesquieu and Madison, local government has undergone a dissimilar fate, representing historically, in our system,
the great exception to trifurcated authority.655 As a well-known
authority on local government observed:
It is well settled that municipal officers may be invested
with powers which belong to either or all three departments
of municipal government, namely, the executive, the legislative and the judicial.656

Thus, from the beginning and in contradistinction to national and
state experience, no constitutional impediments were erected with
regard to concentrated functions in local governmental organization.657
The development of local government from the viewpoint of
separation of powers is, however, an interesting phenomenon even
apart from constitutional requirements. In addition, its significance to the broader principle of limitation in the local context
would appear to warrant some consideration at this point.
(2) Historical Development

Prior to the nineteenth century, of course, cities played but
a very minor role in the community complex.658 What urban development that did exist consisted, for the most part, in the New
England town or the middle western township. And, these governmental units, as geographical and political subdivisions of the
states, more closely approximated our contemporary counties
than the incorporated municipalities of today .659 Not by the petition of an agglomeration of property owners, but by the arbitrary
determinations upon a surveyor's map did they derive political
sanction and the authority to effect community purposes.660 The
"great frontier" with its enticing lure of free land for an, as
well as Jeffersonian mistrust of urbanization,661 accentuated the
predominantly rural bent of early American society.
655. State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, 117 Minn. 458, 136 N.W.
264 (1912).
656. 1 Yokely, Municipal Corporations 179 (1956).
657. State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, supra note 655.
658. In 1790, only 5.1% of the inhabitants of the United States dwelt in
areas of 2,500 or more population. Schulz, American City Government 4 (1949).
659. Anderson & Weidner, State and Local Government 17-19 (1951).
660. Id. at 19.
661. Supra note 17.
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With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, however, cities
began to assume a more significant position in our national life.
As the factory system required a stationary labor force, aggregates of individuals and families began to settle in the proximity
of the industrial site. Shipping and service industries magnified
the demographic concentration, and gradually the city began to
take shape. In contrast to the town and township, however, geographic boundaries had not been predetermined. Rather, the
growth was haphazard, reflecting typical economic indicia of industrial development, such as accessibility to raw materials and
to markets, the availability of sources of energy and labor supply,
etc.662
The concentration of population and economic activity, of
course, occasioned the necessity of maintaining public order and
the provision of basic services. These were essentially local
needs and the state legislatures responded by awarding charters
of incorporation (first by special act and subsequently by general
legislation663) for purposes of local government. Though "creatures" of the State,664 municipal corporations were thus accorded
the governmental prerogative in matters purely "local."665
Assuming the mandate to govern, the next question was the
form that the government organism was to assume. The national
and state governments with their President and Congress, governor and legislature, afforded natural models or prototypes. It
was no wonder, then, that the typical form of local government
in the nineteenth century came to be the mayor-council variety.
Theoretically at least, the mayor was the executive and administrative officer. Not a member of the council, i.e., the legislative
branch, he sometimes possessed a veto power over measures
passed by that body, although in such event the latter generally
could override the veto by a two-thirds or three-quarters vote.66 6
Generally, too, local courts were provided,667 rounding out the
tripartite organization of the higher governing models.
Thus, on the surface, anyway, practice would seem to indicate that, although not required constitutionally, local government
662. Schulz, supra note 658, at 2-4.
663. See generally MacCorkle, American Municipal Government and Administration 54-59 (1948).
664. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 196
U.S. 539, 549, 25 S. Ct. 327, 330 (1905).
665. See generally Schulz, supra note 658, at 25-45.
666. Anderson & Weidner, supra note 659, at 494.
667. See, e.g., Virtue, Survey of Metropolitan Courts, Detroit Area 9-10
(1950).
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in the United States assumed a structure similar to that ordained
by constitution to the governments of the United States and the
states. In fact, however, the Madisonian symmetry of three separate and independent branches of government exercising the three
functions-executive, legislative and judicial-respectively, simply
did not reflect the realities of local conditions. Indeed, the then
prevalent mayor-council type of government was not the "strong"
variety (to use the political science denomination668) of today, but
consisted rather of its "weak" counterpart. The weaknesses were,
in essence, the result of a failure to localize responsibility.
The cities had no spokesman for concentrated authority, as
the nation had in Alexander Hamilton.669 Further, the Jeffersonian antipathy to cities in general became concretized in Jacksonian disdain for city government with its attendant graft and corruption, 670 The result was the erection of an organizational arrangement of such an overlapping, duplicatory, and cross-purpose
character as to render the location of responsibility for any
given action an insurmountable, and even fanciful, task. For example, the mayor appointed some municipal officials, others were
appointed by the council. Still others were elected, and some had
ex-officio status. The mayor's men were often at cross-purposes
with the council's men, and elected officials were responsible to
neither.671 Behind the confusion, corrupt politicians carried on
their activities safe in the knowledge that in all probability they
would never be exposed to the public,672 This, indeed, was the
situation that occasioned Lord Bryce's cryptic commentary:
There is no denying that the government of cities is
the one conspicuous failure of the United States • . . . The
faults of the State governments are insignificant compared
with the extravagance, corruption, and mismanagement which
mark the administration of most of the great cities.673
The lesson of nineteenth-century American cities should
seem clear. Where limitation, in the form of wide diffusion of
power and function, is refracted to the point of precluding the
location of responsibility for the acts of government, confusion,
corruption, public disrespect and governmental impotency can be
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.

Schulz, supra note 658, at 317-18.
Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 4 (1955).
Anderson & Weidner, supra note 659, at 494.
Ibid.
Cf. McGoldrick, Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, 19161930, p. 1 (1933).
673. 2 Bryce, The American Commonwealth 281 (1888).
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the only result. Where on the other hand, executive power is located squarely in the hands of an executive branch with its chief
clearly responsible for executive acts-the same being true for
legislative and judicial officials with respect to legislative and
judicial functions-there is no question as to responsibility, confusion disappears, the opportunity for corruption is mitigated,
public respect rekindled, and government is possible of positive
action. Limitation, of course, remains in the tripartite organization, each branch possessing certain "checks" on the power of
each of the others. To effect this ideal, based obviously upon the
federal and state models, the National Municipal League began,
at the turn of the century, to agitate for the "strong" mayorcouncil type of city government.6 74 Essentially, the proposalwhich gained wide-spread adoption-was as follows:
[E]xecutive and administrative powers [were vested]
in the mayor and. . .rather complete legislative powers
·rconferred] upon the council. Boards and commissions and
independently elected officers were. . .held to a minimum,
and preferably abolished outright. Thus a separation-ofpowers system similar to that of the national government,
with a short ballot, was favored for cities.675
The doctrine, however, was not everywhere implanted at the
local level, as two competing forms of government-neither of
which embodied the sepa!'ation theory-gained currency. Thus,
Galveston, Texas, responding to the inability of its weak mayorcouncil organization to cope with the devestation of its great tidal
wave of 1900, established, under authority of special state law,
the commission form. Thereunder, all government power was
vested in a commission, with each member individually the head
of a city department. The mayor enjoyed no independent status,
being merely a member of the commission, the same as was the
member who headed, for example, the department of public safety. He possessed no veto power, nor was the commission constrained to confine itself to the legislative function. It was, in
fact, the governing body. 676
The other principal competitor to the strong mayor-council
form in this century has been the council-manager plan. First
established for the city of Sumter in 1912 by special act of the
South Carolina legislature, the plan has spread rapidly under the
674. National Municipal League, A Municipal Program (1900).
675. Anderson & Weidner, supra note 659, at 495.
676. See generally Schulz, supra note 658, at 318-23.
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active endorsement of the National Municipal League. Essentially, the plan consists in an appointive executive who serves at the
pleasure, of an elected council, with the latter serving as the
legislative body. Obviously, no real separation of powers can exist under such scheme, the departments in this case being neither
independent nor equal.677
Advantages as well as disadvantages inhere in each of the
three forms herein indicated to embrace current trends in the
organization and structure of municipal government. Evaluation
in these terms, however, is without the purview of this monograph.678 Rather, the immediate concern is with the concept of
the separation of powers as a limiting influence upon government
action-in this case, in its local or municipal manifestation.
(3) Current Status

With the increasing popularity of the commission (14.9% of
cities of 5,000 or more population) and council-manager (24.3%)
types of municipal government in the United States,67 9 the principle of the separation of powers is seen to suffer in the local
context no less than at the federal and state levels. No constitutional requirement, either federal or state, subsists to command the traditional trifurcation of functions.680 And, as indicated, the tendency in practice is to pursue paths of merged, as opposed to separated, models of governmental organization.
The significance of the instant discussion to individual safeguards may be seen by recalling the section in the preceding
chapter pertaining to licensing. As was indicated, the practice is
frequently for the local council itself to construct the licensing
ordinance, establish its own rules of procedure, investigate and
decide who is to be granted and who denied the privilege, and,
finally, to enforce its own determination-all with no constitutional
requirement of judicial review. As is obvious, executive, legislative, and judicial functions with regard to issues at hand are
combined in the same governmental body. No check to arbitrariness nor assurance of individual rights exists in such case but
the self-restraint of the governing body. On the other hand, were
the functions separated (e.g., ordinance-enacting to the council,
determination in a particular case to an independent local board
677. Id. at 323-27.
678. For such evaluation, see, e.g., Adrian, Governing Urban America
172-207 (1955).
679. International City Managers Association, Municipal Yearbook 39
(1950).
680. Supra note 655.
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or court, and enforcement to the executive branch), power would
be so spread, with its incumbent checks, as to afford the individual a greater degree of protection than he would possess in the
case where all of his eggs must be put in the same departmental
basket. Nevertheless, no constitutional requirement now obtains
to compel internal separation; and, as has been observed, the
practice, likewise, is in the opposite direction.
(4) Legislative Oversight

It should be noted at this point that the wide diffusion and
overlap of local function (with its attendant confusion and corruption) which rendered the weak mayor-council formula inacceptable
to the conditions of the twentieth century, is not the only meansoutside of separation-of limiting governmental power at this
level. There remains, in addition, the possibility of legislative
oversight, suggested with regard to federal administration by
Kinnane681 and state administration by Howe.68 2 Since the federal and state agencies are "creatures" of the Congress or legislature, so the theory goes, they remain subject to legislative controls, that is, to the external checks alluded to in an earlier
chapter.683 The powers of investigation, of the purse, of alterations in the enabling legislation, and, in fact, of life-and-death
itself is thought sufficient, at these levels, to protect the citizenry. from the potential despotism of concentrated powers. 68 4
The analogy to local government is obvious. Municipal corporations are, as are the regulatory agencies, creatures of the
state. In the words of the United States Supreme Court:
A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of
the State, and exists by virtue of the exercise of the power
of the State through its legislative department. The legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the corporation itself, and provide other and different means for
the government of the district comprised within the limits
of the former city. The city is the creature of the State.685

Difficulties are encountered, however, in attempting to utilize the analogy to effect an "external" or vertical check upon
681. Kinnane, "Administrative Law: Some Observations on Separation of
Powers," 38 A.B.A.J. 19 (1952).
682. Howe, Legislative Review of Administrative Rules (1956).
683. Supra notes 54 and 55, and accompanying text.
684. Kinnane, supra note 681.
685. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., supra
note 664.
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local governmental activity. Judicially acknowledged notions of
local self-government, as well as such practical considerations
as legislative apathy and inadequate supervisory machinery, both
as to time and finances, work to stay the hand of the state legislature as a limiting influence.686 By far the most significant factor in this regard, however, has been the development of local
home rule.687
·
Originating in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, the very
objective of home rule is to free municipal government from the
supervision of the state legislature as to matters "purely local."
One commentator stated the objectives as follows:
(1) [TJ o prevent or minimize legislative interference in
matters that are primarily of local concern;
(2) to permit the local communities to adopt the type and
form of government they desire;
(3) to provide the cities with sufficient powers to meet the
increasing needs for local services without the necessity of
repeatedly seeking new authority from the legislature •... 688

Nor is the home rule provision confined to Missouri, some fifteen
other states now employing the idea and prospects being great
that others will soon do so.689 In these states, and especially in
those with constitutional home rule, the prospects would thus appear dim that the legislature could operate as much of a check
or limitation upon municipal activity. In fact, in such cases,
where "municipal affairs" are in issue, local legislation is controlling even in the presence of conflicting state law.690
Even in the non-home rule jurisdictions, however, legislative oversight, without more, would appear of minimal value only
in securing the end sought. Legislative apathy has already been
mentioned. In addition, there should be noted the ad hoc character of such supervision. Legislative action occurs only after the
harm has already been done in a particular case. Also, the
686. In addition, local control of municipal finances eliminates the influence of the power of the purse. On local financing generally,
see Elison, Finances of Metropolitan Areas (1963).
687. On home rule generally, see Littlefield, Metropolitan Area Problems and Municipal Home Rule (1962).
688. Schmandt, "Municipal Home Rule in Missouri," 1953 Wash. U.L.Q.
385, 386.
689. These states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
690. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642, 29 S.W. 845, rehearing denied, 127 Mo. 654, 30 S.W. 111 (1895).
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legislature, as the agent of the majority, not of the individual or
minority, may not be sympathetic. This, indeed, was the reason
for including the Bill of Rights in the organic law of the land, as
was the doctrine of the separation of powers so included, although
by implication. Thereby, certain guarantees to individual or minority rights were sought to be placed outside of the instantaneous
whim of the masses, and the despotism of the majority thus
avoided.691 Ad hoc legislation or alteration of enabling laws or
local characters would not seem conducive to the realization of
these guarantees.
(5) Delegation

Whereas the separation of powers in its manifestation of internal trifurcation and external checks appears of minimal and
decreasing value as a limitation upon local governmental action,
its corollary, i.e., the maxim against delegation, retains somewhat more vitality. Of course, no question exists but that the
state may delegate functions and powers to municipal government,
and that it, subject to prohibitions in the enabling legislation or
charter, may further subdelegate to local boards or agencies.692
Two very important limitations arise at this point, however, with
respect to the exercise of the legislatively-delegated power.
In the first place, the municipal government may exercise
only those powers conferred upon it, either expressly or by clear
implication, by the state legislature. According to Dillon's Rule:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that
a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied.693

Thus, by predetermination of the structure and scope of the
municipal corporation, the state legislature may be said to impose a very significant limitation upon local governmental activity.
Where the local authority exceeds its predefined ambit, the action
691. Supra note 10, and accompanying text.
692. Cf. State ex rel. Simpson v. City of Mankato, supra note 655.
693. 1 Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations 44850 (5th ed. 1911).
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is ultra vires and void, and the individual afforded appropriate
judicial relief. As was seen with regard to special assessments,
the power to make local improvements does not contain, by implication, the authority for their funding by special exactions. 694
Similarly, the power to levy taxes, without more, does not sanction the imposition of a regulatory license fee.695 In either case,
the authority must be explicit or the local government will have
transfressed its proper sphere of activity.
It is, of course, true that the effectiveness of such limitation is mitigated to some extent by the wider spheres of action
permitted in home rule jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the prospective legislative control-as distinguished from the retrospectivelyoriented legislative oversight discussed earlier 696 -of predetermining the scope of local governmental undertakings, would, at
this date anyway, appear to comprise a significant limitation.
The second facet of the delegation doctrine deserving of attention as a limiting factor in the local context is that, although
delegation, per se, is today uniformly acknowledged as proper, to
be valid it must be circumscribed by reasonably ascertainable
stanqards by which to govern the exercise of the discretion conferred. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in a zoning
case:
[T] here now seems to be little doubt that a zoning ordinance
must prescribe definite standards for the guidance and control of the building inspector, the zoning officials and indeed
the municipal council, when by the ordinance it reserves to
itself various administrative zoning powers. An ordinance
whereby the city council delegates to itself the arbitrary and
unfettered authority to decide where and how a particular
structure shall be built or where located without at the same
time setting up reasonable standards which would be applicable alike to all property owners similarly conditioned,
cannot be permitted to stand as a valid municipal enactment.697

694. Supra notes 458 & 459, and accompanying text.
695. As the Illinois Court said in City of Chicago v. Drogasawacz, 256
Ill. 34, 99 N.E. 869, 870 (1912): "A city possesses no inherent
power to license any occupation. That power must be expressly
granted in its charter, or be a necessary incident to the powers so
granted."
696. Supra notes 681-91, and accompanying text.
697. North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla. 1956). See
also State ex rel. Greenberg v. Dade County, 120 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
App. 1960) (licensing ordinance).
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The requirement, which, as indicated earlier, applies as
well to licensing ordinances698 and the imposition of individual
assessments,699 is not an inflexible one, however. Thus, "where
it is difficult or impractical for the Legislature to lay down a
definite, comprehensive rule," the courts have generally permitted
a "reasonable amount of discretion [to] • • .be delegated to the
administrative officials." 700
Where the delegation is of a legislative function (e.g., the
authority to fix the boundaries of an assessment district), it is
often said that little objection may be made to the grant of rather
wide spheres of discretion. 701 Legislation or rule-making is general in application; and inasmuch as the legislature itself could
make such determinations-so the courts have held-, it requires
no great feat of logic to justify its delegation to the legislative
branch of the municipal government, which is more familiar with
its own local problems and questions of policy than is its more
remote counterpart in the state capital.
Where, however, adjudication is involved, i.e., where the
action is particular in application, somewhat more of a problem
exists in the grant of unfettered administrative power. In fact,
in this possibility is said to inhere the principal vice which opponents attribute to the administrative process. In this regard,
the words of the Michigan court will be recalled:
Without definite standards an ordinance becomes an
open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool
for the suppression of competition through the granting of
authority to one and the withholding from another. . . . A
zoning ordinance cannot permit administrative officers or
boards to pick and choose the recipients of their favors.702
This is the "tyranny of the American system of government" of
which the Kansas Court spoke,70 3 and the "one conspicuous failure of the United States" as envisioned by Lord Bryce.704
In the light of such fears, it seems little wonder that the
courts (at least at the local level) have, for the most part, limited the more extended grants of discretion to cases involving
698. Supra notes 378-88, and accompanying text.
699. Supra notes 504-07, and accompanying text.
700. Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 159, 164 N.E.2d 389, 196 N.Y.S.
2d 90, 93 (1959).
701. Flynn v. Chiappari, 191 Cal. 139, 215 Pac. 682 (1923).
702. Supra note 383.
703. Supra note 176.
704. Supra note 673.
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potentially substantial harm to the community. As the California
court state_d with regard to licensing statutes:
The granting of discretionary power, not restricted by
specific standards, to confer or deny licenses or permits
has been upheld. . .where the licensed activity, because of
its dangerous or objectionable character, might be regulated
or restricted to certain localities. 705
As has been seen, liquor establishments,706 pool halls,707 and
junk yards,708 among other such activities, are embraced by the
"dangerous or objectionable" classification to which the California
court alluded.
If, on the other hand, the business or activity is not conducive to public harm-and this would include the validity of an
individual assessment, no less than the request, for example, of
a permit to build, or a license to operate a hardware store in a
particular locality-the requirement that discretionary municipal
authority be bounded by rather definite and reasonably precise
standards, would seem to be well established by judicial decision. 709 Exceptions are, of course, in evidence.710 Nevertheless,
the general rule appears to be that announced by the Pennsylvania court in affirming mandamus for a building permit, "the authority of the enforcement officer or agent must be plainly spelled
out in rules or regulations promulgated by duly enacted ordinances
or resolution." 711 In this manner, arbitrariness and capriciousness on the part of local government are sought to be limited. In
the absence of standards to define the ambit of municipal authority and the manner of its exercise, the authorization will be
struck down as an unconstitutional delegation of power ,712

705. In re Petersen, 51 Cal.2d 177, 184, 331 P.2d 24, 29 (1958).
706. Supra note 440.
707. Cf. Murphy v. People of the State of California, 225 U.S. 623, 32
S. Ct. 697 (1912).
708. Supra note 236.
709. The case material in this regard is voluminous. Illustrative recent
decisions include State ex rel. Ware v. City of Miami, 107 S.2d
387 (Fla. App. 1958); State ex rel. Continental Oil Co. v. Waddill,
318 S. W.2d 281, 285 (Mo. 1958); Busch Jewelry Co. v. City of Bessemer, 269 Ala. 180, 112 So. 2d 344 (1959); Borough of Baldwin, Allegheny County v. Mathews, 394 Pa. 53, 145 A.2d 698 (1958).
710. E.g., Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A.2d 9 (1959).
711. Borough of Baldwin, Allegheny County v. Mathews, supra note 709,
at 55-56, 145 A.2d at 699.
712. State ex rel. Continental Oil Co. v. Waddill, supra note 709.
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Such, it will be noted, marks a deviation from federal713 and, to a lesser extent, state 714-practice. At these levels, general legislation in the form of administrative procedure acts obtain to restrict or limit administrative discretion. The need for
strict standards in the particular enabling statute is, in such
event, at least mitigated, if not obviated altogether. On the other
hand, no comparable limitation prevails to contain the discretion
of municipal officials. This would appear to constitute a significant factor in justifying, if not explaining, the continuing vitality
of the requirement of standards in particular enabling acts or
charters at local levels of governmental activity.
b. Due Process
The second of the two principal constitutional limitations
upon administrative government consists in the due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions. Originating as
a purely procedural limitation upon the action of government in
its dealings with the populace,715 the guarantee has been expanded, of late, to embrace consideration of the substantive content
of the statutes authorizing the governmental action in the first
instance.71 6 Thus, the distinction has arisen in constitutional jargon of "procedural" and "substantive due process," both as regards the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution, and of the state constitutions as well.
713. Supra notes 71-83, and accompanying text.
714. Supra notes 145-50, and accompanying text.
715. The requirement is said to originate in ch. 3 of 28 Edw. III (1355),
which provided: "No man of what state or condition he be, shall be
put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor
put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of
law." The significance of the constitutional clause, which provides
that "no person• . . shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," to the framers as a purely procedural limitation, is highlighted by the statement in Coke's Institute (which was the source of their understanding of the matter)
that by due process of law is meant "by indictment or presentment
of good and lawful men . . •or by writ original of the Common Law."
2 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 50 (1669). See generally
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S. Ct. 111, 292 (1884)
(dissent).
716. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261
U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923) (invalidating a minimum wage act as
a violation of "due process" on grounds of its substantive requirements).
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(1) Procedural Due Process

The basic ingredient of procedural due process is said to

be the requirement of notice and the opportunity to be heard. 717

It is rudimentary to principles of fair play and common decency,
· so the theory goes, that before a person may be put in jeopardy
of life, liberty or property, he should be notified of the action
pending against him and provided the opportunity to defend against
it. 718 The sufficiency of notice (by personal service or publication) as well as the form of the hearing (with or without jury)
will, of necessity, depend upon the "nature of the case." 71 9 Nevertheless, where a hearing is required, the constitutional provision ordains that it be fairly conducted before a tribunal manifesting currently prevailing standards of impartiality •720
As has been indicated, however, with regard to federal and
state agencies, the constitutional guarantee (absent such general
legislation as the Administrative Procedure Act) has no necessary
application to administrative proceedings.721 Where, for example,
the function involved is rule-making, the constitutional mantle is
explicitly withheld. 722 And even in the case of adjudication, notice and hearing may be denied without constitutional offense,
where the individual interest in issue is classified as a privilege
rather thaii a right, e.g., alien admission and state occupational
licensing.723
The deficiency of the constitutional guarantee (both federal
and state), in this regard, is similarly evident re the local context. The starting point for inquiry at this leveT, also, is the
legislative-adjudicative dichotomy. Thus, when a local agency (or
the local governing body, itself, e.g., the common council) engages
in a legislative function, as, for example, when, pursuant to statutory authorization, it drafts a licensing ordinance or determines
the "necessity" of a special assessment, it need not, any more
than need a legislative assembly, afford a hearing prior to promulgation.724 The theory is that such action is general in application (i.e., affects a rather large number of people) and that in
balancing considerations as to the desirability of policy, necessity,

717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.

E.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S. Ct. 841 (1897).
See text at note 96 supra.
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289, 2 S. Ct. 569, 589 (1883).
Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 S. Ct. 445 (1951).
Supra notes 90-95, and accompanying text.
Supra note 121.
Supra notes 152-57, and accompanying text.
Supra notes 497-500, and accompanying text.
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and speed as against the protection of individual interests, the
former is said to prevail to the extent of repudiating the guarantee. 725 In fact, in such cases, judicial review may itself be precluded, absent manifest fraud or oppression. As the Kansas Supreme Court stated in an assessment case:
The law having vested the function of determining the
necessity for an improvement in the governing body of the
city, it follows that its determination is controlling and
when made in good faith is not open to review by the
courts. 7 26

The practical effect of this situation, while perhaps necessary on other grounds, is certainly offensive to the doctrine of
limited powers. As was seen in a preceding section, continuing
legislative "oversight" (by the state) of local administrative action has rapidly eroded, of late, under the stimulus of municipal
home rule. 727 With judicial review limited to cases of extreme
arbitrariness-and the burden of proof everywhere upon the complaining individual and, in fact, without even a right to appear before the local board-not much of a safeguard against administrative government in matters of general application would appear to exist at this level. Even the control of the ballot box-a
principal check on the legislature-may be absent, where, for example, the board is nonelective or responsibility for the ordinance
or determination is so diffused as to render its ascertainment
impossible.728
Even in the event of administrative action with particularized effects, i.e., the exercise of adjudicative functions, the guarantee would appear to have been more honored in breach than in
practice. As in the case of legislative matters, the applicability
of the constitutional guarantee is said to rest upon a balancing of
the general interest in the common welfare as against the protection of the individual in the particular instance. 72 9 Inasmuch as,
by definition, an individual is affected personally in such event, it
would seem to follow that notice and hearing would generally be
forthcoming as a matter of constitutional right.
Such, however, is not necessarily the case. In two situations, in particular, the due process requirement has been held
725. Cf. language of the Court in Kissane v. City of Anchorage, 159 F.
Supp. 733, 737 (D. Alaska 1958).
726. Palmer v. Munro, 123 Kan. 387, 389, 255 Pac. 67, 68 (1927).
727. Supra notes 687-91, and accompanying text.
728. Supra notes 670-73, and accompanying text.
729. Cooper, Administrative Agencies and the Courts 88 (1951).

108

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

to be inapplicable to local administrative practice of an adjudicative character: (1) where the adjudicative function is performed
by the legislative body of the local government and (2) where a
privilege rather than a right is involved.
Legislative determination. In regard to number (1) above,
it will be recalled from the discussion of special assessments
that although generally the landowner is accorded, by constitutional right, if not by specific statute, the opportunity to be heard
at some stage of the proceeding ( i.e., before his individual assessment is impose-ct); where the local legislature or council, itself, makes the determination, no constitutional right is infringed
by proceeding without notice and hearing to the affected landowner.730 The courts adhering to this position, distinguish cases
of council delegation to subordinates or administrative boards,
which situations, in their view, do fall within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee.731 But, since the state legislature, itself,
could impose the assessment sans hearing, they find no due process impediment to a delegation to the local legislature of that
function. 732
The difficulty with this view resides in the evident confusion of the exercise of a legislative function with the exercise of
an adjudicative function by the legislative body. Not structureor who exercises the power-but function-whether adjudicative
(particularized action) or legislative (generalized action)-should
control. The problem, of course, issues from the fact of merged
functions at the local governing level. As was indicated earlier,
no constitutional requirement persists to require a separation of
powers in the municipal governing body.733 Further, as was seen,
the tendency (illustrated in the growing popularity of the councilmanager and commission forms of governmental organization) has
been away from separation in practice as well. 734 The result has
been that oftentimes the local council is endowed with adjudicative
and executive functions, no less than legislative. This causes, it
would seem, the judicial confusion that exists at this date. Nevertheless, though evidently predicated on an erroneous, or at least
confused, premise, the general rule appears to be that where the
legislative body itself makes a determination, though particular in
effect, no due process guarantee of notice and hearing obtains.
730. Supra notes 522-53, and accompanying text.
731. E.g., Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 86 Ark. 231, 110
s.w. 1031 (1908).
732. E.g., Town of Gulfport ex rel. C.J. Williamson & Co. v. Mendels,
127 Fla. 730, 174 So. 8 (1937).
733. Supra note 655.
734. Supra note 679, and accompanying text.
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Privilege versus Right. There can be no doubt but that the
grant or denial of an occupational or business license is particular in application, and, for that reason, adjudicative. Nevertheless, as has been seen, the due process requirement is without application as a limitation upon local government (or upon the
states) on the ground that the constitutional guarantee embraces
only rights not privileges.735 By characterizing licenses as conditional privileges, the notice and hearing mandate, in this event,
is avoided,736 and an applicant may be denied the authority to
engage in a particular business without even the opportunity to be
heard.737 Thus liberty of free occupational choice, so often extolled in theoretical discourse, is partially limited in practice.
Even in questions of re-issuance or revocation, where substantial investments have been built up, due process does not
necessarily attach to guarantee a hearing. As was indicated, in
this regard, the distinction has been drawn between noxious and
non-noxious activities, and in the former instance (e.g., re a liquor establishment) considerable latitude accorded to the local authorities in dealing with individual interests. 738 The point is, as
has been said, that due process is a very flexible concept.
Whether it will require notice and hearing in a particular case
depends upon a balancing of the interests involved. 739 In the case
of potentially harmful or noxious activities, this has meant practically free reign to local authorities. The police power, in such
event, has weighed heavily to tip the balance away from individual protection in the right to be heard and toward vindication of
ex parte administrative action.
Such is not to suggest, of course, that hearings may not be
required in local licensing cases. By state constitution or statute,
or by local ordinance, such may be specifically prescribed. The
point, rather, is that in the absence of specific guarantees, the
federal and state due process clauses do not afford any guarantee.
Neither is the suggestion intended that due process never
demands that notice and hearing be accorded to interested parties
in cases of particularized action by municipal government. Where
735. Supra notes 265-66, and accompanying text.
736. Nulter v. State Road Comm'n of W. Va., 119 W. Va. 312, 317, 193
S.E. 549, 552 (1937).
737. As a matter of fact, of course, most statutes provide for hearings
in such cases. Nevertheless, there is no constitutional requirement
to such effect.
738. State ex rel. First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 136
Fla. 788, 187 So. 148 (193 9).
739. Supra note 729, and accompanying text.
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individual assessments are imposed by local boards rather than
the governing untt740 or where a local board seeks to revoke the
license of a nonharmful and useful business, 741 the constitutional
requirement, as has been observed, applies; and notice and the
opportunity to be heard are essential to the validity of municipal
action. Whether, in a given case, the safeguards are afforded depends, of course, upon a judicial balancing of the interests involved. The uncertainty incumbent in this approach (because litigation is necessary to determine whether a hearing is required
in the first instance) would, however, seem to weaken substantially the practical effect of the guarantee. The individual, in this
event, is required to go to court to ascertain if he can go to
court. Strange justice! Nevertheless, this is the result of so
volatile and undefined a concept as "due process of law."
Tangentially, it should be noted that where a hearing is required, the guarantee extends to require a fair hearing. 742 Although not subject to the formal requirements of a case-at-law,
administrative hearings, to be valid, must at least afford the
parties opportunity to be informed as to claims of opponents, to
hear the evidence against them, to cross-examine, to introduce
evidence in their own behalves and to make argument. 743 The
specifics, of course, will be governed by the necessities of the
particular situation-balancing, once again. 744

(2) Substantive Due Process
Of comparatively recent vintage,745 the doctrine of substantive due process is addressed to the content of legislation, as
opposed to the procedures employed in its administration and enforcement. 746 Thus, in a variety of instances, legislation has
been struck down as invalid on its face, the courts holding the
statute in question to be in violation of fundamental notions of
due process of law.747 Early decisions invalidating maxiip.um
740. Supra note 524, and accompanying text.
741. Supra notes 437-39, and accompanying text.
742. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, 170 Cal. App. 2d 637,
339 P .2d 933 (1959) (special assessments).
743. See text at note 96 supra.
744. Cf. Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 6.5 S. Ct. 1316
(1945).
745. See generally Swisher, The Growth of Constitutional Power in the
United States 107-25 (1946).
746. See generally Corwin, Constitution of the United States of America
845-46 (1952).
747. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277 (1908); and
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 29 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
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hour and minimum wage legislation,748 as well as holdings that
retroactively-oriented statutes are invalid,749 illustrate the employment of substantive due process at other than local levels.
In the local setting as well the doctrine has gained currency. Although employed in a great number of situations at this
level, the most significant applications for present purposes are
the following: (1) discriminatory classifications; and (2) reasonableness, as defined by the relation between the statutory purpose
and an authorized power of the governing unit.
Classification. Practically all legislation (federal and state,
as well as local) involves some degree of classification whereby
statutory objectives are dire.cted to particular categories of persons, things, or events. So long as the classifications are reasonable, no constitutional difficulty is encountered.750 By way of
illustration, it will be recalled from the discussion of licensing
that the imposition of license fees upon interstate shippers, where
reasonable in amount and confined to the actual cost of necessary
regulatory activity, is not discriminatory and unreasonable where
no like fees are imposed on local shippers. 751 Likewise, a requirement that improved property in the District of Columbia be
connected with the city sewage system, with different sanctions
for residents and nonresidents, was upheld over the argument
that the classification was arbitrary. 752
Where, on the other hand, by state statute or local ordinance, a classification is without justification in logic or in fact,
(e.g., in authorizing the issuance of licenses to operate a laundry
business to Caucasian residents but not to Chinese753), it is said
to be without basis and void, as being in violation not only of the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of law, but of
substantive due process as well. Classifications which in word
or effect amount to naked discrimination against certain persons,
while simultaneously favoring others without a reasonable basis
in law, or in fact, are thus deemed defective in content, and accordingly are invalidated. In the words of Justice Jackson:

748. Ibid.
749. Cf. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 S. Ct.
271 (1893).
750. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S. Ct.
883 (1937).
751. Supra notes 391 and 392, and accompanying text.
752. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 29 S. Ct. 560 (1909).
753. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886).
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I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states
and the Federal Government must exercise their powers so
as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object
of regulation. 754

Reasonableness. As suggested in the preceding quotation,
not only must classifications be reasonable in the sense of being
nondiscriminatory, but a statute or ordinance to avoid the onus
of substantive due process, must be reasonably related to an
acknowledged power of the governing unit. In the case of licensing, as will be recalled, this means that the regulatory activity
undertaken must exhibit a clear tendency to protect the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare, that is, it must not
exceed the proper scope of the local police power. 755 And, by
way of illustration, as the public health or welfare may not reasonably be said to be promoted by limiting the sale of raw milk
to local dealers only, an Oklahoma City ordinance which so provided was invalidated as offensive to substantive due process. 756
Such, of course, by no means exhausts the categories of
cases where the content of local legislation may be assaulted on
grounds of substantive due process. However the principal ones
from the perspective of the limitations of administrative law have
been mentioned, providing basis for the generalization that substantive due process appears somewhat more effective as a constitutional safeguard than does its procedural counterpart. At
least this conclusion appears warranted in the local context,
where, as has been indicated, procedural due process is of somewhat dubious import.
Parenthetically, there should be mentioned at this point the
related requirement of statutory reasonableness apart from any
question of constitutionality. Often confused in the case law, the
distinction was well-delineated as follows:
The question of reasonableness of an ordinance is treated
differently from the question of constitutionality of a statute.
The former bears on whether or not a local legislative body
has reasonably exercised general powers delegated by statute or charter; the latter on whether a limitation in the

v.

Railway Express Agency, Inc.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112, 69
S. Ct. 463, 466 (1949) (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.)
755. Supra note 374, and accompanying text.
756. Supra note 375. For other such instances, see Corwin, supra note
746, at 853-72.
754.
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constitution, the organic law of the land, has been contravened. . . .
Ordinances enacted under the general welfare clauses
of city charters or those permitting regulation of the liquor traffic must bear some reasonable relation to the
public health, safety, or morals or to the furtherance of
such regulation. They must not be arbitrary or discriminatory . . . .
Accordingly, the courts will review the question as to
the reasonableness of an ordinance, and if an ordinance
passed under a general power is found unreasonable will
declare it void as a matter of law. . .for in every power
given to a municipal corporation to pass ordinances there
is an implied restriction that ordinances will be reasonable, consistent with the general law and policy of the
state, uniform in their operation, and promotive, rather
than destructive, of lawful businesses and occupations. 757

Thus, in addition to the
ess" in assessing the legality
possesses a potent weapon in
or statutory unreasonableness

limitation of "substantive due procof municipal action, the individual
the related doctrine of ultra vires
per se.

2. Procedural Limitations
Procedural limitations, in the form of rules of practice and
procedure imposed by general legislation upon administrative action, have not, at this date, filtered down to the local levels of
government. Thus, even in those states which have adopted administrative procedure acts more-or-less on the federal model,
municipal administration continues to be governed by specific enabling statutes and the ordinances enacted pursuant thereto. The
procedures required of local licensing officials in granting or
denying an application, for example, must, in consequence, be infinitely variable as between cities in the same state, and perhaps even as between different activities in the same city. An
example would be the right of a hearing in regard to the grant
of a license to operate a hardware store, but not for a liquor

757. Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 205-08, 32 N.W.2d
538, 549-50 (1948) (dissent). See also Stason & Kauper, Cases on
Municipal Corporations 123-24 n.4 (1959).
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establishment.758 In addition to the absence of a general guarantee of procedural safeguards, the result (from the vantage of
individual rights) can only be a denial of equal justice.
On the other hand, the application of state procedure acts,
even where such exist, to local administration may sound simpler than experience warrants. It is certainly true that municipalities bear a superficial resemblance to state agencies, in that
both are creatures of the state and theoretically, at least, are
subject to its strict surveillance.759 Nevertheless, current attitudes toward local self-government, and especially the ascendancy
of municipal home rule in this century, 760 have the effect of
rendering doubtful such an application to local agencies. In constitutional home rule states the attempt would even appear to run
counter to the state constitution, in imposing state procedures in
matters of purely "local" concern, e.g., the procedures to be followed in the imposition of a special assessment to fund the laying
of a sewer pipe.761
Even outside of home rule jurisdictions, however, the rule
of practicality would seem to preclude the application of such extensive procedure acts as that, for example, of California. 762 Independent hearing examiners for a town of 1500 would certainly
seem out of the question. On the other hand, the problem of
governmental limitations and individual safeguards persists even
in the smallest of municipalities, necessitating inquiry at these
levels as well.
As has been suggested, the result of particularized legislation, where agency procedures are spelled out in the enabling
statute rather than in general legislation applicable to all agencies
in the jurisdiction, is almost infinite variety in the procedures
employed. Thus, notice and hearing may be prescribed for one
agency, and not for another,763 representation by counsel allowed,
or not;7 64 the rules of evidence followed in one type of proceeding, and not in another; 765 a judicial-type trial provided, or provision be made for a pro forma hearing only;766 etc.
758. Supra notes 440-41, 450-51, and accompanying text.
759. City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., supra
note 664.
760. Supra notes 687-90, and accompanying text.
'761. Cf. Kansas City v. Scarritt, supra note 690.
762. Supra note 161, and accompanying text.
763. Supra note 262, and accompanying text.
764. See text at notes 271-72 supra.
765. Ibid.
766. Cf. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals of City and County of
San Francisco, 23 Cal.2d 303, 144 P .2d 4 (1943).
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The only general guarantee that the individual possesses in
the face of this diversity of local practice is that the procedure
comply with some vague notion of fairness. As stated by the
United States Supreme Court:
[A State or Municipality] is free to regulate [its own] procedure . . . in accordance with its own conception of policy
and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamentai.767

f

If such unfairness can be demonstrated, the procedure will be invalidated as a violation of procedural due process. The difficulty
with this limitation, however, consists in the very vagueness of
its content.
The chameleon-like character of procedural due process,
ever-changing with the times and ever-dependent upon the particulars of a given situation, seems a poor substitute for the definite procedural guarantees contained, for example, in the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, in the face of the obvious
difficulties in imposing such general legislation locally, the poor
substitute is certainly better than nothing at all. On the other
hand, it would seem that the due process guarantee could be
buoyed up, at least, by general legislation of a limited nature.
Thus, a general statute differentiating, perhaps, between legislative and adjudicative functions and providing for judicial review
of adjudicative action in the event of adverse decision or failure
to act, would appear to be reasonable and practicable. In addition, the confusion, alluded to above, of possible denial of any
hearing whatsoever in cases of legislative determination of adjudicative questions, 768 would be obviated to the benefit of individual safeguards and the enhancement of the limitation doctrine in
the local context.

3. Judicial Review
a. Introduction
Judicial review as a limitation upon arbitrary administrative action at the local governing level should naturally have
proven somewhat more salutary as an individual safeguard than
767.
768.

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332
(1934).
Supra notes 733-34, and accompanying text.
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has its legislative counterpart. As indicated above,769 continuing
legislative oversight, as contrasted with the more circumscribed
prospective legislative limitation of predetermining the premises
of local action, 770 is of minimal value only in constraining the
caprice of municipal officials.
Additionally, of course, the internal check of general, limiting legislation prescribing certain rules of procedure, compliance
with which is said to constitute a condition to the validity of the
administrative action of federal and some state officers, 771 appears unavailable as a safeguard in the local context.772 In consequence, the concept of limited government would appear to require, all the more, that recourse to the courts be made available as an external check upon the administrative process.
Such is not to suggest, however, that judicial review is accorded as a matter of right to anyone wishing to object to local
administrative action. Indeed, as was indicated in the sections on
licensing773 and special assessments, 774 the significance of this
safeguard may, in many instances, appear somewhat nebulous, or,
on occasion, even nugatory. The disinclination of many courts to
consider the question of the necessity of a special assessment to
be a justiciable issue within the proper ambit of judicial purview775 will be recalled by way of illustration. Nevertheless, owing perhaps to the practical impotence of legislative oversight and
the unavailability of general procedural legislation on the model
of the Administrative Procedure Act, the doctrine of judicial re. view has retained, on balance, a good deal more vitality as a
limitation upon municipal administration than it now possesses at
the higher governing levels.776
b. Availability of Review
The availability of judicial review respecting action by local
administrative officials is, as is the case in the federal and state
contexts, predicated, in the first instance, upon the requirement
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.

Supra notes 681-91, and accompanying text.
Supra notes 693-96, and accompanying text.
Supra notes 99-124, 160-62, and accompanying text.
Supra notes 686-91, and accompanying text.
Supra· notes 310-12, 323, 325-28, and accompanying text.
Supra notes 497-99, and accompanying text.
Ibid.
On the declining significance of judicial review as a limitation upon
federal and state administration, see Cooper, supra note 729, at

305-15.
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of standing. In order to gain access to the courts, the objecting
party must be "aggrieved" in the sense of ascertainable and especial injury to himself or his property. 777 By way of illustration, a property owner required to contribute to an improvement
to be financed by a special assessment, is affected in the amount
of the exaction imposed, and, therefore, has standing to attack
the assessment either in toto (e.g., as not being "public" in nature778) or in its specific application to him (e.g., as being out
of relation to the benefit he receives779). On the other hand, the
existence of standing is not confined to the party directly before
the local agency. Third parties may be affected, for example, by
the grant of a license or the award of a variance in a zoning
case. Thus, a neighboring property owner who is opposed to the
grant of a variance (e.g., to permit the exploitation of a brick
kiln in a residential neighborhood) is said to be sufficiently "aggrieved" to maintain an action to have the variance set aside.780
Usually, provision is made in the statute or ordinance for judicial review by "aggrieved" persons;78l such, however, is not necessary, for as stated by the Tennessee court:
[A] court already has such power with respect to municipal
ordinances without any Act of the Legislature giving it such
power. . . . [T] he power to determine the reasonableness
of a municipal ordinance is necessarily committed to the
courts.782
,

In addition to the requirement of standing, the availability
of judicial redress is conditioned upon its prompt attainment. If
a statutory time period is prescribed in which review must be
sought (e.g., within twenty days of the administrative determination) the requirement is mandatory, and, as was seen with regard to special assessments, the doors of the court closed to a
party wishing to contest thereafter. 783 Further, even in the absence of a statutory appeal period, unreasonable delay in seeking
judicial review may bar its availability due to laches. 784 Or
777. E.g., Sengstock, Annexation: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area
Problem 64 (1960).
778. Supra notes 619-23, and accompanying text.
779. Supra notes 624-31, and accompanying text.
780. Cf. Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States 67 (1961).
781. E.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-310 (Supp. 1962) (annexation).
782. Witt v. Mccanless, 200 Tenn. 360, 369, 292 S.W.2d 392, 396 (1956).
783. Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 121 Okla. 18, 247 Pac. 15 (1926).
784. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Rahway, 3 N.J. Misc. 1105, 130
Atl. 642 (1925).
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judicial review may be precluded because of estoppel, due, for
example, to acquiescence785 or acceptance of benefits.786
A third general limitation upon the availability of judicial
review at this level is the typical (but not universal 787) requirement of the exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, for example, provision is made for appeal by unsuccessful applicants
for liquor licenses to an appellate licensing board, judicial review
is ordinarily unavailable pending compliance with the administrative remedy.788 Exceptions exist in some instances, where, for
example, the validity of the statute itself is at issue,789 or, in
some jurisdictions, where two or more remedies are sought, e.g.,
damages and injunction, and the administrative remedy is confined
to only one.790 Nevertheless, the general rule (in spite of constant attacks on grounds that its result is "exhaustion of litigants11791 rather than exhaustion of remedies) continues to be that,
where administrative redress is prescribed, it must be sought
and relief unforthcoming before judicial resort becomes available.
Finally, judicial review may be specifically precluded by
statute or ordinance. 792 Of course, every statutory attestation of
administrative finality will not be binding upon the courts because
some may offend prevailing notions of due process of law. 793 The
difficulty with employing due process as a means of expanding the
ambit of judicial accessibility, however, as has been said, consists in its nebulous, uncertain character. 794 It does not, as does
the Administrative Procedure Act, for example, guarantee judicial
type hearing in all adjudicative cases under the Act. 795 Thus,
though the very strength of the Constitution is said to reside in
the elasticity of its substantive provisions, as a specific procedural guarantee in a specific case, it may seem lacking. In
785. Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 105 N.W.
563 (1905).
786. City of Beggs v. Kelly, 110 Okla. 274, 238 Pac. 466 (1925).
787. On the New Jersey exception to the majority view, see Davis, Administrative Law Text 369-70 (1959).
788. Supra note 305.
789. Supra notes 306-07, and accompanying text.
790. E.g., Texas Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 246
S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
791. E.g., Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 775, 831 (1953).
792. Cf. Town of Gulfport ex rel. C.J. Williamson & Co. v. Mendels,
supra note 732, at 732, 174 So. at 9.
793. Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Burlingame, supra note 742.
794. See text at supra notes 91-94.
795. APA §5.
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addition, the great areas of legislative functions and the classifi- .
cation of certain activities as privileges will be recalled as illustrations of broad categories of administrative activity which
may be deemed final without offense to the fourteenth amendment
guarantee. 796 On the other hand, where the matter at issue is
adjudicative (at least where a right and not a privilege is concerned), due process will ordinarily supply the necessary leverage for judicial intervention, regardless of statutory protestations
as to the finality of administrative action.797
c. Scope of Review
In general, local practice as to the scope of review follows
the federal and state models. As was suggested with regard to
review of state administration, however, some disparity does persist at the lower levels, with respect, for example, to the substantial evidence rule and judicial review of administrative determinations of questions of fact. The varying utilization of the
constitutional and jurisdictional fact doctrines will be recalled by
way of illustration. 798 With the caution of consulting local practice in a specific case, however, to ascertain such divergencies
where they exist, the general scheme of local review consists in
the familiar procedure of distinguishing questions of law from
questions of fact, allowing full review in the former instance 799
and confining its scope to the "substantial evidence"800 or "arbitrary and capricious" rules801 in the latter.
Such attacks on the statute or ordinance as unreasonableness
on its face (due process or statutory unreasonableness),802 improper delegation or delegation without sufficient standards,803 or
offense to the commerce clause,804 the equal protection provision,805 or the guarantees of freedom of speech or religion806 of
796. Supra notes 730-39, and accompanying text.
797. E.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Roosevelt County, 134 Mont. 355,
332 P .2d 501 (1958).
798. Supra notes 168-72, and accompanying text.
799. E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 s. Ct. 762 (1941).
800. Cf. Deane v. Board of Adjustment of Zoning Board, 172 Pa. Super.
502, 94 A.2d 112 (1953).
801. State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 75
N.W.2d 780 (1956).
802. Supra notes 373-77, and accompanying text.
803. Supra notes 378-88, and accompanying text.
804. Supra notes 389-92, and accompanying text.
805. Supra notes 393-98, and accompanying text.
806. Supra notes 399-404, and accompanying text.
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the federal and/or state constitutions, are thus fully reviewable
To the same effect are arguments that the statute
or ordinance in question is in conflict with other state or federal
laws,807 and the proposition that actions taken under such statutes
or ordinances are ultra vires and thus void as a matter of law. 808
The rationale for full review in such instances is clear. Questions of law are traditionally matters of judicial competence; the
idea of administrative expertise (said to justify the nonjudicial
determinations characterizing the administrative process) is inapplicable. 809
Determination of questions of fact, on the other hand, goes
to the essence of the administrative idea. The exercise of discretion (the very life blood of the administrative organism) is, of
course, predicated upon the determination of factual questions,
whether, for example, a particular applicant for an electrician's
license is sufficiently well-qualified under the statute.810 To permit complete judicial review would not only be duplicatory, timeconsuming and unnecessarily expensive, it would be at loggerheads with the very justification for administrative agencies in
the first place, i.e., that by their experience and expertise they
can better judge such factual questions within their competence
than can a court of general jurisdiction.811
Such, however, is not to suggest that administrative determinations in such event should be conclusive, at least where
agency action is particularized {adjudicative) as opposed to general (legislative) in effect. Rather, it is to suggest-and this is
the general rule in local practice-that review is not complete,
as in the case of questions of law, but is confined to the substantial evidence rule or to the consideration as to whether the
administrative action "was so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion." 812
So strong, in fact, is judicial disinclination to interfere with
administrative determinations of questions of fact that even clear
statutory authorizations for such review have been eviscerated by
judicial decision. Thus, a zoning statute which empowered the

by the courts.

807. Supra notes 405-08, and accompanying text.
808. Supra notes 615-18, and accompanying text.
809. See generally, Gellhorn & Byse, Administrative Law, Cases ~d
Comments 526-41 (4th ed. 1960).
810. See generally, 9 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 233-35 (3d ed.
1950).
811. Supra note 809.
812. State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, supra note 801, at
522, 75 N.W.2d at 785-86.
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court to "hear all pertinent evidence and determine the facts, and,
upon the facts as so determined, annul such decision if found to
exceed the authority of such board, or make such other decree
as justice or equity may require," 813 was treated by the Massachusetts court as follows:
Both parties and the judge at the hearing seem to have
treated this statute as practically substituting the court for
the board of appeals ahd giving the court the same power
to grant variances that the board possesses. We do not
think that is the meaning of the statute . . . . We do not
construe these words as opening up to the court the whole
area of administrative discretion, contrary to all precedent.
We construe them as requiring a decree according to law.81 4
The law-fact dichotomy, however, is not quite so simple a
formula in practice as it might appear in theory. The problem
is that most questions in administrative law are mixed, containing
elements of both law and fact.815 If, for example, a zoning ordinance sets out certain jurisdictional requirements to the grant
of a variance, compliance is demonstrable by factual showing on
the part of the applicant, but the fact that compliance is deemed
jurisdictional injects a legal aspect into the question.816 In this
event, the court, by deciding for itself whether to characterize
the question as legal or factual, broadens or contracts its own
scope of review. It, in effect, determines its own jurisdiction.
Such is the "knife of policy" referred to by Dickinson in the quotation employed earlier in this work. 81 7
Though difficulties persist, however, in application of the
rule, the bifurcation of questions into legal and factual, allowing
full review in the former and confining its scope to the "arbitrary capricious rule" in the latter, remains the majority view
(at least in the language of the courts) on the scope of judicial
review of local administrative determinations.
d. Selecting a Cause of Action
At the local level, as with the states,818 great variety persists in the forms of action by which a party may contest the
813. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40, §30 (1952), superseded by ch. 40A (1954).
814. Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 55658, 120 N.E.2d 916, 917-18 (1954),
815. See generally Isaacs, "The Law and the Facts," 22 Colum. L. Rev.
1 (1922).
816. Pooley, supra note 780, at 55-64.
817. See text at supra note 137.
818. See generally Davis, supra note 787, at 443-49.
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validity of municipal administrative practice. As a rule, the old
common law writ system obtains (generally by statutory enactment) with the result that a contestant selects his remedy at his
perU.819 Thus, if an assessment statute prescribes the remedy
of appeal to aggrieved property owners, an action by way of
certiorari will generally be dismissed.820 The difficulty is that
when the aggrieved party finally ascertains his proper remedy,
it may be too late; the statutory period for appeal may have
elapsed, 821 or in the absence of such provision the party may be
barred access to the courts due to laches.822
The problem is magnified by the great variety of actions
possible, embracing, for example, mandamus, quo warranto,
certiorari, appeal, injunction, declaratory judgment, habeas corpus, prohibition, money had and received, etc. Professor Davis
described the situation as follows:
For no practical reason, the remedies are plural. A cardinal principle, now and then erratically ignored, denies one
method of review when another is adequate. The lines are
moved about through discussions of such concepts as judicial, nonjudicial, discretionary, and ministerial. These concepts are acutely unfortunate not only because they defy
definition but because of the complete folly of using any
concepts whatever to divide one remedy from another. Nothing is accomplished by holding that certiorari is the wrong
method of reviewing nonjudicial action, that mandamus will
not reach discretionary action, and that since neither certiorari nor mandamus is good for action which is both nonjudicial and discretionary, such as public utility rate fixing,
the remedy is equitable, so that concepts such as irreparable injury fortuitiously come to life and may be decisive,
even though those concepts would not affect certiorari or
mandamus. The theory varies, and departures from the
theory are commonplace. Thousands of cases try to draw
lines. The more the cases the more the lines. The more
the lines the more the confusion. Yet the litigant must label his pleading at his peril.823
The result is, of course, that many cases fail to reach the
merits, and that much judicial effort is directed to "the solution
819. Cf. Lindquist v. City of Lindsborg, 165 Kan. 212, 193 P .2d 180
(1948).
820. The writ of certiorari is discretionary in any event, and the existence of another remedy would generally preclude its use anyway.
821. Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, supra note 783.
822. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Rahway, supra note 784.
823. Davis, supra note 787, at 443.
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of false problems."824 The judicial limitation, in such event, appears severely jeopardized, to the inevitable detriment of the
premised individual safeguards. Such, nevertheless, constitutes
the present practice as to modes of judicial review of municipal
administrative action; 825 and the individual is thus constrained to
scrutinize carefully the local statutes and decisions whereby to
ascertain the proper avenue of access to the courts, the nominal
guardians of his liberty.
C. Rationale of the Chapter
The design of this chapter, as has been indicated, has been
to utilize the conceptual categories of administrative law as they
have evolved in the federal and state contexts as a means of
classifying and assessing the less organized and less coherent
practices of municipal administrations. Specifically, the focus
has been upon the operation (or its absence) of the principle of
limitation as a means of restraining the arbitrary excesses of
administrative government, and, complementally, the protection of
individual rights in interaction therewith.
Such, of course, constitutes a very large task, owing in no
small part to the literally thousands of local governing units
manifesting literally millions of administrative acts and practices.
A comprehesive catalogue of local administrative law is, therefore, without the purview of this work; such, in fact, would seem
impossible in a work of any size. Nevertheless, a relatively
short work addressed to the ascertainable general patterns arising in this area would seem infinitely valuable for a number of
reasons.
In the first place, descriptive commentary of what is actually going on is valuable in its own right. Most of the concern
in the field of administrative law is directed to the federal level.
Nothing of the attention and publicity accruing to the Hector826 or
Landis827 reports, for example, has appeared with regard to the
administrative practices of local governments. The attention
that is given to the subject in the treatises, on the other hand,
is generally confined to the glib overgeneralization inherent in
treating local and state practice as essentially co-extensive.828
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.

Ibid.

Supra notes 314-51, 571-604, and accompanying text.
Supra note 58.
Supra note 57.
E.g., Davis, supra note 818.
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As has been seen with regard to such matters as the requirement of standards829 and the home rule limitation upon the applicability of general legislation to local procedure,830 however,
the commingling is far from justified.
Secondly, a brief statement of local practice would seem
justified as constituting the requisite minor premise in any effort at improvement or correction of shortcomings that such exposition may reveal to exist. It takes no great feat of logic to
demonstrate that before the public resources may be marshalled
to ameliorate the deficiencies of the status quo, there must be
accurate knowledge as to what such deficiencies may be.
Finally, as has been emphasized, the principle of limitation
has significance to local administration, no less than to that of
federal anct state governments.831 Tyranny and arbitrariness (the
very antithesis of an individual-oriented society) may, likewise,
occur at the municipal level. Lord Bryce, it will be recalled,
wrote that in our system of government it was, in fact, more
likely to so occur.832 Yet, individual contact with government is
most direct and its effects are most felt by the average citizen
at the local level. Respect for government and responsible participation in the democratic processes (so necessary to the proper
functioning of our governmental system) are, as has been said,
bred and nurtured here, at the grass roots. If through arbitrary
disregard of individual rights by local administrators, disrespect
is kindled instead, our system may not long endure. Disrespect,
of course, is erosive in effect and readily transferable to higher
governing levels, a heavy burden for any government to bear in
these crucial times. A statement of just what local practice is,
pinpointing, thereby, the scope of such limitations as currently
exist upon municipal administration, and alternatively the extent
of individual safeguards, would thus appear particularly useful not
only from the analytical aspect of the extent to which practice
diverges from theory in our system, but, additionally, as a necessary starting point in any effort towards reform.

829.
830.
831.
832.

Supra
Supra
Supra
Supra

note 702, and accompanying text.
notes 687-90, and accompanying text.
notes 32-33, and accompanying text.
note 673.

V. CONCLUSIONS
A. Individual versus State
The philosophical framework brooding beneath the specific
scrutinies of this monograph is, of course, the age-old poser of
the Individual versus the State.833 Stated broadly, its resolution
in Western society has been sought in the abjuration of extremities. Rather than to pursue one end to the exclusion of the other,
we have endeavored (though not always with success) to mesh, as
harmoniously as possible, individual self-assertion with community interest as interpreted and enforced by the state. Indeed, the
very objective of law in our system is to effectuate a balance between the two.834 The individual is constrained, in the public or
community interest, against undertaking certain activities proscribed by the governing agent. On the other hand, the state is
limited, by constitution or otherwise, both in the activities it may
prohibit (and/or require) and in the procedures by which it may
do so. Thus, from the perspective of the individual, the law in
some instances is confining while in others it affords him assistance.
But the balance is a precarious one. Changing conditions
tilt the fulcrum from this side to that, and then back again; on
the one extremity, anarchy; on the other, despotism. The critical
concern of our day is, of course, with the latter. As has been
indicated, the well-nigh frenetic concern with security, both military and social, has produced a gigantic governing mechanism in
this country. Conditions have so required, and no suggestion is
intended that the increase in size nor the proliferation of activities should or could have been otherwise. Indeed, to seek equipoise by requiring that government relinquish powers and activities in a grandiose program of self-atrophication is as ridiculous
in this day and age as to counsel weight reduction by cutting off
arms and legs. In either case, the technique suggested might effect the end sought, but at what price I
833. See generally on this problem, Duguit, Law in the Modern State
(1919).
834. Cf. Potts v. Coe, 145 F .2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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The necessity for big government is not grounds for a
counsel of despair, nor for resorting only to the hope that the
despot will be benevolent. This, in fact, is the whole point of
the limitation doctrine as enunciated herein-individual ·rights and
community interests as propounded and enforced by the state can
be balanced other than quantitatively. This, as has been said
(and, it is hoped, to some extent demonstrated) is the aspiration
of administrative law. Recognizing the indispensability of big
government, its mission, in effect, is "to govern the governors,"
to accord the counterweight to government power.
B. Form and Substance
Theoretically, at least, the rule of limitation has significance to all three levels of government in this country. The exercise of power can be arbitrary and capricious regardless of
the geographical area affected. Furthermore, government is designed, in our system, to be the servant, not the master, of the
people. And, this is true regardless of whether its particular
manifestation be federal, state, or local in scope. Thus, the
limiting objectives of administrative law have application to municipal administration, no less than to its counterparts at the
higher governing levels.
As has been seen, however, the specific embodiments of
the limitation principle manifest different forms at each of the
three levels of government. The requirement of standards, all
but emasculated as a check upon federal administration, retains
somewhat more vitality in the states and is of great consequence
locally. On the other hand, procedural checks (or, alternatively,
individual safeguards) imposed by general legislation have replaced the need for strict standards at the federal level. The
states, it will be recalled, stand somewhere in between; where
procedural statutes of the nature of the Administrative Procedure
Act are in operation, the requirement of standards is correspondingly mitigated. Where no such acts exist, the requirement
remains of importance.
The form, therefore, is not the crucial concern. The substance of restraint is volatile and capable of many shapes. The
important thing is that limitation, whether in the guise of the
separation of powers, administrative procedure acts, an expanded
scope of judicial review, or whatever, be affirmatively employed
to prevent the exercise of arbitrary, unrestrained power. Government, it cannot be emphasized enough, is the agent of the individual, not his principal.
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Such is by no means to suggest that the government should
be hamstrung with restrictions to the point of rendering its proper operation impossible. The needs of defense and service require a vigorous, positive governmental mechanism. This is to
suggest, however, that the fundamental basis of our governmental
philosophy-the inherent worth of the individual, that the very objective of government is to protect and promote his self-attainment and realization-be not submerged in the murky waters of
a "Garrison-Service State." Balance there must be, but with
power should go limitation, else power is corrupted and the purpose of its giving, prostituted beyond recognition.
C. Realigning the Balance
The gargantuan rise of big government (federal, state, and
local) as has been said, has represented a necessary response
to the conditions of the times. And, new needs, in turn, generate
argument as to the utility of the time-honored governmental concepts erected in days when needs were simpler and problems less
severe. Thus, to some observers the political models attendant
at the incipiency of our nation should be scrapped, as inadequate
to cope with the realities of the twentieth century .835 Others,
seeking in the traditions of the past security in these troubled
times, cling tenaciously to the ancient theories, regarding even
the slightest question as to their current applicability to be an
assault on everything they hold dear and precious.836
The point is that the modes of limitation are but means of
actualizing the substance of the limitation doctrine itself. The
central objective, in this context, is that government be "for the
people." If this means that modern conditions compel that the
separation of powers idea be obviated as regards federal administrative agencies, and a general act prescribing procedural limitations be constructed in its place, no great deviation would appear to be required as to ends, as to fundamental theories of our
governmental complex. Limited government is still the goal and
is still achievable. Only its form has been altered, more adequately to adjust to the realities of the times. This, as indicated, is, likewise, the direction of state development.
Municipal administration, however, which never embraced
fully the separation idea to begin with, has evolved differently.
835. Cf. Laski, "The Obsolescence of Federalism," 97 New Republic
367 (May 3, 1939).
836. Cf. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (1960).
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from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision. If
under the terms of the statute or ordinance governing the procedure before an administrative agency an administrative decision
becomes final because of failure to file any qocument in the nature of objections, protests, petition for hearing, or application
for administrative review within the time allowed by such statute
or ordinance, such decision shall not be subject to judicial review hereunder excepting only for the purpose of questioning the
jurisdiction of the administrative agency over the person or subject matter.
Section 3. [Comlll_encement of Action.]
(1) Every action to review a final administrative decision
shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance
of summons within thirty days from the date that a copy of the
decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby.
(2) The method of service of the decision shall be as provided in the statute or ordinance governing the procedure before
the administrative agency, but if no method is provided, a decision shall be deemed to have been served either when personally
delivered or when deposited in the United States mail, in a
sealed envelope or package, with postage prepaid, addressed to
the party affected thereby at his last known residence or place
of business.
Section 4. [ Jurisdiction and Venue.]
(1) Jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions is
vested in the. • . • . . • . . . . . [Insert name of appropriate
Court.] If the venue of the action to review a final administrative decision is expressly prescribed in the particular statute or
ordinance under authority of which the decision was made, such
venue shall control, but if the venue is not so prescribed, an action to review a final administrative decision may be commenced
in the County Court in which the relevant Municipal Corporation
is situated.
Section 5. [Service of Summons.]
(1) Summons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served
by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and
each of the defendants as in civil cases.
Section 6. (Appearance of Defendants.]
(1) In any action to review any final decision of any administrative agency, the agency shall appear by filing an answer
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consisting of a record of the proceedings had before it, or a
written motion in the cause or a written appearance. All other
defendants may appear by filing a written motion, answer or appearance.
(2) Every motion, answer or appearance shall be filed within twenty days after service of summons upon said defendant.
Section 7. [ Defendants.]
(1) In any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other
than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings
before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.
Section 8. [Pleadings and Record on Review.]
(1) Complaint. The complaint shall contain a statement of
the decision or part thereof sought to be reviewed, as well as the
grounds upon which the complaint seeks reversal or affirmative
action. Upon motion of any defendant, or upon its own motion,
the court may require of the plaintiff a specification of the errors
relied upon for reversal or the specific grounds upon which affirmative agency action is sought to be required.
(2) Answer. Except as herein otherwise provided, the administrative agency shall file an answer which shall consist of
the original or a certified copy of the entire record of proceedings under review, including such evidence as may have been
heard by it and the findings and decisions made by it. By order
of court or by stipulations of all parties to the review, the record may be shortened by the elimination of any portion thereof.
(3) Record after Remand. If the cause is remanded to the
administrative agency and a review shall thereafter be sought of
the administrative decision, the original and supplemental record,
or so much thereof as shall be determined by court order or the
stipplation of all the parties, shall constitute the record on review.
Section 9. [Scope of Review.]
(1) Every action to review any final administrative decision
shall be heard and determined by the court with all convenient
speed.
(2) The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law presented by the entire record before the court. If
the agency has afforded to the affected party an opportunity to
present testimony, questions of fact may be overturned only in
the event of patently arbitrary and capricious agency action.
Where no such opportunity to present testimony has been afforded, questions of fact are fully reviewable.
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Section 10. [Powers of the Court.]
(1) The Court shall have power:
(a) with or without requiring bond, and before or after
answer is filed, upon notice to the agency and for good cause
shown, to stay the decision of the administrative agency in whole
or in part pending the final disposition of the case;
(b) to make any order that it deems proper for the
amendment, completion, or filing of the record of proceedings of
the administrative agency;
(c) to allow substitution of parties by reason of marriage, death, bankruptcy, assignment, or other cause;
(d) to dismiss parties or to realign plaintiffs and defendants;
(e) to affirm or reverse the decision in whole or in
part;
(f) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to reverse and remand the decision in whole or in part, and, in such
case, to state the questions requiring further hearing or proceedings, and to give such other instructions as may be proper;
(g) where a hearing has been held by the agency, to remand for the purpose of taking additional evidence when from the
state of the record of the administrative agency or otherwise it
shall appear that such action is just;
(h) in case of affirmance or partial affirmance of an administrative decision which requires the payment of money, to
' enter judgment for the amount justified by the record and for
costs, upon which execution may issue as in other cases.
(2) Technical errors in the proceedings before the administrative agency or its failure to observe the technical rules of
evidence shall not constitute grounds for reversal of the administrative decision unless it appears to the court that such error
or failure materially affected the rights of any party and resulted
in substantial injustice to him.
(3) On motion of either party, the court shall make findings
of fact or state the propositions of law upon which its judgment
is based.
Section 11. [Appellate Review.]
(1) Any final decision, order, judgment, or decree entered
pursuant hereto may be appealed as in other civil cases.
Section 12. [Effective Date.]
(1) The provisions of this Act are applicable only to such
actions as may arise after the effective date hereof.
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RULE-MAK!NG

Model

State Act

Ariz.

Cal.

Colo.

!II.

lnd.

Md.

11001

1

41-1001,
12-901

11371;
11500

3-16-1

264.l

2

244

§ lOOl(a)

1(1)

41-1001,
12-901

1137l(a);
11500

3-16-1

264.1

2

244(a)

§ lOOl(c)

1(7)

41-1001

1137l(b);
ll500

3-16-1

266.3

-

244(b)

''Contested case• or
similar term

§IOOl(d)

1(2)

41-1001

1137l(c);
11500

3-16-1

264.l

2

244(c)

Requirements for
adoption of rules

§1003

3

41-1002

11374;
11420

3-16-2

-

245

1~ Definitions
"Agency"
11

a.

Federal
Act

Rule11 or "Regulation''

-

Formal & informal
procedure
To supplement rules

§

1002(a)

-

3

-

-

-

-

3

with descriptive

245{a)

-

245(b)

-

245(0)

statements
Prior to adoption to
give notice of intended
action and afford heartng to interested
parties
3. FU!ng and tal,;ing
effect of rules

Effective upon filing

Effective after no. of
days after filing
Emergencies or exceptions

4. Publication of rules
By Sec. of State

Perfod\o Bulletin fol'
new rule.a
Discretion to omit
some if otherwise
available

i 1003

3(a)

41-1002

11423

i I003(c)

4

41-1004,
41-1006

11380;
11422

114Zl(b)

-

-

-

5

41-1006

11409

3-16-2
(11)

-

247

5(a)

41-1006

11409

5(b)

-

11409

-

-

5(c)

-

11409

-

-

H002

I 1002{a)

4(b)(2)

-

-

-

-

246(b)

-

247(a)

247(b)

-

247(c)

247(a)

-

-

11382.5;
11409.5

3-16-2
(9)(11)

-

-

-

11426

3-16-2

-

-

248

6

-

11426

-

-

248

-

6

-

-

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

41-1006

5. Petition for adoption of
rulea

§1003(d)

s

§1003(d)

may petition

for clearance

246

41-1003

-

5(d)

6. Additional :requirements

-

-

-

5(a)

Reconsideration

-

20 da.

11002(1,)

Any interested person

-

30 da.

-

30 da.

Availability of compUations. & bulletins

Periodic revis ion

3-16-2
(3)(4)

Approval of Att'y Gen.
as to form & legality
before rule effective

-

Legislative review

-

134

(7)
3-16-2
(7)
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Mich.

Minn.

Mo.

N.D,

Ohio

Ore.

Pa.

Va.

Wis.

1

24.101

15 .0411

536,010

28.3201

119.01

183.310

1710.2

9-6.2

227 .01

1

1(2)

24.101

15.0411

536.010

28.3201

119.01

183.310

1710.2b

9-6.2

227 .01

1(1)

1(5)

24.101

15.0411

536.010

28.3201

119.01

183.310

1710.2e

9-6.2

227 .01

-

1(1)

24.101

15.0411

536.010

-

119.01

1&3.310

1710.2a

9-6.2

227 .01

-

2, 3

24.102

15.0412

-

-

119.03

183.330

-

9-6.4

-

-

9

24.102

15.0412

-

-

-

183.330

-

-

-

-

6

-

15.0412

-

-

-

183.330

-

9-6.3

-

-

3(2), 2(1)

-

15.0412

-

-

119.03

183.330

1710.21

9-6.4;
9-6.6

-

-

9-6.7

227 .023

-

9-6.7(c)

227 .026

Mass.

5

24.72

15.0412,
13

536.020

28.3203

119.04

183.350

1710.21

5

24.74

15.0413

-

28.3203

-

-

-

-

-

Mun.Act

227 .026

-

-

10 da.

-

10 da.

10 da.

-

-

-

9-6.5

227 .026

-

9-6. 7(b)

227 .025

-

227 .025;
227 .024

-

2(3), 3(3)

24.75

-

536.020

-

119.03

-

6

24.76

15.0414;
15.047

536.030

28.3203

119.05

183.360

1710.21a

6

24.76

15.046

536.030

-

-

183.360

1710.21a

24.76

15.047

536.030

-

-

183,360

-

-

-

-

15.0414;
15.047

-

-

-

183.360

-

-

-

-

183.360

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

24.76

15 .0414

536.030

-

-

6

24.78

15.047;
15.0414

536.030

28.3203

119.05

4

24.103

15.0415

536.041

-

-

183.390

-

9-6.8

227 .015

-

4

24.103

15.0415

536.040

-

-

183.390

-

9-6.8

227 .015

-

-

-

183.360;
183.370

1710.21a

-

-

28.3204

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

24. 72

-

-

28.3202

-

-

1710.21

9-6.9

-

-

-

24.72

15.0412

-

28.3202

-

-

1710.21

-

-

-

-

24.71(b);
24.78(b)
(c)(d)(e)

-

-

-

-

-

-

9-6.9

-

-

-
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APPENDIX II
ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION

Federal
Act

1. Declaratory judgment on
validity of rules by
court

I 1009(b)(d)

2. Petition for agency
declaratory ruling
3. Duty of agency in

Model
State Act

Ariz.

Cal.

7

41-1007

11440

§1004(d)

8

-

-

§ 1004

9

-

11512

3-16-4

-

3

251

Notice to party

§ 1004(a)

9(a)-(b)

-

11509

3-16-14(2)

251

§1004(a)

9(a)

11508

3-16-4(3)

5,6

251

9(e)

-

-

-

-

5,6

Hearing before agency

9

251

§ 1004(b)

9(d)

-

-

-

-

4

251

contested cases

-

Agency to prepare
official record
Informal disposition,

settlement, etc.

Ill.

Ind,

-

-

-

249

-

-

-

250

Colo.

Md.

§ 1006

10

-

11513

3-16-4(7)

-

7,8

252

Effect given to evidence
of probative value

§1006(c)

10(1)

-

11513

-

-

8

252(a)

Based on evidence in
record

§ 1006(d)

-

-

11517

3-16-4(8)

-

8

252(b)

Right to cross examine
and to submit rebuttal

§

1006(c)

10(3)

-

11513

3-16-4(7)

-

8

252(c)

"Official notice"

§

1006(d)

10(4)

-

11513

3-16-4(8)

-

-

§

1007

11

-

11517

-

-

12

253

6. Decisions and orders
must be in writing.
and parties notified in
person or by mail

I 1006(d)

12

-

11518

-

-

-

254

7. Hearing officers or
examiners

§1010

-

11502,
11512,
11521

3-16-4(3)

-

-

4. Rules of evidence

5. Examination of evidence·
by agency, if agency

252(d)

has not heard or read
all the evidence: Pro12:Qsed decision (must
be served and opportunity afforded party
to submit exceptions
and arguments)

-
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Pa.

Ohio

Ore.

-

-

183.400

-

-

-

183.410

-

28.3205

119.06

183.420

1710.31

536.067

28 .3205

119.07

183.420

536.063

28.3205

119.07

183.420

15.0418

536.063; 67

28.3206

119.09

183.420

15.0418

536.060

-

-

24.105

15.0419

536.070

28.3206

24.105(1)

15.0419

536.070

28.3206

11(4)

24.105(2)

15.0419

536.070

11(3)

24.105(3)

15.0419

11(5)

24.105(4)

11(7)

Mo.

Model
Mun. Act

Va.

Wis.

9-6.9(a)

227 .05

-

227 .06

-

9-6.10

227 .07

-

1710.31

9-6.10

227.09

1710.31

9-6.10

227.07

1710.31

-

227.11

-

183.420

-

-

-

-

119.09

183.450

1710.32

9-6.11

227 .10

-

-

183.450

1710.32

9!-.6.11

227 .10(1)

28 .3206

-

183.450

-

9-6.ll(d)

-

-

536.070

28.3207

119.09

183.450

1710.32

9-6.ll(c)

-

-

15.0419

536.070

28.3207

-

183 .450

-

-

227 .10(3)

-

24.106

15.0421

536.080

-

119.09

183.460

-

-

227.12

-

11(8)

24.107

15.0422

536.090

28.3212

119.09

183.470

1710.34

9-6.12

227 .13

-

-

-

-

-

-

119.09

-

-

-

-

-

Mich.

Minn.

7

-

15.0416

8

-

-

-

10

24.104

15.0418

536.063; 67

10,11

24.104

15.0418

10,11

24.104

15.0418

11(6)

24.104

-

24.104

11(2)
11(2)

Mass.

N.D.

536.050
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APPENDIX
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Federal
Act

Initial Judicial Review

§1009

1. Any person aggrieved

§

1009(a)

Model

State Act

Ariz.

m
Cal.

Colo.

Ill.

Ind.

Md.

15

12-904

11440;
11523

3-16-5

265.2

14

255

15(a)

12-904

11523

3-16-5(3)

267.4

14

255(a)

35 da.

30 da.

-

35 da.

15 da . 30 da.

-

by final agency action
entitled to

2. Time party has to
institute court review

-

30 da.

3. Time allowed agency
to submit record to

-

30 da.

-

30 da.

-

§ 1009(d)

15(c)

12-911

11519

3-16-5(5)

5. Conditions for presenting
additional evidence

-

15(e)

12-910

-

3-16-5(6)

6. Court review to be
without jury and confined to record except
for procedural irregulartties

-

15(!)

-

-

-

7. What action court may
take:

§ 1009(e)

15(g)

12-911

-

a) Affirm or remand to
agency

-

15(g)

12-911

b) Reverse or modify
If substantial rights
of the party are
prejudiced because the
administrative action

-

15(g)

-

30 da.

275.12(a)

17;26

255(c)

274.11;
275.12

15

255(e)

-

18

255(!)

3-16-5(7)

274.11

18

255(g)

-

3-16-5(7)

275.12

18

255(g)

-

-

3-16-5(7)

275.12

18

255(g)

court

4. Filing of petition for
review not to stay
agency decision, but it
may be granted

(1) Violates constitution

§ 1009(e)

15(g)(l)

-

-

3-16-5(7)

-

18

255(g)(l)

(2) Exceeds statute or

§1009(e)

15(g)(2)

-

-

3-16-5(7)

-

18

255(g)(2)

(3) Is made on unlawful procedure

§ 1009(e)

15(g)(3)

-

3-16-5(7)

-

18

255(g)(3)

(4) Involves other

§ 1009(e)

15(g)(4)

-

-

3-16-5(7)

-

-

255(g)(5)

1009(e)

15(g)(5)

-

-

3-16-5(7)

-

18

255(g)(5)

§ 1009(e)

15(g)(6)

-

-

3-16-5(7)

-

18

255(g)(8)

I 1009(d)

16

12-913

-

3-16-5(7)

276.13

19

256

agency jurisdiction

-

error of law
(5) Is tmSupported
by competent, ma-

§

terial and substantiat evidence
in view of entire
record
(6) Is arbitrary and
capricious
Appellate Review
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Mass.

Mich.

Minn.

Mo.

N.D.

Ohio

Ore.

Pa.

Va.

Wis.

Model
Mun.Act

7; 14

24.108

-

536.100

28.3215

119.11;
119.12

183.480

1710.41

9-6.13

227 .15

1-10

14

24.108(1)

-

536.100

28.3215

119.11

183.480

1710.41

9-6.13

227.16

1(2)

30 da.

30 da.

-

30 da.

30 da.

15 da.

60 da.

30 da.

30 da.

30 da.

30 da.

40 da.

30 da.

-

30 da.

30 da.

10 da.

30 da.

30 da.

30 da.

30 da.

20 da.

-

536.120

28.3220

119.11;
119.12

183.480

1710.43

9-6.13(h)

227.17

lO(l)(a)

9(2)

14(3)

-

14(7)

24.108(4)

-

536.130(3)

28.3218

119.12

183.480

-

9-6.13(1)

227.19

14(6)

24.108(5)

-

536.140(1)

28.3219

119.12

183.480

1710.44

9-613(1)

227.20

14

24.108(6)

15.0417

536.140(5)

28.3219

119.12

183.480

1710.44

9-6.13(g)

227.20

10

14(8)

24.108(6)

15.0417

536.140(5)

28.3219

119,12

183.480

1710.44

9-6.13{g)

227.20

lO(l)(e)

14(8)

24.108(6)

15.0417

536.140(5)

28.3219

119.12

183.480

1710.44

9-6.13{g)

227 .20

lO(l)(e);
10(1)(1)

14(8)(a)

24.108(6)

15.0417

536.140(2)

28.3219

-

-

1710.44

9-6.13{g)

227 .20

-

14(8)(h)

24.108(6)

15.0417

536.140(2)

28.3219

119.12

-

1710.44

9-6.13{g)

227 .20

-

14(8){d)

24.108(6)

15.0417

536.140(2)

28.3219

-

-

1710.44

9-6.13{g)

227.20

-

14(8)(c)

24.108(6)

-

536.140(2)

28.3219

-

-

-

9-6.13(g)

227.20

14(8)(e)

24.108(6)

-

536.140(2)

28.3219

119.12

-

1710.44

9-6.13(g)

227.20

14(8)(g)

24.108(6)

-

536.140(2)

-

-

-

-

9-6.13{g)

227 .20

9(6)

15; 16

24.109

-

526.140 (6)

28.3221

119.12

183.500

9-6.14

227.21

11
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1710.45;
1710.46

-

9(2)

-

